The National Interest, 2020
Qatari influence and Somalia President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo’s over-reliance on Doha have reversed years of security progress.
by Abdullahi Mohamed Ali
Somalis, both at home and abroad, were optimistic when Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo was elected Somalia’s president in February 2017. Diplomats and the development community shared this optimism, believing Farmajo to be honest, energetic, and reformist. Forty months’ of Farmajo’s rule shows that initial optimism to be misplaced if not naïve. Today, Somalia is in a far worse state than it was before he took the helm. Security is dire; the economy has collapsed; federal states are alienated; and foreign policy is unfocused. Additionally, national institutions have been paralyzed while the coronavirus is slowly ravaging the population. At this point, Mogadishu is in lockdown more because of growing terror threats than public health.
It did not have to get so bad. Somalia’s woes largely stem from the unholy alliance which Farmajo made with Qatar, and the malign influence the Gulf state exerts on almost every facet of Somali politics and diplomacy. Somali people now talk about how Qatar’s desire to wage a proxy war against other regional powers shapes Somali foreign policy. As most states emerge from conflict and failure, they seek to establish broad-based relations. At Qatar’s behest, Farmajo, however, has downgraded its deep, strategic, and historic relationship with other Gulf states and Egypt. This move made Somalia even more dependent on Qatar which, ironically, then failed to fulfill the projects it promised for Somalia.
An even greater tragedy for the Somali people is how Qatari influence and Farmajo’s over-reliance on Doha reversed years of security progress. It was at Qatar’s suggestion that Farmajo appointed his Svengali, Fahad Yassin, to head Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) even though Yassin, a former Al Jazeera journalist, had no security or intelligence background. Under Qatari tutelage, Yassin dismantled key pillars of the agency, systematically and methodically replaced professional and experienced operatives with amateur sycophants and effectively served as a clearinghouse for Qatari intelligence operations in the Horn of Africa. NISA operations no longer focus on the battle against Al-Shabaab, and instead are geared to silence political opposition and critical voices in civil society.
Faramjo has eroded the ability of the Somali Armed Forces, which prior to 2017 had made strides to becoming a competent, broad-based, and professional force, to fulfill their legally sanctioned role to defend the Somali people and the state and be a bulwark against the machinations and murderous violence of Al-Shabab and similar radical groups. Instead, they now serve as a paramilitary force and an extension of Yassin’s NISA, and are often used to harass and intimidate political rivals and perceived enemies in the supposedly uncooperative federal member states. Indeed, several terrorist incidents and the recent increased campaign of assassinations that resulted in the killing of two regional governors- Mudug and Nugal in the Puntland region of Somalia appear to have Qatari fingerprints on them. According to the New York Times, an audio leak of a 2019 phone call from the Qatari ambassador in Somalia appears to confirm his direct involvement in a suicide attack that took place in the port city of Bossaso. At best, NISA is incompetent in preventing such actions; at worst, Yassin may have made some individuals complicit.
Qatari meddling in internal Somali politics is equally reprehensible and could undermine Somalia’s future as a functional and viable state. With Qatari support, Farmajo has sought to reverse the federalism which is at the center of Somalia’s post-civil war political order. It has provided financial and logistical resources to impose Farmajo loyalists on reluctant member states. So far the campaign has been successful in the South West State and Galmudug. Farmajo was less successful so far in undermining regional governments in Puntland and Jubba Land. Farmajo and Qatar have also worked to undermine political checks-and-balances in Mogadishu. They have marginalized the senate, and Qatari money channeled through Yasin has corrupted parliament. After the Qatari-financed and the violent ouster of Parliamentary Speaker Mohamed Sheikh Osman “Jawari,” the chamber has become little more than a rubber stamp. Together, these efforts to reassert dictatorial control has galvanized violent opposition and augmented al-Shabab recruitment as Farmajo and Yassin shred trust in nascent structures and compacts. Particularly odious has been the Qatar-financed campaign to destabilize and destroy Somaliland, perhaps the most peaceful and functioning of Somalia’s regions. Previous administrations, regardless of differences with the Somaliland government, considered stability and peaceful coexistence as sacrosanct. For many Somali and non-Somali observers, Somaliland has been both a haven for victims of violence elsewhere in Somalia and a mode for what Somalia might become.
As Farmajo’s term ends, he recognizes that he has become toxic. One-time allies, including Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, are reportedly deserting, while his opponents are galvanized to unseat him. Alas, the desperation to avoid a humiliating defeat may lead to rigging elections due to be held this year or even unconstitutionally extending his term as part of an “emergency” of his own making.
Somalia is a great land that has experienced an unspeakable tragedy. Cold War-era dictatorship under Siad Barre eroded Somalia’s core stability and led to Somalia’s ultimate collapse. Somali people are historically moderate and want better. Unfortunately, Farmajo seeks to become a new Siad Barre. Somalis will never allow it but Qatar’s money and influence have made the possibility sound both alluring and possible. Historically, Somalis are quite moderate. Qatar, meanwhile, for ideological reasons seeks to promote extremism within Somali society. While Qatari resources might have enabled Somalia to rebuild and again become a regional hub for trade and engine for stability, the Qatari government has decided to do the opposite. Its leaders’ vanity could condemn the Horn of Africa to chaos for generations to come.
Of course, it is not enough to blame Qatar alone. Somali political groups must bury their differences and rivalries, and cooperate to thwart Farmajo’s malign ambitions. Somalia, in its current state, cannot survive a second term of a bitter, incompetent, and vengeful Farmajo-led regime. Such an administration flush with Qatari largesse would undermine national sovereignty, subjugate our people and relegate a once-proud nation into the status of a client state presided over by a self-serving puppet. Let all Somalis and peace-loving peoples pray for Somalia to find new leadership that puts Somalia, its people, and its recovery first.
Abdullahi Mohamed Ali is a former director of Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency and former Ambassador to Turkey and the United Kingdom.
As Farmaajo digs in with Qatari backing, Somalia’s election crisis grows worse
February 9, 2021
Guled Ahmed
Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, whose presidential term ended on Feb. 7, 2021, was elected in February 2017 with the hope that he would build on his predecessor’s successes in improving Somalia’s economy and security situation and deliver on his campaign promises of eliminating the terrorist group al-Shabab and ending corruption. Regrettably, he did the opposite and during his time in office corruption worsened, the economy faltered, and security deteriorated, allowing al-Shabab to regain the majority of the territory it lost before his election. Backed by Qatari money, the incumbent president has become increasingly dictatorial, waging wars against the country’s independent media, political opposition, and the federal member states. He replaced three south-central state leaders with his allies to control the federal state electoral board, while setting his eyes on the region of Gedo, which is part of the federal state of Jubaland, with the goal of delegitimizing its leader, Ahmed Madoobe, who he sees as threat to his reelection.
In December 2020, rather than utilizing the Somalia National Army (SNA) and security funding to fight against al-Shabab, Farmaajo instead chose to turn his fire on Kenya, accusing it of meddling in Somalia’s affairs and cutting off diplomatic ties. Skirmishes broke out along the border in an episode reminiscent of Somali dictator Siad Barre’s 1977 conflict with Ethiopia, as Farmaajo manufactured an international border crisis to cover up his attempt to plot a silent coup.
Electoral impasse
On Jan. 9, Farmaajo declared that unilateral elections would be held, excluding Puntland and Jubaland, in violation of the Sept. 17 electoral agreement. Somalia’s donors have urged that partial and parallel elections be avoided and requested the federal state members and the federal government to resolve the election impasse, paving the way for a Dhusamareeb IV election conference. This time around, however, rather than compromising, Farmaajo started demanding control of electoral selection in Gedo and Somaliland, which would give him an easy path to win reelection. Jubaland’s leader Madoobe accepted that Gedo was a special case and should have its own electoral committee, which was unprecedented and unconstitutional but a reasonable comprise from the state leader, with the condition that Farmaajo remove the SNA and clan militias from Gedo and drop his bid to control the selection of the electoral committee for Somaliland
Farmaajo rejected the compromise and left the conference, using the electoral impasse as an excuse to further delay the vote. In doing so, he hoped the Somalia Parliament would give him a default extension, enabling him to cling onto power beyond his term, which has not materialized. With Qatar’s support, he has found little reason to negotiate with other stakeholders or compromise. As a result, for the first time, Somalia has failed to reach an electoral agreement, leading to an ongoing constitutional crisis. In recent weeks, Qatar’s ambassador has held a number of meetings with clan elders and influencers in Mogadishu to pressure them to support the incumbent president.
Doha’s problematic role
On July 22, 2019, The New York Times published the contents of a conversation between Qatar’s ambassador to Somalia, Hassan bin Hamza Hashem, and a Qatari businessman discussing an attack carried out by the Somali terror group al-Shabab in Somalia’s Puntland region and suggesting that they had knowledge of it and may have at least tacitly condoned it. For Somalis who have long suspected that Qatar was supporting terrorism to advance its national security interests in the country, this did not come as a surprise.
Qatar has allegedly used al-Shabab to target groups it has identified as opposing its interests, including Somali politicians critical of Doha’s role in the country and outside actors like the United Arab Emirates. In the past, Qatar has also allegedly funded the government’s attempts to remove noncooperative leaders of Somalia’s federal member states.
Doha has invested considerable effort into meddling in Somalia’s internal politics and has bolstered its own candidates in Somali elections. In both the 2012 and 2017 elections, Qatari money allegedly played a decisive role in influencing the outcomes. In recent years, Qatar has taken a more prominent role in positioning itself as the main backer of the current Somali president.
To date Qatar’s activities in Somalia have not prompted much external condemnation. The U.S. and other Western governments have turned a blind eye to Doha’s destabilizing role, even going so far as to make it an integral part of the international community’s efforts to stabilize the country.
What’s next?
The current instability and political crisis in Somalia are the consequences of Farmaajo’s autocratic government and Qatar’s problematic role. Efforts to resolve the current crisis will end in failure unless partner nations such as the United States address Qatar’s backing for the current government and its alleged ties to al-Shabab. Pressure must be exerted on Qatar to end its involvement in perpetuating the conflict in Somalia.
To date, Somalia’s donors, mainly the EU and the U.S., have not held Farmaajo accountable for failing to hold elections and manufacturing an electoral and constitutional crisis. The lack of clarity in their recent statements creates ambiguity and a political vacuum at an extremely inopportune time, in the midst of a pandemic and humanitarian crisis. This signals to the average person in Somalia that an emboldened al-Shabab may be a better choice as an alternative government, which is the worst thing that could happen to Somalia and the Horn of Africa.
On Jan. 26 people in Mogadishu and across Somalia celebrated the 30th anniversary of the ousting of the ruthless dictator Siad Barre. It is ironic that three decades later it is the citizens of Mogadishu, who have spent billions of dollars of their own money to rebuild with only limited help from outside and lack any political representation, that have a greater commitment to the future success and prosperity of their country than a tribal elder like Farmaajo, who has instead chosen the interests of his clan and Qatar over those of Somalia.
Guled Ahmed is a Non-Resident Scholar with MEI, a renewable energy and water infrastructure expert, and an entrepreneur. The views expressed in this piece are his own.
As Farmaajo digs in with Qatari backing, Somalia’s election crisis grows worse
February 9, 2021
Guled Ahmed
Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, whose presidential term ended on Feb. 7, 2021, was elected in February 2017 with the hope that he would build on his predecessor’s successes in improving Somalia’s economy and security situation and deliver on his campaign promises of eliminating the terrorist group al-Shabab and ending corruption. Regrettably, he did the opposite and during his time in office corruption worsened, the economy faltered, and security deteriorated, allowing al-Shabab to regain the majority of the territory it lost before his election. Backed by Qatari money, the incumbent president has become increasingly dictatorial, waging wars against the country’s independent media, political opposition, and the federal member states. He replaced three south-central state leaders with his allies to control the federal state electoral board, while setting his eyes on the region of Gedo, which is part of the federal state of Jubaland, with the goal of delegitimizing its leader, Ahmed Madoobe, who he sees as threat to his reelection.
In December 2020, rather than utilizing the Somalia National Army (SNA) and security funding to fight against al-Shabab, Farmaajo instead chose to turn his fire on Kenya, accusing it of meddling in Somalia’s affairs and cutting off diplomatic ties. Skirmishes broke out along the border in an episode reminiscent of Somali dictator Siad Barre’s 1977 conflict with Ethiopia, as Farmaajo manufactured an international border crisis to cover up his attempt to plot a silent coup.
Electoral impasse
On Jan. 9, Farmaajo declared that unilateral elections would be held, excluding Puntland and Jubaland, in violation of the Sept. 17 electoral agreement. Somalia’s donors have urged that partial and parallel elections be avoided and requested the federal state members and the federal government to resolve the election impasse, paving the way for a Dhusamareeb IV election conference. This time around, however, rather than compromising, Farmaajo started demanding control of electoral selection in Gedo and Somaliland, which would give him an easy path to win reelection. Jubaland’s leader Madoobe accepted that Gedo was a special case and should have its own electoral committee, which was unprecedented and unconstitutional but a reasonable comprise from the state leader, with the condition that Farmaajo remove the SNA and clan militias from Gedo and drop his bid to control the selection of the electoral committee for Somaliland (which is a self-declared and de facto independent country like Taiwan).
Farmaajo rejected the compromise and left the conference, using the electoral impasse as an excuse to further delay the vote. In doing so, he hoped the Somalia Parliament would give him a default extension, enabling him to cling onto power beyond his term, which has not materialized. With Qatar’s support, he has found little reason to negotiate with other stakeholders or compromise. As a result, for the first time, Somalia has failed to reach an electoral agreement, leading to an ongoing constitutional crisis. In recent weeks, Qatar’s ambassador has held a number of meetings with clan elders and influencers in Mogadishu to pressure them to support the incumbent president.
Doha’s problematic role
On July 22, 2019, The New York Times published the contents of a conversation between Qatar’s ambassador to Somalia, Hassan bin Hamza Hashem, and a Qatari businessman discussing an attack carried out by the Somali terror group al-Shabab in Somalia’s Puntland region and suggesting that they had knowledge of it and may have at least tacitly condoned it. For Somalis who have long suspected that Qatar was supporting terrorism to advance its national security interests in the country, this did not come as a surprise.
Qatar has allegedly used al-Shabab to target groups it has identified as opposing its interests, including Somali politicians critical of Doha’s role in the country and outside actors like the United Arab Emirates. In the past, Qatar has also allegedly funded the government’s attempts to remove noncooperative leaders of Somalia’s federal member states.
Doha has invested considerable effort into meddling in Somalia’s internal politics and has bolstered its own candidates in Somali elections. In both the 2012 and 2017 elections, Qatari money allegedly played a decisive role in influencing the outcomes. In recent years, Qatar has taken a more prominent role in positioning itself as the main backer of the current Somali president.
To date Qatar’s activities in Somalia have not prompted much external condemnation. The U.S. and other Western governments have turned a blind eye to Doha’s destabilizing role, even going so far as to make it an integral part of the international community’s efforts to stabilize the country.
What’s next?
The current instability and political crisis in Somalia are the consequences of Farmaajo’s autocratic government and Qatar’s problematic role. Efforts to resolve the current crisis will end in failure unless partner nations such as the United States address Qatar’s backing for the current government and its alleged ties to al-Shabab. Pressure must be exerted on Qatar to end its involvement in perpetuating the conflict in Somalia.
To date, Somalia’s donors, mainly the EU and the U.S., have not held Farmaajo accountable for failing to hold elections and manufacturing an electoral and constitutional crisis. The lack of clarity in their recent statements creates ambiguity and a political vacuum at an extremely inopportune time, in the midst of a pandemic and humanitarian crisis. This signals to the average person in Somalia that an emboldened al-Shabab may be a better choice as an alternative government, which is the worst thing that could happen to Somalia and the Horn of Africa.
On Jan. 26 people in Mogadishu and across Somalia celebrated the 30th anniversary of the ousting of the ruthless dictator Siad Barre. It is ironic that three decades later it is the citizens of Mogadishu, who have spent billions of dollars of their own money to rebuild with only limited help from outside and lack any political representation, that have a greater commitment to the future success and prosperity of their country than a tribal elder like Farmaajo, who has instead chosen the interests of his clan and Qatar over those of Somalia.
Guled Ahmed is a Non-Resident Scholar with MEI, a renewable energy and water infrastructure expert, and an entrepreneur. The views expressed in this piece are his own.
