The Ethiopia – Somaliland deal

Source: Academy for Peace and Development

By Dr Mohamed Farah Hersi 

Abstract

On January 1st, 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland announced a historic Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which promises to reconfigure the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. The MoU grants Ethiopia access to the sea, in which it will lease 20 kilometers of coastline. In return, Ethiopia has agreed to recognize Somaliland, which also is due to receive a stake in Ethiopian Airlines. 

This agreement has significant implications for the foreign policy of Ethiopia towards Somalia, as it prioritizes its interests and those of Somaliland over historical ties with Somalia. The deal has been met with opposition from the Somalia government, which has declared it null and void. 

However, Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that the recognition marks a significant diplomatic milestone for the country. Relevant foreign actors and multilateral organizations have remained cautious in responding to the agreement, refraining from doing anything that might upset the status quo of Somalia’s de jure authority, while also not explicitly condemning the contents of the agreement. 

The article explores the relationship between this historic MoU and Somaliland’s evolving approach to acquiring long-awaited international recognition, arguing that the Ethio-Somaliland Accord marks a turning point for both countries. The success of the agreement, as long as the international communities support in resolving the potential disagreements arising from its alteration to geopolitical power relations, will determine the future of regional integration and cooperation in the Horn of Africa

Full Report here

1 ContentsAbstract …………………………………. 2Introduction ……………………3

1. Context Background: Somaliland’s Statehood …………………………..4
2. Ethio-Somaliland Deal: Drivers and Players …………………62.1 Ethiopia’s Ambition for Access to the Sea……………………62.2 Somaliland’s Quest for International Recognition……………72.3 United Arab Emirates and its Regional Influence in Horn of Africa …………………..8
3. Somaliland’s Security Dilemma: Regional Security of Horn of Africa in Multipolar WorldOrder ……………………………..9
4. Opportunities…………………….104.1 Berbera Port Utilization……..114.2 Security Cooperation …………114.3 Trade Agreement and Economic Integration …………12
5. External Risks of the Deal for Somaliland…………………………………………………………………………..125.1 Al-Shabaab…………….125.2 Somalia …………………125.3 Egypt………………….135.4 Djibouti ……………14
6. Possible Scenarios ………………..156.1 Scenario I: Ethiopia and Somaliland Succeed through Diplomacy…………………156.2 Scenario II: Somalia and its Allies Win the Diplomatic War……………………176.3 Scenario III: Internal Disagreements between Ethiopia and Somaliland Undermine the MoU..18
7. The Way Forward……………………..18References……………………..212On January 1st, 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland announced a historic Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MoU) which promises to reconfigure the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa. TheMoU grants Ethiopia access to the sea, in which it will lease 20 kilometers of coastline. In return,Ethiopia has agreed to recognize Somaliland, which also is due to receive a stake in EthiopianAirlines. This agreement has significant implications for the foreign policy of Ethiopia towardsSomalia, as it prioritizes its interests and those of Somaliland over historical ties with Somalia. Thedeal has been met with opposition from the Somalia government, which has declared it null andvoid. However, Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that the recognition marks asignificant diplomatic milestone for the country. Relevant foreign actors and multilateralorganizations have remained cautious in responding to the agreement, refraining from doinganything that might upset the status quo of Somalia’s de jure authority, while also not explicitlycondemning the contents of the agreement. The article explores the relationship between thishistoric MoU and Somaliland’s evolving approach to acquiring long-awaited internationalrecognition, arguing that the Ethio-Somaliland Accord marks a turning point for both countries.The success of the agreement, as long as the international communities support in resolving the potential disagreements arising from its alteration to geopolitical power relations, will determinethe future of regional integration and cooperation in the Horn of Africa.Abstract 3On January 1, 2024, President Muse Bihi and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia signed aMemorandum of Understanding (MoU) of Cooperation and Partnership between Somaliland and Ethiopia, granting Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. During the signingceremony in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, Abiy Ahmed stated, “We have agreed with ourSomaliland brothers, and an MoU has been signed today,” (Reuters, 2024). President Muse Bihiof Somaliland declared that in accordance with the agreement, Ethiopia would be the first nationto acknowledge Somaliland’s independence in the near future. (Reuters, 2024).” By signing this Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), Somaliland will lease Ethiopia 20 kilometers of its coastline. In return, Ethiopia will recognize Somaliland and receive a stake in Ethiopian Airlines. This unprecedented agreement, if implemented, promises to alter the status quo of Ethiopia as a landlocked country and Somaliland as a de facto state, two long-pursued goals. The deal constitutes a significantshift in Ethiopia’s foreign policy towards Somalia, with Ethiopia, by formally recognizing Somaliland, signifying that it will prioritize its interests, as well as those of Somaliland, over itshistorical ties with Somalia.Shortly after the agreement was reached, Somalia’s government issued a statement declaring thedeal null and void because of its alleged violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and unity.According to Mogadishu, Somaliland is still considered part of Somalia, and any attempt to enterinto an agreement with it is unlawful. In a statement released by Somalia, “The Somaliagovernment recognizes Ethiopia’s actions as a blatant violation of the sovereignty and territorialintegrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia” (VOA, 2024). In contrast, Somaliland’s Ministry ofForeign Affairs released a statement avowing that “recognition marks a significant diplomaticmilestone for our country’ (VOA, 2024)”. However, it is important to note that Somaliland andSomalia were two separate sovereign states at the outset of decolonization, prior to theirunification under the Somali Republic in 1960, which came to an end in 1991 (historicalcontextual factors are explained below) (VOA, 2024).Several multilateral organizations have taken a stance on the issue, including theIntergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), African Union (AU), European UnionIntroduction4
8. Context Background: Somaliland’s Statehood(EU), Arab League, and Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC). While these organizationsdid not explicitly endorse the annulment of the agreement, they proposed diplomatic dialogueamong all stakeholders. This approach supported Somaliland’s case that international recognitionshould be treated as a regional and international concern, rather than a local issue betweenSomaliland and Somalia. Major powers, including the United States, United Kingdom, Denmark,the Netherlands, Egypt, and Italy, also responded to the agreement, reinforcing their commitmentto Somalia’s territorial integrity and unity while refraining from condemning the content of theagreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia.This article explores the relationship between these developments and Somaliland’s evolvingapproach to acquiring long-awaited international recognition. It argues that the Ethio-SomalilandAccord marks a turning point for both countries, with Somaliland poised to achieve internationalrecognition and Ethiopia securing access to the sea. All signs indicate that the two countries arecommitted to implementing the agreement signed in Addis Ababa on January 1, 2024, and thesuccess of the agreement will determine the future of regional integration and cooperation in theHorn of Africa.Somaliland, a former British protectorate, was governed by the British empire from 1887 until itachieved independence on June 26th, 1960 (Affairs 2016). At the time, colonial intervention haddivided Somali territory into five political entities: British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, FrenchSomaliland, the Ogaden (which came under Ethiopian control), and the Northern FrontierDistrict (which is now part of Kenya). A pan-Somali movement emerged in response to thesedivisions, seeking to unite the territories within a single Somali nation-state. As a result, on July1st, 1960, Somaliland, despite being international recognized as a sovereign, independent state,and Italian Somaliland united to form the Somali Republic, with the aim of incorporating theremaining three Somali territories into an eventual “Greater Somalia”.However, the legality of this union was contested from the beginning. The Act of Union betweenSomaliland and Somalia was never ratified by parliament, resulting in an ongoing legal issue thatcasts doubt on the union’s legality under international law (Somaliland Law, 2006). Ibrahim5Hashi, a renowned legal commentator in Somaliland, posits that the Act of Union was initiallyembraced by Somaliland; however, it failed to gain endorsement from Somalia. This absence ofendorsement rendered the Act of Union devoid of any legal efficacy within Somalia (SomalilandLaw, 2006). In 2005, the AU sent a fact-finding mission to understanding the case of Somalilandand concluded that “The fact that the ‘union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified’and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960-1990, makes Somaliland’s search forrecognition historically unique and self-justified in African political history” (Union, 2005). Tothis day, Somaliland’s elected leaders, such as sitting president Musa Bihi, refer to this legaldetermination as justification of Somaliland’s independent legal status (MMTV, 2024).On May 18th, 1991, following a ten-year-long war between the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barreand the Somali National Movement (SNM), representatives of the Somaliland declared thedissolution of the unlawful union, thereby reasserting Somaliland’s sovereignty, based on theborders established on June 26th, 1960 (Affairs, 2016). Somalia, on the other hand, descendedinto violence and political disorder, leaving the territory without an internationally recognizedgovernment until 2012 (Parliament, 2013). That year, the United Kingdom organized aconference with the aim of initiating talks between Somaliland and Somalia, two distinct politicalentities that had been separate since 1991. The first talks were held at Chevening House in theUnited Kingdom in 2012, followed by 11 more talks in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, andDjibouti over the course of the past decade.However, all of these talks proved unproductive due to the lack of commitment from Somalia,which failed to implement low-level agreements reached on issues such as airspace management.The last meeting was held in Djibouti on December 28th, 2023, where an agreement was reachedto discuss issues of unity and separation. However, a few days later, President Muse Bihi ofSomaliland traveled to Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia, and reached an agreement betweenEthiopia and Somaliland on Ethiopia’s access to the sea, in which Ethiopia was offered control(lease arrangement) over 20 kilometers of coastline in exchange for international recognition ofSomaliland. The government of Somalia contested the agreement between Somaliland andEthiopia, claiming that Somaliland is a part of Somalia, and thus ineligible to enter into a pactwith Ethiopia. However, this viewpoint does not align with the prevailing situation on the6
9. Ethio-Somaliland Deal: Drivers and Playersground, as Somaliland has operated as an independent, de facto state, separate from Somalia,since 1991.The agreement between Ethiopia and Somaliland had been in the planning stage for severalmonths before its announcement, and is motivated by several factors that have the potential topositively impact Somaliland’s political independence and Ethiopia’s ambition to access the seathrough peaceful means. For Somaliland, which has for three decades fallen short in its ambitionfor international recognition, the slow rebuilding of a Somali federal system next door hostile toSomaliland independence has increasingly been viewed as an existential threat. At the same time,the increasingly multipolar nature of global power opened new opportunities for Somaliland toseek allies from amongst those willing to alter the international status quo. On the other hand,Ethiopia’s pursuit of access to the sea has been a longstanding goal of the Ethiopian government,and all its coastal neighbors have declined Ethiopia’s request for access. These two main factorsare the primary drivers of the new agreement between the Somaliland and Ethiopia.2.1 Ethiopia’s Ambition for Access to the SeaIn an article published by the Academy for Peace and Development in December 2023, Dr.Mohamed Farah Hersi, argued that Ethiopia’s quest for access to the sea was fundamental for theHorn of Africa’s regional security, cooperation, and economic integration (Hersi, 2023). To quoteat length from the article’s basic assessment of the motivations at play, which preceded theannouncement of the Ethio-Somaliland MoU by several weeks: “Given the stakes of the issue, itis clear that an increased understanding of Ethiopia’s pursuit of access to sea is necessary.However, it is equally important to consider the implications of this pursuit for Ethiopia’snational security and economic interests. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia seeks access to theRed Sea or the Gulf of Aden to ensure continued economic prosperity, particularly through thedesire to have sovereign security over its resources, trade, and transit routes. Most importantly,the excessive port charges that Ethiopia must pay to neighboring coastal countries to make use oftheir logistical services have hindered Ethiopia’s growth; Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed himself7recently noted that the amount of money spent on these charges could be used to build theRenaissance Dam every three years” (Hersi, 2023).In light of these dynamics, the Ethiopian government initiated diplomatic talks with the coastalcountries of Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, and Somaliland to negotiate a mutually beneficialagreement, focusing on establishing a naval base and diversifying the use of commercial ports intheir respective countries. Although most coastal countries could not arrive at mutually agreeableterms with Ethiopia, the offer was a game changer for Somaliland, given their unique need forinternational recognition. Furthermore, after placing much economic hope in the revitalization ofBerbera Port through investment by DP World, a United Arab Emirates-owned port operator,greater partnership between Ethiopia and Somaliland on coastal arrangements promises todeepen economic cooperation between the two countries. (Hersi, 2023).2.2 Somaliland’s Quest for International RecognitionFor over 30 years, Somaliland has sought recognition from the international community but hasyet to achieve this goal. The primary obstacle to Somaliland’s international recognition has beenA) Somalia’s opposition to an independent Somaliland, B) wariness from the IntergovernmentalAuthority on Development (IGAD) over supporting separatist movements among member states(which Somaliland is often grouped under, despite its unique experience as a former independententity), C) the African Union’s (AU) rigid policy on redrawing state boundaries, due to thepotential risks of opening a “Pandora’s box,” and D) the post-Cold War unipolar global order,which has made the case less attractive to the Western world and has led to Arab interests inmaintaining a unified Somalia to counterbalance Ethiopia’s influence in the Horn of Africaregion. Nevertheless, while recognition was off the cards, Somaliland used cooperation with theinternational community on practical matters such as counter-terrorism, anti-piracy, migration,and humanitarianism as a means to slowly raise its status as a de facto legitimate government.However, with the recognition of a Somalia federal government in Mogadishu in 2012, and theresulting international support to the government in terms of defense, economic growth and statebuilding, Somaliland has increasingly concluded that its state sovereignty and security are at risk.Indeed, over the past decade, both Mogadishu and the international community’s staunchcommitment to a “one Somalia policy” represented an existential threat to the gains in8independent, democratic governance that Somaliland has achieved. Consequently, Somaliland’sleaders chose to adopt a new approach to alter the existing circumstances and bring the countrycloser to regional and international diplomatic platforms to actively campaign for theachievement of its objective of de jure recognition. The MoU between Somaliland and Ethiopiarepresents a significant achievement in this direction, not only by securing Ethiopiancommitments regarding recognition, but by demonstrating Somaliland’s legitimacy and capacityto engage in direct bilateral diplomacy, without intervention from Mogadishu. Additionally, byreaching a mutually beneficial solution, Somaliland and Ethiopia are now better positioned tocooperate and collaborate than ever before, and prospects for regional economic integration inthe Horn of Africa have improved significantly.2.3 United Arab Emirates and its Regional Influence in Horn of AfricaThe United Arab Emirates (UAE), with its abundance of resources and influence in the region,has been an active player in the regional integration of the Horn of Africa, with a major focus onEthiopia and Somaliland. Unlike Somaliland, the UAE has diplomatic and political influenceover Somalia, which it sees as an important partner because of its rivalry with Qatar. At the sametime, it has made major investments in Somaliland, including Berbera Port’s modernization, andthe construction of a free zone, industrial park, military base and the Berbera corridor, a road thatconnects Somaliland to Ethiopia.Equally, the UAE and Ethiopia has concluded several MoU’s since Abiy Ahmed came to poweras the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. Among these agreements was the cooperation between DPWorld and the Ethiopian government, which made significant investments in the Port of Berbera.(Ecofin Agency, 2023). Cooperation between the UAE and Ethiopia represents a significantstrategic partnership aimed at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the region,particularly in Djibouti, which serves as China’s gateway. However, China’s stake in Djibouti,where it has invested in ports and railways, as well as its only overseas military base, also entailsa strategic interest in Ethiopia as the region’s dominant power and economic hub. According tothe Congressional Research Service, China has provided nearly $1.5 billion in financing majorinfrastructure projects in Djibouti since 2000. Among the projects being built by Chinese firms isa $3.5 billion free-trade zone (FTZ), which is expected to be Africa’s largest. The first phase wascompleted in 2018, and was expected to create 200,000 new jobs and handle over $7 billion in9trade from 2018 to 2020. Three Chinese companies have stakes in their FTZ alongside Djibouti’sport authority (Service, 2019). Competition for regional power over the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden,and the Horn of Africa has led to China and the UAE emerging as major rivals. Nevertheless,while the deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia will primarily benefit the UAE, it is believedthat China’s interest in boosting the economic potential of the wider region will supersede anycompetitive attempts to stand in the way of the deal.Somaliland, as an unrecognized de facto state, has maintained political stability over the past twodecades through the adoption of a democratic system of governance and the holding of popularelections. Despite its ability to exercise sovereignty and secure its borders, its defense capabilityhas been limited due to financial constraints and the absence of defense and security cooperationwith other states, including Ethiopia. In contrast, Somalia, which claims Somaliland as part of itsterritory, has received international defense cooperation from countries such as Turkey, UAE,Ethiopia, Uganda, UK, US, and Qatar, which have provided training to their national army. As aresult, Somaliland remains isolated and its defense capabilities are constrained. Furthermore, theUnited Nations Security Council lifted the arms embargo on Somalia in December 2023 aftermore than three decades, enabling Somalia to build its armed forces. Given the failure of talksbetween Somaliland and Somalia to resolve their differences, Somaliland has been compelled totake unilateral actions in its defense and foreign policy strategies aimed at overcoming itsisolation and vulnerability.The new deal between Somaliland and Ethiopia is thus about much more than economicdevelopment and integration between the two nations, but instead also relates to cooperation inthe areas of security and defense, in order to counter Somalia’s growing strength. On January 8th2024, a delegation led by Somaliland’s Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Major General NuhIsmail Thani met with Ethiopia’s Chief of State Field Marshal Berhanu Jula in Addis Ababa todiscuss military cooperation between the two countries. That this type of cooperation is of adifferent scope and scale is evident in the fact that both parties tied this contact to the fulfillmentof the recently signed MoU (Afrika, 2024).
10. Somaliland’s Security Dilemma: Regional Security of Horn of Africa inMultipolar World Order10
11. OpportunitiesIn a region marked by persistent conflict and the absence of political stability, to have bothSomaliland and Somalia building up military capabilities under circumstances absentconstructive dialogue risks the possibility of conflict. The lack of a coordinated approach toSomaliland and its status, and Somalia’s attempt to exploit this gap so as to isolate Somaliland,only makes conflict more likely. It is thus imperative for global powers to take advantage ofchanging relations between Ethiopia and Somaliland as a starting point for formalizingSomaliland’s independent status, with Ethiopia serving as an anchor and balancing forcebetween Somaliland and Somalia, thereby granting an equal and stable platform for the twoSomali neighbors to negotiate cooperative relations. The Ethio-Somaliland MoU demonstratesthat Somaliland’s self-governance is inevitable and beneficial to the region, and now is the timeto ensure that this transition happens through peaceful means, without fanning the flames ofSomalia’s current belligerent approach to impeding this reality.’Rivalry between the United States and China is increasingly being observed in the Horn ofAfrica, particularly in Djibouti, which serves as a strategically vital military hub for Africa. Bothnations have established military installations and outposts in Djibouti, located 174 km fromSomaliland’s border. However, diplomatic ties between Somaliland and Taiwan have strained therelationship between Somaliland and China, causing Beijing to view Somaliland’s actions asunfriendly. In contrast, improved relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia are likely to enablethe country to form expand alliances with both global powers, thanks to both the US and China’sdual dependence on Ethiopian influence in the Horn.Prospects for cooperation between Ethiopia and Somaliland are extensive, and it is crucial thatsuch an arrangement proves mutually beneficial for both parties. It is imperative that Ethiopia’saccess to the sea does not come at the expense of Somaliland’s economic progress, and that thetwo sides must work together to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome. The substance of theMoU focuses on three key areas: the implementation of the Berbera Port Utilization Agreementof 2016, defense and security cooperation between Somaliland and Ethiopia against potentialexternal threats, including AS, and a fair-trade agreement that enables Somaliland’s small marketto access the rapidly growing Ethiopian market. Finally, the MoU will facilitate diplomatic11efforts at the IGAD and AU levels, where Ethiopia is to advocate for Somaliland as anindependent state.4.1 Berbera Port UtilizationIn 2016, an agreement was reached between Somaliland and Ethiopia regarding the utilization ofthe Berbera Port. According to the terms of the agreement, Ethiopia committed to using the portfor 30% of its imports and exports. However, while DP World, the third party in this agreement,fulfilled its commitment to invest in the modernization and expansion of the port, Ethiopia’s 30%commitment still has not been realized. Within the framework of the recently signed MoU,Ethiopia has committed to routing 10% of its maritime trade through Berbera, which issignificantly less than the 2016 agreement.However, the MoU, by also entailing Ethiopia’s potential development of its own commercialport, does not resolve Somaliland’s (and DP World’s) overarching desire to maximizecommercial maritime trade through its Berbera Port. In the event that new ports need to beconstructed, the same investment model adopted for the Berbera port can be used, where eachparty receives stakes in the new port, rather than Ethiopia demanding exclusive ownership. It isessential that the new agreement be commercially viable for all parties involved. Without acommercially viable agreement, the deal may not be implemented, and both parties will miss theopportunity to establish a fair, balanced, and mutually beneficial partnership.4.2 Security CooperationThe collaboration and alliance between Ethiopia and Somaliland have elicited concerns fromSomalia and Al-Shabaab (AS), both of which have declared war against Somaliland andEthiopia, asserting that the Ethio-Somaliland partnership undermines Somalia’s sovereignty.Furthermore, AS accused Ethiopia of occupying Somali-owned territory that was granted bycolonial powers, alluding to the Somali Region of Ethiopia. With these threats and potentialthreats from other countries, such as Egypt and Eritrea, which are displeased with Ethiopia’saccess to the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, the stability and security of Somaliland and Ethiopia, aswell as the broader Horn of Africa region, are at risk. Therefore, it is crucial for parties toestablish a comprehensive security and defense partnership to prevent such threats and solidifycooperation that safeguards the interests of both sides.12
12. External Risks of the Deal for Somaliland4.3 Trade Agreement and Economic IntegrationThe significance of cross-border trade between Ethiopia and Somaliland cannot beunderestimated. Trade is facilitated by three market chains: Qat, livestock, and re-export ofconsumer goods. Despite the absence of a formalized trade agreement between the two countries,informal trade plays a pivotal role in their commercial relations. The signing of the MoUpresents an opportunity for Ethiopia and Somaliland to formalize trade relations, taking intoaccount the substantial contribution of informal trade to the budget of the Somalilandgovernment.This section focuses on the external risks associated with the implementation of the MoU, whichare more significant than the internal differences.5.1 Al-ShabaabAl-Shabaab (AS), an extremist group affiliated with Al-Qaida and prevalent in Somalia, pledgedto launch attacks against Somaliland and Ethiopia in an effort to prevent the Ethio-Somalilandagreement. The group’s spokesperson, Ali Raage (Ali Dheere), and a member of the Shura council,invoked religious themes and historical events in Islam, connecting Israel and Ethiopia in acampaign of “expansionism.” In a chilling comparison, Raage drew parallels between the currentSomaliland President Muse Bihi and the Banu Thaqif tribe that guided the Aksumite (i.e.Ethiopian) general Abraha in his assault on Mecca in 570 CE. (Maruf, 2024). In contrast toSomalia, where it wields control over significant portions of territory, AS maintains no physicalfoothold in Somaliland. Nevertheless, dormant cells and inactive individuals would likely beprepared to serve AS if they are to launch an attack on Somaliland.5.2 SomaliaUpon the announcement of the MoU, the government of Somalia issued an official statementexpressing its disapproval, asserting that Somaliland is an integral part of Somalia and cannot enterinto any agreement with foreign entities. The Somali government specifically objected to theprospect of Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state, which it perceived as a directthreat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, it is important to note that Somaliland’s13claim of statehood is grounded in historical and legal facts that are in no way dependent onSomalia’s consent.On January 3, 2024, Ali Mohamed, the acting Foreign Minister of Somalia, convened a meetingwith diplomatic representatives in Somalia to lodge the Federal Government of Somalia’s objectionto the MoU. During the meeting, the acting Foreign Minister saw international law as fallingdecisively on the side of the inviolability of Somalia’s territorial boundaries. Furthermore, hecriticized Ethiopia for potentially strengthening AS, by linking the Somaliland issue to Ethiopianimperial ambition (Somalia, 2024). A resolution was passed during the Council of Ministers’Extraordinary Session on January 2, 2024, which was presided over by the Prime Minister ofSomalia. This resolution included a call to IGAD, the AU, the Arab League, and the UN to protectSomalia’s territorial integrity. The resolution also denounced the “egregious” actions of Ethiopiaand affirmed Somalia’s right to pursue legal remedies through all available channels in response(Somalia, 2024). Similar sentiments were voiced personally in public statements made by twoformer Somalian presidents, Mohamed Abdilahi Farmaajo and Sheikh Sharif, and two formerPrime Ministers, Hassan Ali Kheyre and Mohamed Hussein Rooble.In an effort to exert diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud visited Eritreaand Egypt, two countries that have historically had a contentious relationship with Ethiopia andsaw the MoU as a threat to their strategic interests. Despite this, major global powers, includingthe United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, have adopted a more balancedstance on the matter, advocating for a peaceful resolution. It is noteworthy that despite thesignificance of the Ethio-Somaliland agreement as a strategic game changer for the Horn of Africa,Russia and France have yet to issue any official statements on the matter. Although none of thecountries publicly condemned the agreement except Egypt, they expressed commitment toSomalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.5.3 EgyptIn 2019, Egypt proposed a deal whereby it would establish a military base in Somaliland(EelSheikh town) in exchange for international recognition. Somaliland declined this offer forseveral reasons. First, allowing Egypt to establish a military base would constitute an act of waragainst Ethiopia, and Somaliland was concerned about the potential security and economic14consequences of this deal. Second, Somaliland’s security and economic cooperation with Ethiopiawould be jeopardized, resulting in the loss of Ethiopia’s diplomatic and practical support, whichwould be detrimental to Somaliland. Third, if relations between Somaliland and Ethiopia were todeteriorate, the UAE’s interests in the region would be damaged. Egypt is nowhere near theeconomic or security partner to Somaliland that Ethiopia is, and Egypt has historically maintaineda close alliance with Somalia and consistently supported Somalia’s unity. At the same time,however, Egypt’s geostrategic interests lie in the Red Sea region, which means it cannot ignoreSomaliland. Given this context, Egypt has engaged in diplomatic engagement with Somalilanddespite Somalia’s consternation. Egypt’s interests in Somaliland are thus threefold: to counterEthiopia’s regional influence, to secure access to the Nile by being close to Ethiopia’s capital, andto control the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are essential for the security of the Suez Canal.In light of its strategic interests, Egypt responded to the Ethio-Somaliland agreement byemphasizing the same need to respect for Somalia’s territorial integrity voiced by Somalia’s otherallies. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry cautioned that any escalating actions or statements fromneighboring countries could undermine stability in the Horn of Africa (Fayez, 2023). Due to thefact that Egypt’s response was diplomatically restrained due to the lack of condemnation of thecontent and nature of the MoU, it appears that Egypt remains keen to maintain its diplomaticrelations with Somaliland.5.4 DjiboutiOver the past three decades, Djibouti has significantly benefited from Somaliland’s lack ofinternational recognition, positioning itself as the sole strategic power in the Red Sea and Gulf ofAden. The absence ofstrategic rivalry has allowed Djibouti to capitalize on both Ethiopia’s relianceits territory for access to the sea, and its strategic military and commercial importance to greatpowers such as the United States, China, and France as an African gateway to the Red Sea andGulf of Aden. Ethiopia’s heavy dependence on Djibouti for access to the sea is reflected in the factthat over 95% of Ethiopia’s maritime trade is funneled through Djibouti, generating revenue ofover one billion US dollars for the country (Bank, 2023).The termination of the DP World’s concession agreement by Djibouti in 2018 negatively impactedthe relationship between the UAE and Djibouti. In light of Ethiopia’s growing market and the15
13. Possible ScenariosUAE’s strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, DP World then shifted attention to the Berbera Port,also securing an agreement with Ethiopia to use the port in the future. This strategic cooperationamong Somaliland, the UAE, and Ethiopia has repositioned Somaliland’s geostrategic rivalry withDjibouti, creating tensions over the future configuration of power dynamics in the Horn of Africa(Reuters, 2018).Djibouti was caught off-guard by the announcement of the Ethio-Somaliland MoU, which hasfurther strained the relationship between Somaliland and Djibouti. Nevertheless, Djibouti has nottaken an official position on the matter, and has proposed to continue hosting talks betweenSomaliland and Somalia (Osman, 2024). Djibouti’s stance is influenced by three primary factors:Ethiopia’s access to the sea through Djibouti, which is crucial to the latter’s economy and its desireto avoid antagonizing Ethiopia; Djibouti’s role as the host country for Somaliland and Somaliatalks, making it inclined to maintain neutrality; and Djibouti’s position as the current chair ofIGAD, which it does not want to lose (Osman, 2024). Given these factors, it is difficult to predictDjibouti’s actions, but it is evident that it is not supportive of the deal and will use diplomaticresources to obstruct it. The MoU’s economic threat to Djibouti, combined with its diplomaticthreat to Somalia, make these two countries allies in opposition.Three potentialscenariosfollow from the analysis presented in this report, each of which is feasibledepending upon the direction each actor takes in attempting to achieve their policy objectives, witheach side seeking to outmaneuver the others. Ethiopia seeks access to the sea, Somaliland aims forinternational recognition and a mutually beneficial commercial maritime agreement, whileSomalia endeavors to impede both of these key objectives for Somaliland and Ethiopia. CanSomalia, with its current domestic challenges, effectively obstruct and prevail over Ethiopia andSomaliland? This paper examines each scenario and assesses its consequences.6.1 Scenario I: Ethiopia and Somaliland Succeed through DiplomacyIn this situation, Ethiopia and Somaliland make the case for their deal via diplomatic efforts, boththrough bilateral engagement as well as at multilateral forums, including IGAD and the AU. Theobjective will be to overcome the diplomatic crisis between Somalia and Ethiopia, which stems16from Somalia’s opposition to both Ethiopian access to Somali territory and the issue ofSomaliland’s recognition. Here, Somalia continues to appeal to de jure recognition of Somalia’sauthority over Somaliland territory. However, this case is undermined by several factors, such as(1) Somalia’s inability to enact its claimed sovereign control over Somaliland by virtue of its lackof state capacity; (2) Somaliland’s strong legal case for independence based on the historicdissolving of a failed union (for which there is much legal precedent); and (3) the extremedependence of Somalia on outsourcing its sovereign power to foreign militaries and governmentssince the establishment of the federal government in 2012, of which the current Ethio-SomalilandMoU pales in comparison.Furthermore, despite Somalia’s protests to the AU and IGAD, both organizations remain heavilyinfluenced by Ethiopia and Kenya, reducing Somalia’s influence within these bodies. Ethiopiaholds particularly strong influence in the AU, given its location in Addis Ababa and Ethiopia’spolitical and economic weight. Consequently, it is unlikely that AU organs and most of its memberstates, excluding certain outliers such as Egypt, will condemn and protest against the recentlysigned MoU.It is equally unlikely that the United Nations Security Council would intervene in the issue, butwould rather leave it up to regional diplomatic decision-making both of Africa and the Gulf. Ifthese assumptions prove correct, implementation of the MoU between the government ofSomaliland and Ethiopia should not face any significant obstacles, paving the way for Somaliland’spath to international recognition and potentially inspiring other states to follow suit. The stance ofSaudi Arabia, however, one of the key players in the region, remains something of an openquestion, and its direction could prove pivotal. Despite its support for the territorial integrity ofSomalia, Saudi Arabia has not expressed any objections to the content of the MoU. Therefore, ifboth Saudi Arabia and the UAE do not object to the MoU, it is likely that the agreement will besuccessfully implemented.If the diplomatic crisis between Ethiopia and Somalia deepens, or if the prospect of armedconfrontation or instability becomes more likely, the AU may have to step in and attempt to addressthe situation. This may have to positive consequence of finally placing Somaliland’s case on the17agenda of the AU, as a matter of great concern. Given the failure of the bilateral talks betweenSomalia and Somaliland that were sponsored in 2012, and which continue to be weakly appealedto by the international community today, placing responsibility in the hands of the AU to finallyaddress the issue of Somaliland’s status, alongside the backing of Ethiopia for this initiative, couldfinally provide an African solution to the Somaliland question.At the regional level, alliances may realign, with Somaliland, Ethiopia, and the UAE forming abloc against a possible alliance between Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Egypt. Within such aregional formation, Somaliland’s role as a viable, credible and important geopolitical actor willbecome more visible, providing it with an opportunity to be granted a voice at certain regionalorganizations, both in the Arab world and Africa. It is possible that Somaliland may be granted anobserver status at the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU, allowingit to participate in discussions regarding the future of the Horn of Africa’s regional dynamics,including by helping to negotiate regional governance and security architecture able to managepolitical change in a peaceful and mutually prosperous manner.6.2 Scenario II: Somalia and its Allies Win the Diplomatic WarUnder this scenario, the international consensus tips in Somalia’s favor, with Arab countries beingparticularly influential in backing Somalia’s conception of its territorial integrity. Without eitherthe backing or tacit acceptance of the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, China,and Saudi to the contents of the Ethio-Somaliland MoU, it is unlikely that the deal will beimplemented. In this event, Ethiopia may be forced to reconsider its position and withdraw fromthe deal, further isolating Somaliland.However, while international actors have long subordinated the issue of Somaliland’s status to itsstate building and anti-AS missions in Somalia, attitudes are starting to change. Not only ispatience and financial support for Somalia’s stalled efforts at self-governance running out, butthere is also a growing recognition of the importance of the Red Sea, which has shifted the locusof gravity ever more towards Somaliland. As such, with the exception of those global powers whoexplicitly fear a strong Ethiopia, such as Egypt, it is likely that most of the international communitywill follow the lead of Ethiopia, and thus pursue a solution to the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute that18
14. The Way Forwardaccommodatesits desire to accessthe sea through Somaliland, even if it means taking Somaliland’sindependence claims seriously.6.3 Scenario III: Internal Disagreements between Ethiopia and SomalilandUndermine the MoUEven if Ethiopia and Somaliland are able to navigate external resistance to the MoU, the twoparties to the agreement also face internal hurdles that could potentially obstruct a successfuloutcome. On the one hand, it seems that distance still remains between the two parties over whatthe recent MoU means for the Berbera port, and whether any commercial port made under fullEthiopian control might cut into Ethiopia’s usage of Berbera port. Additionally, much will dependon the seriousness with which Ethiopia carries out its pledge to support Somaliland’s recognition,which is a much more uncertain and complicated process than the building of commercial andmilitary infrastructure. Third, much will depend upon the financial support that Ethiopia is able toobtain for carrying out this significant investment in infrastructure. Lastly, domestic politics ineach country will also play a significant factor, with the various antagonisms between AbiyAhmed’s government and the Tigrayan and Amhara communities serving as a constant source ofinstability and distraction, while Somaliland has seen opposition to the deal among certainconstituencies and political groupings, even if the general atmosphere is one of overwhelminghopeful expectation regarding the potential for international recognition.In light of the above analysis, the following main recommendations can help guide theimplementation of the MoU between Somaliland and Ethiopia.Adherence to the agreed stipulations the MoU: The primary objective of the MoU is to providesea access to Ethiopia through lease arrangements while acknowledging Somaliland’s sovereignty.The two vital national interests of Ethiopia and Somaliland remain unchanged, and diplomaticengagement aimed at dialogue with Somalia will not alter these dynamics. As such, any diplomaticengagement by the parties and the international community in the aftermath of the agreement isnot to alter the content, but to build such an agreement into a new governance framework for19regional integration, one that recognizes Somaliland as an equal partner and which reinforcesEthiopia as a key maritime player. Furthermore, it is crucial for both parties to conduct the processtransparently and the final agreement must be ratified by the respective parliaments.Deterrence against external threats: Given the threats by AS and Somalia to violently derail theMoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, not out of a respect for international law or regionalstability but instead as spoilers to regional economic and political progress, it is imperative forinternational and regional actors to support Somaliland’s security apparatus in counteracting anypotential attacks. With Somalia militarizing its border with Somaliland, ratcheting up its bellicoserhetoric towards both Somaliland and Ethiopia, and scaling up its clandestine incitement of clanconflict within Somaliland, it is vital that all external parties work towards ensuring that thesepotential spoilers are restrained, instead handling all disputes through regional bodies such asIGAD and the AU, with Somaliland participating as an independent and equal stakeholder.UAE engagement: The UAE serves as a strategic partner to both Somaliland and Ethiopia, witha regional strategic focus that aims to access Ethiopia’s growing market through Somaliland andcontrol the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These two grand strategies are of utmost importance to theUAE, and any negotiations between Somaliland and Ethiopia have a direct impact on the UAE’sstrategic interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. As such, the UAE’s engagement is crucial andinstrumental in the successful implementation of the agreement between Somaliland and Ethiopia.9220706 For Somaliland, it is vital to address the UAE’s strategic interests within the frameworkof its national interests.AU’s engagement: In 2005, a fact-finding mission was dispatched to Somaliland, resulting in therelease of a report that outlined the future of Somaliland’s statehood. The report emphasized thatthe AU acknowledged Somaliland’s unique case, and that this case should be assessed from anunbiased historical perspective and a moral viewpoint that takes into account the aspirations of thepeople. The mission urged the AU to devise a special approach for dealing with Somaliland,affirming that Somaliland’s status was not connected to the potential consequences of opening a“Pandora’s Box” in Africa (Somaliland, 2016). Due to the limited international interest in the caseof Somaliland and Egypt’s objection to its statehood, the report on the matter was never presentedto the Heads of State of the AU and was instead buried upon arrival. As a result, the AU’s20engagement with Somaliland diminished, and Somalia’s recognition by Western governments in2012 further weakened the AU’s address of the issue. However, with the recent agreement signedbetween Somaliland and Ethiopia, it is hoped that the AU will address the case of Somaliland morepractically, with Ethiopia serving as a lead sponsor and advocate of the case.Mutual economic benefits: This new arrangement presents Ethiopia with a significantopportunity to establish a naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, which marks asignificant departure from its lack of present on the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Additionally,Ethiopia will gain a commercial maritime advantage over other ports where it currently has nostake, as it now has a stake in Berbera. Furthermore, if additional ports are constructed, Ethiopiawill have a stake in those as well. For Somaliland, the agreement brings international recognitionfrom Ethiopia, which should serve as a catalyst for wider recognition, given the policy of countriessuch as the UK, US and others to defer to the region and Africa on the Somaliland issue. However,the success of this agreement hinges on a fundamental question: is Ethiopia willing to negotiate afair deal in which it transfers 70% of its maritime trade to Somaliland in exchange for a stake inits ports, or does it only want to establish its own commercial port without utilizing Somaliland’sports? If the answer is the latter, Somaliland will not be interested in pursuing the agreement.However, if the answer is the former, Somaliland will be able to negotiate jointly with the UAEand move forward with the agreement with Ethiopia. It is crucial that the agreement iseconomically viable for both parties, and not solely beneficial to Ethiopia.21Affairs, S. M. (2016). Recognition of Somaliland: A Brief History. Hargeisa: Somaliland.Afrika, T. (2024, January 09). TRT Afrika. Retrieved from TRT: https://www.trtafrika.com/africa/ethiopiasomaliland-discuss-military-cooperation-16590414Bank, W. (2023, July 23). World Bank. Retrieved from World Bank:https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-getmajorupgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoaEcofinagency. (2023, August 23). Ecofinagency. 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