Esleman Abay

TPLF’s annexation of Wolkait, Ethiopia: motivations, strategies, and interests

Article: 2376859 | Received 30 Oct 2023, Accepted 30 Jun 2024, Published online: 10 Jul 2024

Abstract

Ethiopia has been riddled with conflicts of varying nature and magnitude, some of which have threatened its very survival. It was to stem this scourge of conflicts that ethnic-based federalism was adopted in 1991. Sadly, the federal dispensation has not worked well in terms of preventing conflicts as various forms of local conflicts engulfed most parts of the country. In the existing sources, these conflicts are often characterized as ‘ethnic’, despite the real issues being resources, territory, power, etc. The article investigated the conflict in Wolkait, one of the conflict hotspots since 1975. The findings gleaned from pertinent data, both primary and secondary, show that the conflict has its roots in the formation of the TPLF in 1975 with its ‘Greater Tigray Manifesto’. As stated in its manifesto, the TPLF sought to establish an independent ‘Republic of Greater Tigray’ by annexing territories from Amhara (Wolkait and Telemt from Gondar and Raya from Wollo), and Eritrea’s port of Assab. Upon state power capture in 1991, the TPLF championed ethnic federalism as a politico-legal strategy to redraw the previous administrative boundaries and legitimize the annexation of Wolkait, Telemt, and Raya. Annexation of Wolkait outside of any constitutional-legal framework was meant to help the TPLF further political and economic motives: vengeance against the Amhara, a springboard for further territorial annexations, a site of resettlement of Tigrayans, and a foundation for the establishment of ‘The Republic of Greater Tigray’.

Keywords:

Reviewing Editor:

Robert Read, Economics, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

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1. Introduction

Ethiopia has been plagued by recurring incidents of intra- and inter-state conflict. Its location at the heart of the Horn of Africa makes it vulnerable to a host of security threats arising from trans-boundary resources, border conflicts between neighboring countries, insurgency aimed at power or statehood, and terrorism, among others. Internally, its political history is noted for political and economic contradictions that have resulted in many forms of conflict along class, ethnic, religious, and regional lines (Kefale, Citation2009). In order to stem the scourge of conflicts that bedeviled previous authoritarian regimes, ethnic-based federalism was adopted as a viable conflict management strategy in 1991.

The new federal system did not meet expectations. Since its inception, conflicts have increased in breadth and depth (Kefale, Citation2009; Regassa, Citation2010). Far from preventing conflicts, the system (re)produced new conflicts or transformed the nature of conflicts. As Regassa (Citation2010, p. 55–56) makes it clear, ethnic-based federalism reduced national ailments by decentralizing conflicts ‘to sub-national and local levels’. There are many instances of such local conflicts. The ones that have been at the center of scholarly debates include Silte-Gurage conflict, the Wogagoda language conflict, the Sheko-Megengir conflict, the Anyuwaa-Nuer conflict, the Berta-Gumuz conflicts, the Gedeo-Guji conflict, the Oromo-Amhara conflict, the Borana-Garri conflict, and the Oromo-Somali conflict, and ‘natives’-’migrants’ (as in Benishangul-Gumuz region) or ‘titular’- ‘titular’ (as in Gambella region) (see Abbink, Citation2006; Kefale, Citation2009).

However, the conflict over WolkaitFootnote¹ has been a peripheral issue in previous studies. In the words of John (Citation2021, p.1008), ‘The issue of Wolkait has not yet been investigated by scholars inside Ethiopia due to restrictions in academic freedom and remains a mere side note in the literature on Ethiopian contemporary history and politics’. The issue is tangentially treated as a mere border conflict between the Amhara and TigrayFootnote², following territorial readjustment in the guise of self-determination. Against this background, this article aims to shed light on the factors responsible for the emergence of conflict in Wolkait. Specifically, it attempts to explain the issue from the perspective of the motivations, strategies and interests of the TPLF.

2. Conflicts in Ethiopia: a brief literature review

Ethiopia has been portrayed as synonymous with conflicts. There were occasions where conflicts even threatened its existence. A review of the relevant literature demonstrates that the occurrence or persistence of conflicts in Ethiopia is intertwined with three issues: ethnicity, competing interests of political elites, and ethnic federalism. Many scholars (e.g. Gudina, Citation2003; Keller, Citation1988; Regassa, Citation2010) attribute the onset of conflicts with the issue of ethnicity. Gudina (Citation2003) argues that ethnicity is the bone of contention among major conflict actors, who are predisposed to the use of ethnicity for political mobilization. Politicization of ethnicity has its origin in the 1960s when the ‘National Question’Footnote³ was raised as a mobilizing issue against the central state. Until 1991, the nature of conflicts was, for the most part, vertical, pitting the central governments against ethnic-based armed groups that claimed to have been excluded or marginalized.

Ethnic-based armed groups lay the blame on the ‘Shewan Amhara elite’ for sowing the seeds of conflict. The latter were held to have spearheaded the state formation process in the 19th century, which resulted in the formation of a modern Ethiopian state. However, this process was framed as an imperial expansion that resulted in the subordination of various groups to the Shewan Amhara elites (Keller, Citation1988; Gudina, Citation2003). The various people in the south were seen as second-class citizens, which compelled them to raise economic and identity questions (Keller, Citation1988). Since then, the struggle for the ‘self-determination’ of ethnic groups, including secession, has become a mode of conflict among elites and movements such as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the TPLF, and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF).

Ethnic-based groups, mainly the EPLF and the TPLF, waged one of the most protracted insurgencies in Africa and toppled the Dergue regime in 1991. Upon capturing the state, the TPLF gradually installed an ethnic-based federal system. The new federal dispensation was acclaimed for its remedial power to free ethnic groups from the bondage of ‘national oppression’ (in the parlance of the TPLF) or ‘black colonialism’ (in the parlance of the OLF) (Gudina, Citation2003; Regassa, Citation2010). However, it was not long before conflicts involving various ethnic and cultural groups became the dominant feature of the political system. Although it can be argued that ethnic-based federalism worked well in terms of forestalling a large-scale civil war between the government and ethnic-based insurgent groups, low-intensity communal conflicts have become a common feature of the political system (Abbink, Citation2006). In fact, as most scholars attest, the incidence of conflict has increased since the introduction of the federal model in 1991. It failed to achieve what it was supposed to achieve: resolving the ‘national question’ (International Crisis Group, Citation2009). If considered effective, its virtues lie not in preventing conflicts but in changing the arena in which conflicts occur. As Regassa (Citation2010, p. 55–56) puts it, the existing ethnic-based federalism ‘devolved conflicts to subnational levels. It reduced national ailments to sub-national and local levels’. Some of the conflict incidents that featured in previous studies include: Silte-Gurage conflict, the Wogagoda language conflict, the Sheko-Mejengir conflict, the Anyuwaa-Nuer conflict, the Berta-Gumuz conflicts, the Gedeo-Guji conflict, the Oromo-Amhara conflict, the Borana-Garri conflict, and the Oromo-Somali conflict, and ‘natives’-’migrants’ (as in Benishangul-Gumuz region) or ‘titular’- ‘highlander’ (as in Gambella region) (see Abbink, Citation2006; Regassa, Citation2010).

These conflicts are often characterized as ‘ethnic’, while in fact the real issues that lie behind conflicts are other issues such as territory, resources, or personal greed. Ethnic groups are not monolithic actors engaged in conflicts. Political groups or elites claiming to represent ethnic groups are involved in conflicts with their political ambitions. Ethnic federalism invited violent conflicts in situations of resource scarcity and rivalry for power (Berhe, Citation2008). In this regard, Gudina (Citation2003) locates the origin of conflicts in the competing interests pursued by elites. For example, the Amhara elites are centrists in their political orientation. Despite their enormous sacrifices in the struggle against the monarchical regime, along with the Oromo and Tigrayan elites, Amhara elites find their niche in multi-ethnic organizations, with their interest limited to regime change without questioning the existence of the Ethiopian state (Gudina, Citation2003).

Other competing elites vacillated between the national oppression thesis and colonialism. They resorted to political organizations formed along ethnicity. More prominent in this regard are those that struggled within the EPLFFootnote⁴, the TPLF, and the OLF. They are of the conviction that the history of Ethiopia is one of oppression at best and internal colonialism at worst, for which the remedy is self-determination up to secession. These elites hesitated to cooperate with multi-ethnic actors, whom they perceived as ‘heirs to the Amhara-dominated empire, and hence rivals that could not be taken as comrade-in-arms’. (Gudina, Citation2003, p.172) They made best use of every opportunity, violent and non-violent, to oust the Dergue regime and emerged triumphant in 1991. With Eritrea seceding from Ethiopia (to the satisfaction of most Eritrean elites), other ethnic-based actors coalesced under the EPRDFFootnote⁵ coalition and established current ethnic federalism as the culmination of their longstanding struggle for self-determination.

However, Tigrayan elites advanced their political and economic interests in the garb of the EPRDF, and orchestrated a redrawing of territories in the guise of ethnic federalism, thereby providing fertile grounds for the rise and proliferation of a host of conflicts, including that in Wolkait (Abbink, Citation2011). Thus, ethnic federalism has failed to do enough to satisfy the wishes of other elites for an equitable share of power and/or forming an independent statehood. Eventually, due to the growing competing ethno-nationalisms and mass popular and youth protests in Amhara and Oromia Regions, the TPLF lost its grip on the national power in 2018. Subsequently, the TPLF withdrew from the EPRDF coalition and entered an armed insurgency, vowing to fighting for self-determination up to secession. Drawing from the above discussions, this article seeks to shed light on the roots of the conflict in Wolkait from the perspective of the motivations and interests of the TPLF.

3. Methods and materials

The study employed a qualitative case study method, which is ‘an intensive and detailed study of a case in its natural and contextual settings to develop as full understanding of that case as possible’ (Punch, Citation1998, p.150). The use of a case study design helps examine the contemporary issue of conflict and security dynamics in their natural setting in areas where limited research has been conducted on the issues or themes under study. In this study, Wolkait presents an important context for probing conflict from the perspective of competing interests and strategies pursued by the TPLF. Pertinent data were collected from purposefully selected informants who could best answer the themes under study. Prior to conducting interviews, prerequisites that facilitate data collection process were fulfilled. The first was for the Principal Investigator, an Ethiopian doing his PhD at Makerere University, Uganda, to obtain a letter of ethical clearance in an accredited institution in his home country, Ethiopia before embarking on the study. One of such accredited institutions mandated to review studies for ethical clearance is the University of Gondar, Ethiopia. He presented a proposal for his study titled ‘Conflict and Security in Wolkait-Tegede-Humera, Ethiopia: Actors’ Interests and Strategies’ to the Institutional Ethical Review Board of the University of Gondar. Upon confirmation by the Institutional Ethical Review Board for its ethical soundness, the Research and Technology Transfer Vice President Office of the University of Gondar issued a letter of ethical clearance, reference number: VP/RTT05/217/2022 for Alene Kassaw as Principal Investigator and Dr. Veneranda Mbabazi and Dr. Godfrey Asiimwe as Co-investigators to proceed with the study as of October 3rd 2022.

Secondly, informed consent was obtained from the selected informants after explanations about the nature and purpose of the study. Subsequent to their verbal consent, which was considered justified for informants feeling apprehensive about threats in the context of the prevailing armed conflicts, interviews were held on the conditions of anonymity, confidentiality, and safety with a member of the APP in Bahir Dar on 10 October 2022, a researcher from the University of Gondar on 04 October 2022, a political analyst in Addis Ababa on 06 October, and a veteran of the TPLF in Addis Ababa on 07 October 2022. Still, on the conditions of anonymity, all the informants readily offered written consent for their views to be published.

Thirdly, a field visit was made in mid-October 2022 to Wolkait, which was provisionally reconstituted as ‘Wolkait Tegede Setit Humera’ Zone under the Amhara Region following the withdrawal of the TPLF from the area in 2020. Interviews were held with two authorities and four local notables subsequent to their consent. Written consent for publication of their views on the themes of the study was obtained from all the interviewed informants. Lastly, recent literature and media outlets that reflect the views of the TPLF and Tigrayan elites regarding the Wolkait issue were included in the study for an objective analysis of the issues at hand. A wide range of pertinent data were also gathered on the themes of the study from published and unpublished secondary sources such as peer-reviewed journals, books, dissertations, archives, official documents such as proclamations, and political pamphlets.

4. The study area

The study area is popularly known as Wolkait, which covers a vast swathe of territories south of the Tekeze River that were historically part of the Begemedir province (Figure 1). The Tekeze River, which springs from Abergele in Waghemira and flows all the way into Sudan, acts as a natural boundary between Begemdir Province and Tigray Province (Tamiru, Citation2020). Contiguous geographically to the rest of Gondar, the area is known for a vast territory covered with rugged landscape and large tracts of plain lands. For centuries, Wolkait including Kafta Humera, Tegede, and Telemt was part of the Begemedir (Gondar) province of Ethiopia (John, Citation2021). The historical Gondar province covers the whole territory west of Tekeze, extending into Sennar in Sudan (Smidt, Citation2011). As the ‘Book of Axum’, written by the chief of Axum during the reign of Zera Ya’cob in the 14th century, attests, the Tekeze River served as a natural boundary separating Begemedir from the Tigray province, which by then encompassed Tembein, Shire, Seraye, Hamasen, Bur, Sama, Agame, Amba Senait, Geralta, Enderta, Sahart and Abergele, which are all found north of the Tekeze river (Tamiru, Citation2020).

Figure 1. Map of Wolkait.

Note. The map shows Wolkait and other territories including Telemt and Raya that were annexed by the TPLF during its insurgency in 1970s and 80s. Source: Tedla, W. and Kelklie, M. (2021). Wolkait, Ethiopia: Geo Strategic Importance and the Consequential Annexation by TPLF. Horn of Africa Insight, para. 1. Available at https://www.hornafricainsight.org/post/welkait-ethiopia-geo-strategic-importance-and-the-consequential-annexation-by-tplf (Accessed 12 January 2022).

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During the Gondarian period in the 18th century, Wolkait became part of the border province of the Christian State. Yet, as a frontier area, it continued its interactions with the adjoining Muslim areas in Sennar Sudan (Smidt, Citation2011). During this period, Dejazmach Ayanazgi was often cited as the governor of Wolkait in the court of Gondar. He is often remembered for building Bete Mulu Castle, which reflects the architectural design known during the Gondarian period. Although in a sorry state now due to neglect and old age, one can vividly see its resemblance with Castles in Gondar (Etege Mentewab Complex, Atse Bekaffa Palace, Atse Eyasu palace, etc.) in terms of architectural design and the raw materials used for the construction (interview with a local notable, Humera town, October 15, 2022).

The map prepared by Italy in the 19th century showing the provinces of Ethiopia, including the languages spoken in them, located Wolkait within the province of Gondar, where Amharic was spoken (Tamiru, Citation2020; Tedla & Kelklie, Citation2021). The brief Italian occupation (1935–41) merged Ethiopia into a newly created Italian Empire called Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI)Footnote⁶ (the empire of Italian East Africa), which was organized into six administrative divisions based on linguistic criteria: Eritrea (where Tigrigna was spoken), Amhara (where Amharic was spoken), Shewa (where Amharic and Oromifa were spoken), Sidamo (where Sidama was spoken), Harrar (where Harari was spoken), and Somali (where Somali was spoken). In the course of the brief Italian occupation, Wolkait- the lowlands between the Setit and the Angareb rivers- were lumped into the northern section of the Mazega around the village of Om-Hager, now Eritrea, and placed under the jurisdiction of the new governatorato of Amara in 1937 (Puddu, Citation2020). When Italy left Ethiopia in 1941, Wolkait was reinstated as Begemedir (Fitaye, Citation2021). Thus, in the post-liberation period up to 1991, Wolkait remained part of the Begemidir and Simen province (Tamiru, Citation2020).

The victory of the TPLF over the Dergue in 1991 was a critical juncture that upset the balance of power between Begemedir and Tigray. Having already annexed Wolkait during the insurgency against the Dergue in the 1970s and 80s, the TPLF tightened its grip on Wolkait. With a sense of triumph over the Dergue, the TPLF, along with the OLF, pressed on with the enterprise of redrawing territories favourable to ethnic groups they claim to represent (Aklog, Citation2020; Vaughan, Citation2003). The newly created Tigray region emerged unusually inflated, incorporating large chunks of land from the neighboring Amhara region. Wolkait-less Begemedir was then incorporated within the newly reconstituted Amhara region, which was created from the leftovers of the former territories of Gonder, Wello, Gojjam, and Shewa (Aklog, Citation2020). It is such an ethnic-based redrawing of borders under the guise of an ethnic federal system that gave rise to a host of conflicts, including the one in Wolkait.

Tigrayan elites, however, contend that what transpired in 1991 was just the return of Wolkait and other Tigrigna speaking territories back to the sovereignty of Tigray. After the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, a Tigrayan, Tigray fared badly in the power struggle with the Amhara. It lost not only its autonomy, but also its territories- Wolkait, Raya, and Mereb MellashFootnote⁷. This was part of the motivation that led to the rise of the TPLF as an ethno-nationalist armed group aspiring to restore alleged parts of Tigrayan land mainly Wolkait and Raya, which had been lumped to Begemedir and Wollo provinces by Menelik II and Haile Selassie I (Omna Tigray, Citation2021). As a response to the Amhara’s claim, some Tigrayan elites even attempted to unearth old maps of the 18th and 19th centuries as ‘evidence’ showing Wolkait’s location within Tigray. In their studies of historical maps, they claimed to have found out that Wolkait was included within Tigray at various periods in history: 1707–1794, 1829–1898, 1908–1909, and 1935–1941; yet at other times, the area remained either independent or became part of the Amhara/Gondar (Nyssen & Demissie, Citation2023).

Most Tigrayan elites, however, do not dwell on the map argument; they rather put more emphasis on current demography as evidence of their assertion. They hold the view that the Amhara were just a minority dispersed throughout the area amidst the Tigrayan residents. The people inhabiting Wolkait were predominantly Tigrayans, which gave the TPLF the original impetus to annex the area and subsequently make it part of the Tigray Region in accordance with ethnic restructuring of the country in 1991 (Tesfaye, Citation2022). They often cite the FDRE constitution, which makes ethnicity a legal criterion for delineating the regional states. Accordingly, the former administrative provinces, which were largely geographical, were reorganized into nine regional states in accordance with ethnicity that took into consideration settlement patterns, language, culture, and, allegedly, consent of the people concerned. So, they argue, despite the fact that Wolkait was part of Begemedir/Gondar, the new logic of ethnic federalism makes it necessary to label it Western Tigray (Nyssen & Demissie, Citation2023).

5. Motivations of the TPLF

The TPLF has been one of the long-established political actors that ruled Ethiopia for almost three decades (1991–2018). It owes its formation to the motivation of fighting the alleged domination and exploitation of the Tigrayan people at the hands of the Shewan Amhara elite. It launched its struggle with the dissemination of the ‘Greater Tigray Manifesto’, authored clandestinely by its inner circle in 1976 (Young, Citation1994). The manifesto-76 is a narrative of grievances that explains the onset of the struggle, interests, and strategies of the TPLF. The starting point for its narrative of grievance is the death of Emperor Yohannes IV, the last Tigrayan emperor that ruled Ethiopia (1872–1889). His successor, Emperor Menelik II, was seen as a usurper of the throne to which the descendants of Yohannes should have been legitimate successors. Since then, they say, Tigray entered a period of impoverishment and subjugation at the hands of successive Amhara rulers (Manifesto of the TPLF, Citation1976).

The TPLF castigates Emperor Menelik II for having used the tactic of impoverishing Tigray and sowing seeds of instability in the province by deliberately disrupting trade, imposing heavy taxation, and ravaging the countryside. As a result, Tigrayans were forced to live in double jeopardy: exploitation by ‘their own exploiters’- meaning the Tigrayan feudal class, and severe oppression of the Amhara ruling class- the economic exploitation, political, cultural, and linguistic oppression imposed by the Amhara ruling class over the Tigrayan people (Manifesto of the TPLF, Citation1976). As the Manifesto states, power rivalry between the Tigrayan and Amhara ruling classes degenerated into national oppression of the Tigrayan people. This was not confined to Tigray. The formation of a centralized empire state under Menelik was the beginning of national oppression in the rest of Ethiopia (Manifesto of the TPLF, Citation1976).

The manifesto-76 also states that Tigray suffered ‘ethnic domination’ at the hands of the Amhara, the elimination of which is a solution to lasting peace for Tigray. Thus, the aim of the TPLF was to ‘liberate Tigray’ from the subjugation of the ‘Amhara rule’. Its grievances are targeted not only toward the Amhara ruling class, but also the Amhara ethnic group as a whole (Anteneh, Citation2021). Thus, the history of the power struggle between the ruling classes of the two communities is framed as the history of the ethnic domination of the Amhara group. However, the tenability of these narratives has been called into questionFootnote⁸. Having framed the struggle as national oppression, the TPLF took up armed resistance in early 1975 to achieve self-determination for TigrayFootnote⁹ (Berhanu, Citation2000). As stated in the manifesto-76, the objective of the TPLF’s struggle is ‘creating an independent democratic republic of Tigrai as a likely preferred option under the circumstances’ (Gebrehiwot, Citation2018, p. 94–95). As victory over the Dergue loomed large towards the end of 1980s, the TPLF changed its mind in favour of ‘autonomy of Tigray’ within a federated Ethiopia.

Having captured the state in 1991 after protracted insurgency, the TPLF pressed on with the objectives inscribed in its manifesto-76: establishing ‘Greater Tigray’, the territory of which is defined as extending to Sudan in the west, the Aluha River in the south-east, and the Port of Assab (Eritrea) in the east. The TPLF’s ambition of autonomy was all about annexing territories for its political scheme of creating a new country called ‘Greater Tigray’. The lands of the people of Amhara (Wolkait and Raya), Afar, Kunama, Saho, Agaw, etc., are declared to be Tigray in this grandiose plan. The manifesto-76 defined a Tigrayan as anybody who speaks Tigrigna irrespective of where s/he is or what ethnicity s/he is. In this far-fetched definition, even an Amhara who speaks Tigrigna can be considered a Tigrayan (Anteneh, Citation2021).

The concept of creating an independent Tigrinya-speaking ‘Republic of Greater Tigray’ as published in the TPLF manifesto-1976 found expressions in the colonial plan concocted by British colonialists, then governing Eritrea following the withdrawal of Italy in the 1940s. British colonialists produced a map (Figure 2) proposing a union between the Christian parts of Eritrea and the Tigray province of Ethiopia, calling it ‘Greater Tigray’ (New African Institute, Citation2021). It is such a colonial proposal that served as an inspiration for the TPLF to envisage the establishment of a new republic of ‘Greater Tigray’ in the Horn of Africa. The territorial span of the ‘Greater Tigray’ as proposed by Britain, did not include the land of Wolkait, which was then considered part of the Amhara territory. Later, in the 1970s, the TPLF modified the proposed map by incorporating the Tigray province, Wolkait, and Raya (from Gondar and Wollo provinces, respectively), and the Eritrean coast of Assab.

Figure 2. British map of ‘Greater Tigrai’.

Note. ‘Greater Tigrai’, depicted in black color in the map, was an independent state conceived by Britain in 1940s by uniting the Christian parts of Eritrea and the Tigray province of Ethiopia. Source: New African Institute (Citation2021). Disinformation in Tigray: Manufacturing Consent for a Secessionist War, p. 2. Available at: https://aepact.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Disinformation-in-Tigray-Manufacturing-Consent-For-a-Secessionist-War.pdf (Accessed 3 September 2022).

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The other historical precedent inspiring the TPLF’s ambition for annexation of Wolkait was the request by Ras Seyoum Mengesha, governor of Tigray province, to Emperor Haile Selassie I to portion out Wolkait to the Tigray province so that Tigrayans would not bother to migrate to the rest of the country in search of livelihoods. Wolkait would become the food basket of Tigray, providing abundant harvest of sorghum and cash crops. Tigrayan daily laborers used to come to the area to work on commercial farmlands that produced ‘about 8,000,000 quintals of sesame seeds yearly then, besides cotton and sorghum’ (Fitaye, Citation2021, p. 26). The request was, however, turned down due to the objections of Ayalew Biru, then hereditary ruler of Wolkait. Since then, Tigrayans had been looking for an opportune time to annex Wolkait, which came to reality in 1979 de facto and in 1994 de jure (Fitaye, Citation2021).

6. Strategy of the TPLF

The TPLF imposed ethnic federalism as a politico-legal strategy to realize its interests. Administrative boundaries were redrawn along ethnic lines. Every ethnic group was given defined territories to help them exercise self-determination, including secession, as stipulated by Article 39 of the FDRE constitution (Gamachu, Citation1994). In order to draft a new ethnic map, a Boundary Commission was established in August 1991 out of 10 members who consented to or were co-opted by the TPLF/EPRDF. Neither opposition groups nor representatives from the people participated in this exercise (Vaughan, Citation2003). The Border Commission relied predominantly on current language use as an effective criterion, shrugging off other markers of identity, such as settlement pattern, consent of the people, or history. Claims based on history were dismissed as contentious. Rather, the current demographics were preferred. To this end, the Commission used the study of the ethnic profile of the country conducted by Dergue’s Institute for the Study of Ethiopian Nationalities (ISEN). The study ‘found out that of the 580 weredas in the country, only around 30 odd were actually monolingual’. As a result it was concluded that ‘language was not a good criterion on which to base an administrative division’ ‘(Vaughan, Citation2003, p.35).

Despite the Commission’s decision against the use of language, the TPLF/EPRDF obstinately argued for use of it. The position of the TPLF even contradicts the provision of the constitution that states that ‘the federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall comprise States, and the States shall be delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and the consent of the people concerned’ (Article 46). The commission hurriedly finished its work within a few months, shunning many disputes over the boundaries. As a political process, the new territorial arrangement entailed clear winners and losers. Oromos, Afars, and Somalis emerged to the scene with largest territories. It was a political compromise to placate the dissidence of some ethnic groups (e.g. the Afars in relation to their conflict with Isa Somalis over grazing lands) (Abraham, Citation1994). It also worked out favourably for Tigray, which legitimated the incorporation of Wolkait- the land the TPLF annexed in 1976 during its insurgency over the Dergue.

Amhara elites complained that Wolkait had already been subject to forceful annexation before preparations for the Charter or the constitution were underway. During the Transitional Period (1991–1994), the issue of Wolkait was presented as a fait accompli: as if it was part of Tigray. The role of the Charter and the Constitution became mere political tools for according legitimacy to the retrospective occupation and incorporation of the area into Tigray. When the regional states were formed along with their territorial demarcation, the TPLF did not raise the issue of Wolkait. The Constitution Commission took for granted that Wolkait was part of Tigray, while in fact it was annexed by force, and the people never expressed their will (Fitaye, Citation2021). If the main criteria for demarcation- the will of the people, settlement pattern, ethnic identity or psychological make-up of the people as stipulated in the Transitional Charter and the FDRE constitution were considered, Wolkait would have remained in Gondar. Yet, the TPLF was determined to settle the issue with military annexation rather than win the issue on constitutional grounds (Fitaye, Citation2021).

The territorial demarcation process was fraught with claims and counterclaims among ethnic-based political parties and their self-appointed elites. As ethnic representatives, all actors put forward ambitious claims to maximize territories for their own fiefdom. The secessionist OLF advanced a strong bid, claiming that Harari, Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa, and Wollo province should be carved into the State of Oromia. It put claims on ‘much of Amharic-speaking Wollo as ‘really’ (i.e. historically) Oromoland’ (Vaughan, Citation2003, p.34). In what appeared to be an act of appeasement, a special zone was created in Wollo for the Oromo-speaking population based in Kemise (Aklog, Citation2020). As stated in its political program, its imagined ‘Republic of Oromia’ encompasses all lands inhabited by Oromos, plus other nationality groups except Harari and Gurage. Moreover, its territorial hegemonic agenda includes land from Sidama, Kembata, Gurage and Wello. Moreover, for the OLF, Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz (B-G) are inhabited by ‘Black Oromos’, and thus belong to Oromia (Jalata, Citation1993).

For all its efforts, the Border Commission was unable to produce an official map of the regional states, given the controversies over territorial claims. It only made the outlines of the regions and forwarded them ‘to the regional governments to sort out their own internal boundaries’ (Vaughan Citation2003, p.34). In this way, controversies over territories were postponed, side-stepped, or siphoned off for separate negotiations by the concerned actors. Wolkait was one of the disputes shunned by the Commission for political expediency. Although the Commission suggested resolving territorial claims through negotiations at a later date, nothing of the kind came through to date (Alebachew, Citation2020). Fourteen regional states were formed according to the outline of the map. Following the ratification of the FDRE constitution in 1994, these 14 regional states were reorganized into nine regional states and two Special Administrative Areas (Abbink, Citation2011).

Practically, the establishment of constituent units (regions) lacked clarity and consistency. Only a few ethnic groups satisfy the constitutionally ordained criteria of ethnic markers to form their own regions. Some regions were formed based on political or economic exigencies of the TPLF/EPRDF. For example, Harari, Gambela, and B-G emerged regional states of their own unlike Sidama, which was denied a regional state of its own despite its population size, economic viability, territorial size, etc. (Tesfai, Citation2015). The establishment of Gambela and B-G regions out of several small ethnic groups rested on the need to thwart the OLF’s hegemonic political goal over these tiny nationalities that it considered ‘black Oromos’ (Tesfai, Citation2015, p.52). Likewise, as Abbink (Citation2011, p.608) asserts, Wolkait- a historical homeland of Amhara (Gondar/Begemdir)- was incorporated into Tigray not based on ethno-linguistic criteria as claimed by the TPLF, ‘but on profitable economic criteria’.

However, the TPLF advanced the argument that the incorporation of Wolkait into Tigray was based on language. It claimed that, since a significant portion of the population spoke Tigrigna, they were Tigrayans. The TPLF justified the territorial demarcation, arguing that ‘history or historical precedent are not acceptable legal bases either for the demarcation of states or for identifying the nations, nationalities and peoples which constitute legal right-bearers under the constitution’ (Nyssen & Demissie, Citation2023, p. 13). The new concept of self-determination is based on ethnic self-determination, not historical control. As such, Wolkait may not have been administered as part of Tigray in the past, but it is populated by Tigrayan speaking people. True, Wolkaites are multilingual, speaking Amharic, Tigrigna, and to some extent Arabic, for various reasons. However, they identify themselves as Amhara due to their cultural affinity with the Amharic-speaking people of Begemedir (Atnafu, Citation2017; Fitaye, Citation2021). The use of language to identify ethnic groups is a flawed strategy. Tigrigna is spoken not for the reason of expression of ethnic identity as Tigrayan but for economic reasons. Fitaye (Citation2021) explains that unlike most parts of Gondar, where farmers had large tracts of land to tend to, Tigray had many farmers to spare as labourers on Wolkait’s large commercial farms. They stormed the area during the harvest season and obtained employment on farmland for a period of three to four months every year. It was among these immigrant labourers that Wolkait Amharas picked up some Tigrigna. However, they use their mother tongue, Amharic, for both indoor and outdoor events, including marriage ceremonies, mourning, war cries, etc. (Fitaye, Citation2021).

The TPLF also dismissed the claim that Wolkait was the ancestral land of the Amhara. Administrative boundaries have never been static in the history of Ethiopia. They have been subject to changes with the change of governments in accordance with the political ideologies and political necessities of the various governments that ruled the country. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with boundary restructuring that created nine ethnic regions and two autonomous cities in 1991 out of the old provinces. This territorial readjustment entailed that some ethnic groups take or forfeit territories they historically controlled. Accordingly, Tigray took Wolkait from the former province of Gondar, as it gave away territories on its eastern side to the newly constituted Afar Region (Tesfaye, Citation2022). The Amhara were given their own regional state out of territories from Gojjam, Gondar, Shewa, and Wollo, which they claim as their ancestral homelands. Thus, the Amhara claim of Wolkait has been decried as irredentist- a threat to the rationale of ethnic federalism, which aims to address the national question by ensuring self-determination (Tesfaye, Citation2022).

On their part, the Amhara argue that the adoption of ethnic federalism in 1991 changed the concept of territory. The enterprise of redrawing of territories to create ethnic homelands makes territories not mere administrative boundaries, but part of the ‘sovereignty’ of the Regional States. The making of boundaries became contentious, embroiling the Amhara in a tug of war with other ethnic groups over territories. Considering itself as a vanguard of ethnic groups, the TPLF imposed the federal dispensation, which deprived the Amharas not only authority in the region created for them [Amhara Region] but also territories they claim as their ancestral lands (Gudina, Citation2003).

7. Interests of the TPLF

While the redrawing of territories was justified in terms of helping ethnic groups enjoy self-rule within their own territory, it left pundits to ponder many questions. Why language alone, while there were also other avenues available to delimit internal boundaries such as geometric (e.g. the USA), natural features such as rivers, mountains etc. (e.g. Ethiopia before 1991), or a blend of variables such as economic efficiency, resources, culture, etc.? The following section explains the motives for which the TPLF ventured into the redrawing of Wolkait as part of Tigray.

7.1. Vengeance

The annexation of Wolkait can be conceived as a manifestation of vengeance the TPLF wants to wreak on the Amhara. It is clear that the TPLF’s manifesto-76 declares that the Amhara are mortal enemies of Tigray. As reiterated, the manifesto was all about accusations against the Amhara: Tigrayans were denied their identity; they were deliberately denigrated and belittled under the oppressor Amhara nation. Tigrayan elites frequently claim that the Amhara ruled the country for 700 years, and it is their turn to rule. In the event of losing power, the TPLF would rather dismantle the country than see Amhara rule Ethiopia again (interview with a Political Analyst, Addis Ababa, 06 October 2022). The TPLF assumed the duty to reverse the situation. Wolkait was thought of as bloodland–one that the TPLF annexed as a booty of war through blood and sweat. The TPLF claimed to have sacrificed 65,000 Tigrayan fighters to overthrow the ‘Amhara-dominated’ Dergue. It is for this enormous sacrifice that the Amhara should pay by relinquishing the land to Tigray (interview with a Political Analyst, Addis Ababa, 06 October 2022).

The long-held conviction of the TPLF is that Ethiopia is a creation of Emperor Menelik II out of the subjugation of hitherto independent nations and nationalities (Manifesto of the TPLF, Citation1976). For this reason, not only do the various peoples claim self-determination, neighbouring countries (Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, and Kenya) can also reclaim their territories lost to Menelik II during the scramble for Africa. Menelik II was depicted as a contender for imperial expansion, along with European powers. This explains why the TPLF annexed Wolkait into Tigray and ceded a large tract of Amhara land to the Sudan (interview with a Researcher at the University of Gondar, 04 October 2022).

As a victor, the TPLF carved out the most fertile lands of Wolkait, Tegede, Humera, and Telemt and incorporated them into Tigray in the 1970s. Tigrayans harboured a grudge over the employer-employee status prevalent before 1991. Wolkait landowners employed labour immigrants from Tigray to harvest crops. This status changed after the TPLF seized power in 1991. Wolkaites had to leave their land for the Tigrayan settlers and investors. They were alienated from the land they had developed for large-scale crop production. As Fitaye (Citation2021, p. 70) testifies, under the iron-fist of the TPLF, ‘Tigres then confiscated all the Humera farms and settled their armed Tigray militias with TPLF finances and protection’. The TPLF embarked on a land reform program in the area that entirely reversed the pre-existing employer-employee relationship between Wolkait landowners and Tigrayan labourers and settlers. As one TPLF member reminds, land reform was implemented to enable the ‘slaves’ [Tigrayans] to become landowners [in place of Wolkait landowners] (Enquai, Citation2007, p.119).

The Amhara elites charge the TPLF for ceding parts of Gondar- Metema, Qwara, and Tachi Armachiho to the newly formed B-G region as a deliberate policy aimed at weakening Gondar in particular and the Amhara in general. It was the TPLF’s strategy to use the B-G region as a proxy to snatch more territories from Gondar. This insinuated the TPLF’s map of ‘Greater Tigray’ whose territories border on the B-G region. When the TPLF came to realize that it could not push beyond Wolkait, it supported the leaders of the B-G region to annex the territories of Gondar as far as Qwara, Metema, and Armachiho so that Tigray and B-G would have shared borders. This move would help the TPLF control The Great Renaissance Dam, located in the B-G region in the long term (interview with a Political Analyst, Addis Ababa, 06 October 2022).

A portion of fertile land was also given away to the Sudan by uprooting Amhara farmers and investors. The TPLF deliberately carved out the Amhara flank of the border (along Qwara, Armachiho, and Metema) to the Sudan. It is believed that some 35,000–40,000 hectares of Ethiopian land around the Angereb River were left in the hands of Sudanese investors without any border agreement to speak of (Alebachew Citation2020, p.612). As Puddu (Citation2020, p.122) submits, the TPLF relinquished contested borderlands to the Sudan ‘in return for other benefits, such as the recognition of usufructuary rights to TPLF-backed concessionaires in the lowlands between the Angareb and Setit river under formal Sudanese sovereignty’. It made a deal with Sudan to get territorial adjustment favourable to Tigray at the expense of the Amhara. Sudan appeared an important ally to be rewarded with territories taken from the Amhara side. The Sudan supported the TPLF’s insurgency and was a major export destination for the TPLF’s companies. The TPLF returned the favour by carving out fertile Amhara lands to them (Puddu, Citation2020).

Tigrayans deny such accusations. They view the issue of Wolkait as part of a power struggle between Tigray and Amhara. Tigray had a history of autonomy for centuries resisting any form of assimilation or centralization by the Amhara rulers. Viewing this as a threat, Emperor Menelik II reduced Tigray by abandoning Eritrea to Italy in 1986 and carved parts of Tigrigna speaking areas (Wolkait and Raya) into Amharic-speaking provinces of Begemedir/Gondar and Wollo. Having lost much of its fertile lands, Tigray was rendered weak economically and politically. It was this grievance that motivated the TPLF to launch an insurgency to restore Wolkait and other Tigrigna speaking territories back to the sovereignty of Tigray. This came to reality in 1991 as part of the country-wide federal restructuring aimed at ensuring self-determination for each and every ethnic group (Omna Tigray, Citation2021).

7.2. Wolkait as a springboard for further annexations

The other importance of Wolkait for the TPLF is its relevance as a springboard for further expansion. In due course, it became clear that Wolkait proved to be a key strategic location for the TPLF’s long-term expansion plan. The TPLF opened the pathway to other fertile and strategic lands in the Amhara, such as Tegede-Marzeneb, Abdulrafi, Metema, and Qwara. Having consummated the incorporation of Wolkait, Humera, Tegede, and Telemet in accordance with its manifesto-1976, the TPLF opened a new territorial scheme aimed at controlling Armachiho, Qwara, and Metema. The hunger for land did not seem to end. The TPLF released a new map of Tigray for public display through mass media outlets, leaflets, websites, and even Grade 10 textbooks, incorporating Ras Dejen Mountain from the central part of Gondar (interview with a Researcher at the University of Gondar, 04 October 2022).

At the height of its insurgency against the Dergue, the TPLF crossed Wolkait and expanded its operations into Tegede and Tachi Armachiho, where the TPLF claimed that the Tigrigna language was spoken by a considerable number of people. Although these areas were not envisaged in the manifesto-76, the TPLF unveiled its plan to annex them. Tegede was divided into two parts: the first portion (styled Tsegede) for the TPLF to be lumped with Wolkait, and the other portion (styled Tegede- without ‘s’) to remain under the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM) of the Amhara region (interview with a Researcher at the University of Gondar, 02 October 2022). The expansion of the TPLF did not cease. It encroached on the Gobe, Gichew, and Mayembuwa kebelles of Tegede, seeking control of fertile lands for Tigrayan settlers. These areas were also planned for use as fortress to protect Wolkait from any possible attack from the Amhara in the future (interview with a Researcher at the University of Gondar, 04 October 2022).

7.3. Wolkait as a site of resettlement of Tigrayans

During its insurgency against the Dergue, the TPLF followed a policy of ‘self-sufficiency’ for which ‘the capture of surplus-producing regions of northern Gondar, such as Dejena’ [in Wolkait] was imperative (Tareke, Citation2016, p. 96). Wolkait became indispensable for mechanized farming, cultivating cereals (corn, sorghum) and cash crops (sesame) for export to the Sudan, which helped the TPLF ease the burden of peasants feeding its armies and its dependence on other external actors. Wolkait was also instrumental as a site for the resettlement of drought-affected Tigrayan peasants. During the 1984–5 Tigray famine, the TPLF resettled over 500,000 drought-affected peasants from central Tigray to Wolkait, Gondar (Alebachew, Citation2020). It also used this area as an access point for humanitarian aid. When humanitarian aid was blocked, the TPLF evacuated close to 300,000 peasants from famine-affected areas in the central and eastern regions to eastern Sudan via Wolkait (Enquai, Citation2007). The number of Tigrayan settlers was estimated to range from 500,000 to 700,000 (Alebachew Citation2020).

Most refugees resettled in Wolkait were those who had taken refuge in Sudan. In the face of incessant conflict, near-endemic poverty, and drought-induced famine in Tigray, most Tigrayans joined the TPLF as the best option, while others fled to the Sudan (Berhanu, Citation2000). The TPLF provided protection and safe passage for those willing to cross the Sudan. By mid-1985 alone, the number of Tigrayans reaching Sudan as refugees had reached 300,000, with an extra 2,000 Tigrayans trying to make it to Sudan on a daily basis (Berhanu, Citation2000, p.81). Later, with the liberation of Tigray and the rest of the country, refugees were repatriated with the concerted efforts of the UNHCR, the Ethiopian government, and the Sudanese government. Having felt excited by the victory of the TPLF, Tigrayan refugees were enthusiastic about returning. The TPLF took advantage of its state power to favour the return of Tigrayans. To this end, it posted secret notices to Tigrayans as the return of other refugees, especially those linked to the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), was undesirable (Berhanu, Citation2000).

The repatriation program was not given official publicity, but was clandestined for utmost care by the TPLF. The repatriation of pro-TPLF refugees was given priority as they were considered politically reliable sections of the refugee population. According to Berhanu (Citation2000), returnees were not merely refugees in need of rehabilitation but political agents who discharged political functions in Wolkait, such as espionage for the TPLF, political administrators, and border guards. They informed on returnees linked to the EDU and the EPRP, whose efforts to redevelop their commercial farms were repeatedly obstructed. While Tigrayan refugees were encouraged to come home, non-Tigrayans were not. The repatriation program was a reinforcement of the ‘political contract’ made between the TPLF and refugees in the height of the 1984/5 famine (Berhanu Citation2000, p. 123–124).

The first phase of repatriation was carried out in June 1993, when 12,000 refugees from the Sofowa refugee camp in the Sudan arrived in Humera. These refugees were resettled at three sites around Humera: Rawayan, Ada Bai, and Mai Kadra (Berhanu, Citation2000, p.118). Another round of repatriation was carried out to settle in 1994 (interview with a local notable, Humera town, October 15, 2022). Moreover, the TPLF also settled 30,000 of its former fighters with their arms in strategic places, such as Dansha, Humera, and Kabtiya (Alebachew, Citation2020). Well before the repatriation, the TPLF had already forced the refugees to discontinue traditional practices such as idir and iqub and organized them into a number of associations: Mahber Shekala (Workers), Mahber Harstot (Farmers), Mahber Menaesey (Youth), and Mahber Dekenstyon (Women)–political organizations preventing the Tigrayan refugee community from the Dergue, the EDU, and the EPRP infiltrators (Berhanu, Citation2000). Exploiting its hegemony in the national politics, the TPLF forged partnership with the Red Cross Society, UNHCR, and OCHA to expedite its resettlement scheme. These institutions were instrumental in arranging refugees’ repatriation from the Sudan, providing food, clothing, and facilities at settlement sites (Berhanu, Citation2000).

The TPLF deceived the UNHCR through its Tigrayan interpreters working therein into registering Tigrayan refugees and omitting Wolkaites, who also fled to the Sudan during the civil war. When asked about their home localities where they wanted to resettle, Tigrayan refugees naively responded that they wanted to go to their place of origin, such as Shire, Adwa, Mekelle, etc. Furious of their naivety, Tigrayan interpreters working in the UNHCR tore the register into pieces. They chided the refugees, saying: you filled in places like Shire, Adwa, Mekelle, etc., as if you had plenty of fertile land there to till. Why did not you fill places like Humera, Adabay, Rawuyan, Metema, Kokit, Abrhajira, and Abulrafi? The refugees then filled in the names of these new places to which they were repatriated for settlement (interview with a Researcher at the University of Gondar, 04 October 2022). International organizations took for granted the cooked data of the TPLF and its affiliates.

At any rate, the host community was forced to bear the brunt of a wave of state-sponsored settlements. They found that their private holdings were increasingly encroached upon with the growing number of incoming returnees. The situation was exacerbated by the influx of Tigrayans coming from other parts of Tigray who heard news of the resettlement scheme in anticipation of benefiting from the scheme. Land allocation and other benefits turned out to be sources of antagonism. The Tigray regional state deployed its structures and cadres throughout Wolkait, with more presence at resettlement sites. Cadres and combatants of the TPLF expropriated the most fertile lands and filled the major administrative posts. The TPLF leveraged its position as a guardian of land as public property to benefit its loyal members with large tracts of land. The foremost beneficiary is the TPLF itself, running the Hiwet Farm Mechanization (>10,000 hectares of land and huge amounts of capital, machinery, and human labour). Large tracts of land hitherto developed and utilized by private investors as well as the state-owned Humera State Farm (over 10,000 hectares with 100 tractors) were transferred to Hiwet Farm Mechanization for producing cotton for Almeda Garment Factory (interview with a local notable, Humera town, October 15, 2022).

The Resettlement of Tigrayans can be considered the TPLF’s policy of demographic re-engineering of Wolkait. The first complete census in Ethiopia was conducted under the Dergue regime in 1984. The second and third studies were conducted during the TPLF/EPRDF reign in 1994 and 2007, respectively. The one conducted in 1984 shows that during the Gondar provincial administration, where Wolkait was a part, ethnic Amharas accounted for 2,542,723 (84.3%), whereas Tigrayans accounted for 190,183 (6.3%). Against this fact, the TPLF had already drawn the ethnic map of Tigray, which included Wolkait. When it captured the Ethiopian state in 1991, the TPLF held onto the ethnic map of Tigray. The second census was conducted in 1994 to show that Wolkait was Tigray. As it transpired, the census report revealed that the ethnic composition of Wolkait was turned upside-down: Tigrayans accounted for 97%, whereas Amhara accounted for 3% (Tedla & Kelklie, Citation2021).

This demographic re-engineering has resulted in two contradictory processes. While native Amharas were displaced as victims, new Tigrayan settlers occupied the land. At one time, it was estimated that 50,000 Amharas were forced out of their land, migrating within and outside Ethiopia (interview with a Researcher at the University of Gondar, 04 October 2022). To accommodate the wave of Tigrayan settlers in the area, the Amhara inhabitants were forcibly displaced. Amhara inhabitants who considered themselves native to the area were subject to intimidation, disappearances, and persecution. Those who resisted the resettlement policy on their ancestral land were killed, incarcerated, or forced to flee. The Tigrayan identity was forced upon the native inhabitants who remained there. Natives who were conversant with Tigrigna along with their mother tongue, Amharic, were coerced to embrace the new Tigrayan identity. They were counted as part of the Tigrayan population in the 1994 and 2007 national census reports. Settlement was not adequate to force Wolkaites to embrace Tigrayan identity. Settlers were encouraged to marry and intermingle with the female Wolkaites. Male Wolkaites were chased out of the area, and their wives were held in concubinage by the Tigrayan settlers to multiply the population of Tigrayans and overwhelm Wolkaites (interview with a Researcher at the University of Gondar, 04 October 2022).

On their part, Tigrayan nationalists admit that there was indeed a resettlement scheme in Wolkait before the 1994 census. They alleged, however, that it was an intra-regional settlement scheme-one conducted within Tigray, where Wolkait is an integral part (Nyssen & Demissie, Citation2023). Given the fact that the Tigrayans were the majority in the area, even before the emergence of the TPLF, the resettlement scheme did not create an impact in terms of altering the demography of the area in favour of Tigray. As one Tigrayan writer explains,

the resettlement was not different from intraregional resettlement programs implemented elsewhere in the federation, including the Amhara region. The program has more to do with helping food insecure and displaced populations by resettling them to more fertile areas than a sinister plot to tinker with demographics (Tesfaye, Citation2022, Resettlement effect, para.2, underlining in the original).

7.4. Wolkait as a foundation for the establishment of the Republic of Greater Tigray’

As articulated in its manifesto-76, the TPLF aspired to establish an independent republic called ‘Greater Tigray’, whose territorial extent spanned territories as far as Aluha (Wollo in Amhara) in the south, Mereb River in the north, Wolkait and Telemet (Gondar in Amhara) in the west, and the port of Assab from Eritrea in the northeast. The success of this grandiose plan hinged on two conditions. The first was to undertake territorial expansion within Ethiopia. A small province of Tigray expanded into the territories of the Amhara, annexing Wolkait in the west and Raya in the south-east. The second was to acquire access to the Red Sea (through the port of Assab) (McCracken, Citation2004). The first condition was fulfilled when the TPLF had annexed Wolkait and Raya with little fanfare during its insurgency. To realize the second condition, the TPLF/EPRDF made a futile attempt during the border conflict with Eritrea (1998–2002) to control Burie town-a strategic front that would help to capture Assab-a sea outlet coveted to be part of ‘Greater Tigray’. If the annexation of Assab was successful, the TPLF would have consummated its plan: ‘Greater Tigray’ as set forth in its manifesto-76 (McCracken, Citation2004).

The TPLF was of the conviction that it had already set in place the conditions necessary to realize ‘Greater Tigray’. Having defeated the Dergue regime, the TPLF boldly declared that it achieved one of the objectives it envisaged in its manifesto-76: resolving the ‘nationalities question’. In other words, the TPLF incarnated the right of self-determination including secession for each ethnic group in the 1995 FDRE constitution. The TPLF assured itself that, through its hard-earned victory, the quest of Tigray for the right to self-determination up to secession has been guaranteed. In the event of the exigency of secession,Footnote¹⁰ as per Ar. 39 of the FDRE constitution, the TPLF argued that Tigray had clearly delineated boundaries and borders. As such, the fate of Wolkait was a dead issue for the TPLF; it was part of the sovereignty of Tigray as provided for in the Tigray Region’s constitution (interview with a Researcher at the University of Gondar, 04 October 2022).

The TPLF advanced the conviction that the old Ethiopia came to an end with the demise of the Dergue regime in 1991. It survived total disintegration after ‘sovereign’ ethnic groups ‘came together’ to form a federal system based on self-determination (Melesse, Citation2022). With the adoption of ethnic federalism in 1991, the pre-1991 multi-ethnic provinces were redrawn to create ethnic homelands within which ethnic groups exercise self-determination rights. This has changed the concept of territory- it is not a mere administrative boundary, but part of the sovereignty of the Regional States. If anything happens that threatens their sovereignty, ethnic groups are entitled to secede as stipulated under Article 39 of the FDRE constitution. However, the historical fact is that Ethiopia was a unitary state before devolving into a federal system. The federal system that came about in 1991 was not a ‘coming-together’ federalism, as advanced by the TPLF but that of ‘holding-together federalism’Footnote¹¹ (Kefale, Citation2009). The obvious evidence is that sovereign ethnic groups with their own fixed territory as we see today did not exist prior to 1991. Neither Tigray, nor Amhara, Oromia etc. existed as sovereign entities. That is why, even after three decades of their creation, ethnic groups are embroiled in a tug of war over territories, without mutually recognized borders. Under such circumstances, secession remains a recipe for interminable border conflicts (Melesse, Citation2022).

The TPLF’s agenda of secessionFootnote¹² gathered momentum following its loss of a dominant position within the ruling coalition of the EPRDF in 2018. Since then, the political milieu has been filled with rumours and suspicions that the TPLF could reactivate its original plan. In fact, the TPLF leaders were engaged in the rhetoric of regaining federal power, or opting for secession, referendum, confederation, etc. Now that the TPLF lost its hegemony in the national politics, staying in the Ethiopian federation lost its appeal among the majority of Tigrayans. As one advocate of Tigrayan nationalism avers, Tigrayans grew increasingly frustrated with the new political narrative after 2018, which purveys that

‘Tigrayan’s constitute only 6%’, we the Oromo and Amhara combined are a majority and should monopolise power. This development has ignited fear among the Tigrayans: is majoritarian democracy the only avenue and should it be exclusive? Are we going to accept this exclusive 6% narrative and perpetual minority status? If so, why should we stay in the union? These are serious issues that one continues to hear in Tigray (Lema, Citation2020, A Federation without Tigray, para.1).

Amidst such frustrations with the new leadership under the Prosperity Party (PP)- one formed in 2019 by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to replace the EPRDF, the TPLF came to be wary of the surge of Amhara nationalism that push for the restoration of Wolkait into Amhara. On 4 November 2020, a military confrontation broke out between the federal government and the TPLF. The TPLF was dislodged from most of its military positions, including Wolkait-a lynchpin in the TPLF’s quest for secession, within the first two weeks of the fight (Tedla & Kelklie, Citation2021). Amharas regained Wolkait, which they claimed as their ‘ancestral land’ forcefully annexed by the TPLF without their consent. For them, the issue of Wolkait seems to have been settled at least militarily. The area was then reconstituted as a new administrative zone with four of its woredas- Kafta-Humera, Wolkait, Tegede and Awra, under the Amhara Regional State (interview with a member of the APP, Bahir Dar, 10 October 2022).

Yet, with the legality or constitutionality of the ‘restoration’ of Wolkait to Amhara still pending, the area remains a bone of contention among a host of political actors. Due to its strategic importance, the Oromo-dominated PP has a vested interest to put Wolkait under the federal administration. If Wolkait falls into the hands of the TPLF, it will invite a threat to the hegemony of the PP or even the survival of the country itself. The TPLF will get access to supply of arms via the Sudan for its war efforts aimed at either regime change in Addis Ababa or secession out of Ethiopia (Interview with a member of the APP, Bahir Dar, 10 October, 2022). It also seems to object to Wolkait being restored to the Amhara fearing that it will create trouble to ethnic federalism by setting an unfavourable precedent for future territorial claims. Thus, it insists that pending lasting solution, the area should be under the control of the federal government. The signing of a Cessation of Hostilities (CoHA) between the government and the TPLF in Pretoria, South Africa on 2 November 2022 has further complicated the peaceful settlement of the Wolkait issue. While the peace deal was intended to settle the power struggle between the PP and the TPLF, Wolkait, the main issue that pits Tigray and Amhara, was left unaddressed thereby setting the stage for a resumption of war in the area (interview with a member of the APP, Bahir Dar, 10 October 2022).

8. Conclusion and the way forward

This article has demonstrated that the issue of Wolkait is not a mere ethnic conflict between Amhara and Tigray ethnic groups. The conflict has its roots in the formation of the TPLF, the motive of which was the establishment of ‘Greater Tigray’ by carving out Wolkait and Raya territories from Amhara and Assab from present-day Eritrea. Wolkait was annexed in 1975 de facto and then incorporated to Tigray in 1991 outside of any legal constitutional process. The issue of Wolkait took a new twist during and after the November 2020 war, leading to its restoration to the Amhara Region. Yet, it still remains a bone of contention among political actors pursuing irreconcilable interests over the fate of the area, making the use of peaceful approaches imperative. Obviously, the best solution lies in overhauling the existing federal order-one that made co-existence among ethnic groups impossible by putting territories under exclusive ownership of ethnic groups. Regrettably, both the federal government and the TPLF reaffirmed their shared commitment to keep ethnic federalism in place through the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities in 2022, leaving Wolkait to be settled in accordance with the provisions of the FDRE constitution.

In that regard, the federal government has suggested referendum arranged under its auspices, which was nonetheless rejected by Amharas and Tigrayans. The TPLF has insisted on a reversion to the status quo ante– re-establishing the pre-war territorial sovereignty of Tigray as a sine qua non for peace. On their part, Amharas perceive the referendum as a ploy to set up Wolkait for the TPLF take-over, which will subject the Amharas for yet another round of subjugation. They fear Oromo-dominated federal government is more likely to favour its ideological partner-the TPLF on account of their shared commitment to ethnic federalism. Moreover, they argue that Wolkait was subjected to ethnic cleansing since 1970s with the TPLF deliberately undertaking demographic engineering by resettling Tigrayans. In such a situation, is it Tigrayan settlers or the indigenous Wolkait Amharas who will vote? Amidst such fears, Wolkait Amharas are striving to maintain the status quo-the hard-earned freedom they won after decades of subjugation by the TPLF. They are calling on the federal government to uphold their self-determination rights as an initial step, followed by measures aimed at dealing with past injustices inflicted on them, including investigating past crimes, holding perpetrators accountable, and compensating victims, as well as facilitating reconciliation.

Authors’ contributions

The conception and design of the study came from the corresponding author-Alene Kassaw, a PhD candidate at the Department of Religion and Peace Studies, Makerere University. He was involved in the collection and analysis of the data. He drafted the manuscript and forwarded it to Dr. Veneranda Mbabazi, Head of Department of Religion and Peace Studies, Makerere University, for her scholarly support that involved revision of the manuscript for language editing, structure, and inclusion and exclusion of data. Both authors approved the final draft of the manuscript for publication. They agree to be accountable for all aspects of the paper.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to acknowledge key informants, who willingly shared their views on the themes of the study.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

The data used for this manuscript are in no way shared or made available for any third parties for ethnical, privacy and security reasons. Informed consent needed for data collection was obtained on the condition of anonymity, confidentiality and privacy.

Additional information

Funding

No funding was received.

Notes on contributors

Alene Kassaw

Alene Kassaw has been a Senior Lecturer at the University of Gondar, Ethiopia. He graduated from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia in 2008. He joined the Department of Religion and Peace Studies, Makerere University, Uganda as a doctoral student in 2021. He published several articles in areas of conflict, self-determination, and trans-border security threats.

Mbabazi Veneranda

Mbabazi Veneranda is Senior Lecturer and Head of Department of Religion and Peace Studies, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Makerere University, Uganda. She graduated from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium and Uganda Martyrs University, Uganda. She is on the management team of the Makerere Rotary Peace Center. She has published in areas of gender and leadership, peacebuilding, conflict transformation and countering violent extremism.

Notes

1 In various literature, Wolkait is also written as ‘Welkait’, or ‘Wolqait’. Yet, ‘Wolkait’ is used throughout this article. In direct quotes taken from previous literature where other usages appear, they are retained as they are.

2 Tigray is also written as ‘Tigrai’ in various literature. Yet, ‘Tigray’ is used throughout this article unless employed otherwise in direct quotes taken from previous literature.

3 The ‘national question’ refers to the struggles by ethno-national groups to rectify the alleged ethnic domination and marginalization since the formation of the modern Ethiopian state in the early 20^th c. It served as a mobilization tool by ethno-nationalists that rallied their ethnic folks towards realizing self-determination rights up to secession. Some groups (mainly the OLF) went to the extent of portraying the Ethiopian state a ‘colonial empire’ waiting to be decolonized for the people to exercise their self-determination (Vaughan, Citation2003).

4 The EPLF was formed in August 1973 to achieve Eritrea’s independence. It waged a war of independence, portraying Ethiopia as a colonial power, heir to Italy. It argued that Eritrea was an Italian colony from 1882 to 1941, and as such should have been liberated in 1941 in the wake of the dislodgement of Italy or at least in 1950 when the UN made a decision to hand it over to Ethiopia through a federation (Zewde, Citation2002). Its struggle was not an ethnic one, since Eritrea was a multi-ethnic society composed of nine ethnic groups. During its struggle, the EPLF argued that Eritrea was monolithic rather than a composite of nine ethnic groups-an issue that put it at loggerheads with the TPLF. While the TPLF argued that the right to self-determination should be applied to each and every ethnic group in Eritrea, the EPLF countered that the principle should be applied to Eritrea as a whole. It mobilised all Eritreans irrespective of ethnic and religious differences and achieved independence in 1990 de facto and 1993 de jure.

5 The EPRDF was a coalition of ethnic based parties formed with the political patronage of the TPLF out of prisoners of war. When victory over the Dergue loomed large, the TPLF shifted its interest from secessionism to capturing the state. Yet, as one from a minority ethnic group, it had to forge an alliance with other ethnic-based armed groups that would readily share its political program/manifesto. First, it had forged an alliance with the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (EPDM)- a precursor of the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). It then proceeded to create the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO) and the Southern Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement (SEPDM) as its surrogates to govern the Amhara, Oromo, and the various groups in Southern Ethiopia respectively. It was this TPLF-led EPRDF that orchestrated a political process ushering to the adoption of ethnic federalism in 1991 (Gudina, Citation2003).

6 Italy staged a comeback in 1935 after its humiliating defeat at Adwa in 1896. During its brief occupation (1936-41), Italy put Ethiopia under its ‘direct rule’ as part of a newly formed Empire of Africa Orientale Italiana– a merger of Ethiopia and Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland (Zewde, Citation2002). The Empire was divided into six regions, organized chiefly on ethnic and religious criteria. The use of ethnicity appeared a double-edged sword for Italy- to best pursue its colonial interests through divide and conquer policy, and abolish the ‘alleged’ dominance of the ‘Amhara’ over other ethnic groups. Yet, the application of ethnicity was proved difficult, thus forcing Italy to use additional criteria such as geographical convenience and economic interest, thus making the regions multi-ethnic or multi-lingual (Vaughan, Citation2003). Shewa was, for example, carved out of territories from the neighbouring Amhara and Oromo population groups, making it multilingual despite Amharic being the dominant language.

7 Tigrayan elites allege that present-day Eritrea (known historically as Mereb Mellash before named Eritrea by Italy) was part of the Tigray province of Ethiopia. It was only lost out to Italy by the political perfidy of Emperor Menelik II, who they accused was keen on making Tigrigna speaking people weak and divided. He failed to capitalise on the victory of Adwa to dislodge Italians out of Mereb Mellash to reunite Tigrigna speaking people for various reasons (Vaughan, Citation2003). Yet, by default or by design, Tigrayan elites overlook the hesitation or leniency of Emperor Yohannes IV to deal with Italians before they expanded into the whole of Eritrea. By 1890, Italy had already carved the colony of Eritrea out of Ethiopia. By then, it was Yohannes IV, who was ruling the whole Ethiopia. Menelik was a mere nigus of Shewa. Rather than marching north to face Italy, Yohannes rushed to Matamma, taking his entire army, including his general Ras Alula, who was successful in checking the advance of Italy to the interior. This tragic mistake was exploited by Italy, then confined to Massawa, to quickly fill the vacuum left by Yohannes to annex territories all the way to Asmara (Haile, Citation1986).

8 The charges of Amhara domination were just political stereotypes exploited by ethno-nationalist groups for their assertions of ethno-political ends. Many scholars (e.g., Henze, Citation1986; Clapham, Citation1989; and Berhanu, Citation2000) ascertain that the ‘Amhara domination’ thesis held by the TPLF is replete with contradictions. First, the people of Tigray have a clear sense of being ‘the foremost Ethiopians’ as with the Amhara (Berhanu, Citation2000). Use of Amharic was not an issue for the traditional Tigrayan elites including for Emperor Yohannes IV, who used Amharic for official correspondence within Tigray and elsewhere (Berhanu, Citation2000). Besides, Tigrayan culture was already a culture of the core of Imperial Ethiopia. Second, Tigray was immune from an economic surplus extraction imposed in other regions of Ethiopia (Lata, Citation1999). Third, the Tigray nobility was part of the power struggle in the national politics. The Shewan ruling class represented elites from the traditional Abyssinian core (Eritrea, Tigray, and Amhara) as well as some sections of Oromia. Zewde (Citation2002) also notes that the mode of political struggle in Ethiopia was not ethnic in character, but regional, with Gondar, Yejju, Tigray, and Shewa provinces jockeying for power. While this was the fact, accusations against the Amhara continued even after the demise of the ‘Solomonic/Amhara ruling class’ in 1974. Much more so with the adoption of ethnic federalism and the official endorsement of the national oppression thesis, which has exposed the Amhara people to eviction, displacement, and ethnic cleansing in various parts of the country.

9 The independent state the TPLF envisaged to create is variously written in the previous literature as ‘Republic of Tigray’, ‘Republic of Greater Tigray’, or ‘Greater Tigray’.

10 Yet, whether Tigray can legally secede from Ethiopia in the name of self-determination is questionable. As stated in the UN Charter, the ‘self’ in ‘self-determination’ pertains to those people who were colonized, or under foreign domination. In view of this, the TPLF’s quest for ‘Greater Tigray’ has little or no prospect in the purview of international law. Tigray is not a colonized land and is not subject to ‘foreign domination. To the contrary, the Tigray-led TPLF/EPRDF now dominates Ethiopian politics’. (McCracken, Citation2004, p. 215)

11 ‘Holding-together’ federalism is one adopted to hold various sub-units together within the already existing state by devolving powers/autonomy whereas coming-together federalism comes into being, as in the USA, when hitherto sovereign states band together to form a common central government. The federal experiment since 1991 is best described as ‘putting together’ federalism rather than a holding together federalism. As Keller (Citation2003, p. 32) puts it, the system ‘began as a holding together federation and soon became a ‘putting together’ federation’. It was a nominal one that operated under the iron-fist of the TPLF.

12 The agenda of secession has subsided in the wake of the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities (CoHA) in Pretoria, South Africa, on 2 November 2022. It has been eclipsed by the agenda of ‘post-war reconstruction of Tigray’- endeavors aimed at helping Tigray recover from its devastation. While divisions and dilemmas persist among them, Tigrayan elites concur on rebuilding Tigray in the short-term including recovering the economy, resettling IDPs, ensuring transitional justice, and restoring ‘contested’ territories (Wolkait and Raya) to the sovereignty of Tigray. They also stand firm on the right to self-determination of Tigray including secession. As Fiseha (Citation2023) asserts, genocide and ethnic cleansing perpetrated on Tigrayans during the recent war and the entrenchment of an authoritarian government in Addis Ababa make Tigray’s quest for secession all the more justified.