How can terrorism be deterred? With violence! This answer seems tobe obviously right, because terrorism has »a connotation of evil, indiscriminateviolence, or brutality« (Lutz, 2004: 9). How can one negotiatewith terrorists like Usama bin Laden or Hassan Nasrallah who kill innocent men, women and children? This proposition is, at the very least,absurd. Right?I believe that the real absurdity is not an alternative security strategy
– even one that relies on negotiating with terrorists – but a security architecture that rests first and foremost on the threat of massive military force.»Coercion or negative sanctions are found to have little effect [on terrorism, A.B.] and, in important instances, are even counterproductive« (Frey,2004: IX). That is something we could have learnt from everyday experiencein Israel, Palestine, Iraq, and, of course, from the (failed) attacks onAmerican and European cities. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu puts it:»Retaliation against a suicide bomber only gives rise to more suicide bombers« (quoted in Govier, 2002: 94). In other words: fighting terrorismby force is of no use; it does not even have a deterrent effect. On thecontrary, the employment of massive military force makes it easier for terroriststo justify their attacks, to find broad support, and to recruit newfollowers.
Nonetheless, if we are talking about fighting terrorism, we are talkingabout fighting terrorism by force. The security policy of the usa is theprime but not the only example.1French President Jacques Chirac de1.The national budget for weapons and security under President George W. Bushhas received »the largest increases in funding since the Reagan Administration,and this Budget builds upon that record. The 2006 request represents a 41-percentincrease over 2001, and a 4.8-percent increase over 2005. The Departmenthas used these resources to transform our Nation’s military capabilities to meet futurethreats, to improve the quality of life for our troops and their families, and tofight the Global War on Terror« (www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/pdf/budget/defense.pdf, p.3). In 2006, spending increased overall to usd 419.3 billion.
clared at the beginning of 2006 that his country was prepared to launcha nuclear strike against any country that sponsors a terrorist attack thatthreatens French interests – a threat the usa added to its security strategyas early as 2005.2 And Israel has been fighting the threat of Palestinianterrorism for decades and a few weeks ago started its own »War on Terrorism«against Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah’s Hizbollah. »A war Hizbollahhas already won,« as Zaid Al-Ali explains on »opendemocracy.«3Hizbollahwas able to hold its own on Lebanese territory and defend itself inspite of Israel’s massive military efforts. But most of all Hizbollah wonbecause Israel’s attacks killed hundreds of innocent people, thereby notonly increasing public support for the organization but also helping it torecruit new fighters.Underlying all these measures is the contemporary concept of deterrence,based on warding off the threat of (global) terrorism with enormousmilitary power and strength. In contrast to the Cold War, whendeterrence meant the credible threat of retaliation in case of an attack, itnow encompasses the threat of preemptive self-defense.4However, both retaliation and preemption need a real target, such asthe ussr during the Cold War. In his »Mutual Deterrence« speech Secretaryof Defense Robert McNamara explained in 1967 that »if the UnitedStates is to deter a nuclear attack […], it must possess an actual and acredible assured-destruction capability.«5As defined by McNamara, thismeant the capability »to destroy 50 percent of its [the ussr’s] populationand industry in a retaliatory strike« (Lebow, 1994: 349).
- »Here [to influence terrorists] deterrence [i.e. nuclear deterrence] may be directedat states that support their efforts as well as the terrorist organization itself« (Doctrinefor Joint Nuclear Operations, March 2005, under: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/jp3_12fc2.pdf, p. 21). Note that »[t]he us does notmake positive statements defining the circumstances under which it would usenuclear weapons« (ibid., p. 22).
- Zaid Al-Ali: »Whatever happens, Hizbollah has already won,« on: www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-middle_east_politics/hizbollah_victory_3809.jsp.
- »The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to countera sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater isthe risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory actionto defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of theenemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, theUnited States will, if necessary, act preemptively« (»The National Security Strategyof the usa«, September 2002, under: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, p. 19).
- »Mutual Deterrence« Speech by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, under:http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml.
I will not discuss the internal problems of any deterrence strategy, suchas: What is an (unprovoked) attack and what is merely a defensive measure?6How can both sides be sure they are speaking the same language(cf. Jervis, 1976: 356–82; Morgan, 2003: 42–78; Davis: 2000, 10–25)? – butlet us focus on the essential problem: Terrorism cannot be deterred.Why?First, a terrorist organization like al Qaeda has no territory (on whichit could be attacked) and it has no population and no infrastructure (thatcould be killed or destroyed). Al-Qaeda is invisible. Its training campsand headquarters in Afghanistan have apparently been hit by the Americanwar machine – but not the network itself. Al Qaeda is an ideology:followers join it, believe in it and fight for it, but they do not settle withinit, unlike a state. Al Qaeda can be anyone and everywhere. That is oneadvantage of a terrorist organization over a conventional military power.Al Qaeda is never ultimately threatened because its invisibility makes thethreat of retaliation and preemption less credible.The same applies to an organization like Hizbollah. Maybe one canargue, as Israel does, that it has a territory from where it launches its attacksand where it can be hit (a conviction the usa also holds7). However,in this way Hizbollah as such is not affected. Instead, merely its campsand rocket launchers but unavoidably also the Lebanese people are hit.Holding innocent men, women and children collectively liable for violentacts for which they are not responsible8 will surely foster the beliefthat Hizbollah is fighting a necessary and justified war.This means, generally speaking, that attacking countries which are undersuspicion of supporting or harboring terrorists will only strengthenthe ideology these organizations stand for. In other words, these attacks
- The »War on Terrorism« can easily be used as evidence for a crusade againstIslam and terror attacks can be used as an argument to expand the »War on Terrorism.«
- The »National Security Strategy« (nss), published in March 2006, is decisive:»The United States and its allies in the War on Terror make no distinction betweenthose who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor them, becausethey are equally guilty of murder« (www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf, p. 17, italics added).
- Or do we really want to argue that the Lebanese people are collectively responsiblebecause they support this organization or at least did not resist it? But then we haveto accept that the same applies to us: that citizens of democratic states are held collectivelyresponsible for the acts of th
give terrorists a pretext for their attacks and make it easier for people tobelieve in their ideology and justifications.Secondly, the threat of death and destruction has no purchase on someonewho is willing to sacrifice his or her life in a suicide bombing.I will pose a simple question to back my thesis: Has the world becomemore secure because of the »War(s) on Terrorism«? I don’t think so. Butthat is something we could have learned from the Cold War: deterrenceleads to more insecurity.9 The same holds true of the fight against terrorism:»Deterrence is based on a negative approach: terrorists are threatenedwith punishment if they continue their activities. Coercive action isanswered by coercive action. Such interaction tends to degenerate into anegative sum game between the parties involved, making each of themworse off: both countries engaging in the coercive response and the terroristslose« (Frey, 2004: 34 – italics in original). The conclusion is clearenough: Deterrence (even when combined with preemption) is neitherthe right nor an adequate answer to the threat of terrorism.To reduce the threat of terrorism we must reduce people’s willingnessto engage in terrorism. Our »line of defense« must run through areaswhere we know (and fear) that new terrorists will be recruited: the lesssupport is offered to extremists like Usama bin Laden, the lower the dangerof additional attacks. But how can this be achieved if not by negotiations?If we are willing to negotiate with terrorists we open up a window ofopportunity for them to attain some of their objectives in a peaceful way.We can reward them if they are cooperative – for example, by instigatinga ceasefire or releasing hostages – by accepting them as a negotiating partner.But this should not be misinterpreted to mean that we should acknowledgeall their objectives or accept all their actions. It means merelyoffering them the same reward as that offered to rogue states like Libya:becoming a negotiating partner. And offering terrorists and their supportersa real and credible chance of achieving some of their objectives withoutviolence will challenge the terrorists’ claim that they have no other choicethan to use deadly force. Of course, there always will be some supportersof violence for the sake of violence. But it will become more difficult foran organization to find support and to recruit new followers for its violent
convincingargument. By offering negotiations to terrorists, even when it seemstaboo,10 we start to fight terrorism at its source: in a setting where violenceis perceived, for whatever reason, as the only option.This is not utopian: »In the Netherlands, for example, terrorist sympathizersare granted access to the media to a considerable extent. As aconsequence, they do not have to turn to illegal means, and possiblybloodshed, in order to communicate their views« (Frey, 2004: 111). InSwitzerland the »Front de Libération Jurassien,« that used violence in the1960s for the independence of the Bernese Jura, was even integrated intothe political process. The Swiss government agreed to hold a referendumon the future of the Bernese Jura and the attacks decreased immediately.The majority voted against independence. And when the »Front« attemptedto recommence the struggle, »they lost popular support andsoon ceased to exist« (Frey, 2004: 112).One may object that it is impossible to negotiate with, say, al Qaedaor Hizbollah, because they make unrealizable claims. But of course innegotiations demands are never completely realized. Which objectiveswill be realized and to what extent is a matter of negotiation. And evenorganizations like al Qaeda or Hizbollah have demands that could bepartially realized: for example, both justify their attacks with reference,among other things, to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. An offer to negotiatecould be based, for example, on Security Council Resolutions 24211and 154412 and link the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state with anunconditional commitment to acknowledge and respect Israel’s right toexist.
- As Frey notes, both the usa and Israel, that officially follow a strict policy of nonegotiations with terrorists, at times make an exception to that rule and negotiateon the freeing of hostages (see Frey, 2004: 58–59).
- »Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territory occupied in the recent conflict[…]«, under: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nro/240/94/img/nr024094.pdf?OpenElement.
- »Reiterating the obligation of Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulouslyby its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Conventionrelative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,Calling on Israel to address its security needs within the boundaries of internationallaw, Expressing its grave concern at the continued deterioration of the situationon the ground in the territory occupied by Israel since 1967 […]«, under:http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/N04/357/21/pdf/N0435721.pdf?OpenElement, italics in original.
A second objection, as an author suggests in The Conservative Voice, isthat negotiations with terrorists are futile because they have no interestin keeping their part of the bargain, and they are not honest about theirwishes. That means, »killing terrorists is the only practical means ofcoping with them.«13But even if these objections are correct, they do not invalidate myargument. As mentioned above, negotiations tend not so much to influencethe terrorists as their supporters and environment. Attempts tosatisfy some terrorist objectives peacefully will, in the long run, reducesupport for and belief in the need to use violence. And, unlike the demandto hunt terrorists down, the offer to negotiate will not provokemore violence. It is rather a rational attempt to break the vicious circle inwhich violence only causes more violence.However, an alternative security strategy that relies on negotiationwith terrorists is hard to imagine – at least as an official strategy. PresidentBush meets with Usama bin Laden (or his successor) to negotiate theconditions of a ceasefire. Handshake, cameras flash, incredible.But why are negotiations with terrorists so hard to imagine; why dothey seem to be taboo?Do we not negotiate even with rogue states that support or harborterrorists, or disregard human rights and international treaties. To put itbluntly: Are we going to stop talking with Iran or North Korea andbomb their nuclear facilities? No, of course not. Talking to rogue statesis not to be condemned, but something we expect from responsible politicians.What about negotiations with, say, Muammar al-Ghaddafi? Libya’sinvolvement with and support for terrorism were confirmed in the late1980s. It delivered weapons to the ira and masterminded the bomb attackon Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie on December 21, 1988, whichkilled 270 people, everyone on the airplane plus eleven inhabitants ofLockerbie. Libya was a rogue state and its revolutionary leader a supporterof terrorism. Nevertheless, in 1997 South African President Nelson Mandelaand un Secretary-General Kofi Annan negotiated the repatriation oftwo Libyan suspects involved in the attack to the Netherlands for trialunder Scottish law. In return, un economic sanctions were suspended.Of course, one may object that this was just a »pawn sacrifice« becauseGaddafi went unpunished. However, Gaddafi stopped supporting ter
orism and became a moderate Arab leader, becoming involved in thesearch for a peaceful solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, a metamorphosisthat even the usa has acknowledged. On May 15, 2006 the usState Department announced that it would restore full diplomatic relationswith Libya and that it would be removed from the list of nationsthat support terrorism.14Negotiations with Gaddafi have been vindicated, having reduced thethreat of terrorism. That is surely a positive outcome, regardless of thefact that Gaddafi can be viewed as having been »rewarded« to some extent.
In the end we have to ask ourselves, what is more dubious: negotiatingwith terrorists or fighting them?BibliographyDavis, James W.: Threat and Promises. The Pursuit of International Influence, Baltimore2000.Frey, Bruno S.: Dealing with Terrorism – Stick or Carrot? London 2004.Govier, Trudy: A Delicate Balance. What Philosophy Can Tell Us about Terrorism, Oxford2002.Jervis, Rovert: Perception and Misperception in International Relations, Princeton 1976.Lebow, Richard Ned: We All Lost the Cold War, Princeton 1994.Lutz, James M., and Brenda Lutz: Global Terrorism, London 2004.Morgan, Patrick M.: Deterrence Now, Cambridge 2003.