Dr Roland Marchal is Senior Research Fellow at the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS), based at the Centre for International Researches, Sciences-Po, Paris. He is a specialist in conflicts and politics in the Horn of Africa and Central Africa.
Abstract
This chapter considers the motivations and drivers of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has built itself on a clear agenda: ridding Somalia of foreign forces, portrayed as Christians, and implementing the Sharia. These goals implied the need for reform and discipline of Somali society using all means: dawa (preaching) as well as violence. While the goals fit well with Somali nationalistic and Salafi agendas, more fluidity or even flexibility is shown by Al-Shabaab in a situation of weakness. However, there is no doubt that Al-Shabaab eventually intends to monopolize the religious arena and curb the political and social influence of any contenders. Somali viewpoints are not always antagonistic towards Al-Shabaab, which throws light on some of the mistakes or weaknesses of its enemies.
Summary
Al-Shabaab’s ambition to rule Somalis means that it has to dedicate people and resources to govern large areas of the country and address governance issues. Since its membership is limited compared to the territory to rule, it uses different models of governance, some relying on fear, others on devolution of limited powers to some segments of the population. Contrary to the common beliefs,
Al-Shabaab not only secures the areas it controls, it also provides important public goods by managing public infrastructures, helping destitute people and addressing important issues for the population such as conflict on family issues, inheritance and property titles.
Introduction
Testimonies of the early days of Al-Shabaab in 2004 reveal an important internal debate. Some led by Aadan Haashi Faarah ‘Ayroow had a militaristic understanding of what Al-Shabaab should be built for: killing spies and all opponents allied with Ethiopia and Western countries. This trend had he support of some Al-Qaida members such as Abu Talha al-Sudani, killed early 2007.1 This option corresponded to the dangerous environment they had been living in for months or even years.
There was a second trend in the group that was more political and viewed its role as a political vanguard that would educate and lead society and not only destroy enemies and dissenters. The death of ‘Ayroow in May 2008 and the dramatic increase of territories and populations controlled by Al-Shabaab in the following months meant that Al-Shabaab could not escape its responsibilities and had to rule populations. While the emphasis has been put on Al-Shabaab’s “coercive security”, in other words, its capacity to maintain order by terrorising people and overreacting in case of the breach of basic regulations, little attention has been paid to less strategic policies that were not always instrumental to control people but were conceived as a step forward to the kind of society Al-Shabaab would accept.2
In many regards, what follows could be a rough description of what the so-called Islamic State (IS) did in areas of Somalia that it controlled after 2014. Broadly speaking, it corresponds to a certain vision of how society is managed in Saudi Arabia, though it dismisses the many tensions and compromises made in that society which create some space for virtual dissidence.
3 What follows intends to describe Al-Shabaab’s intentions as a ground reality, and illustrates a great
variety of social responses to Al-Shabaab’s stimuli. In certain areas, people played into Al-Shabaab’s
hands and civil activities flourished. In others, the distrust was such that Al-Shabaab did the
minimum to stay in control.
Three main sectors have been selected here: preaching and education, organising civil society, and
justice. It would be wrong to assume that these activities took place in an amicable atmosphere but it
would be equally wrong to believe that the population remained as a block opposing all Al-Shabaab’s
attempts to enforce its domination. Al-Shabaab offered paths to social promotion as does any
authority for those who accept it and become its clients.
Dawa and Religious Education
Al-Shabaab has no utilitarian understanding of Islam. It believes what it says about religion. This
means that dawa (preaching) is an important part of the duties that have to be carried out by the
movement whenever they take over a village or a city.
It also points to a common misunderstanding: Westerners tend to overlook how Islamic Al-Shabaab
can be. Al-Shabaab is still using its Islamic credentials to legitimate itself in the eyes of the
population. Fear is used under conditions that make sense for believers, even if they disagree with
such understanding of Islam. As a consequence, whenever Al-Shabaab faces hostility from a
population, it may call one of its religious authorities to discuss the issue with the population and
ease the tensions. This suggests that Al-Shabaab’s religious figures are important and often more so
than military commanders who can be easily replaced.
Dawa has an important role for Al-Shabaab, and requires a considerable amount of time in the
mosque. Consequently, disapproval of Al-Shabaab may take the form of empty mosques to make the
group feel a lack of popular sympathy. Dawa not only focuses on the latest military achievements of
Al-Shabaab; it also provides a vision of what is happening elsewhere and reminds the public
audience that mistakes should not be tolerated, but corrected. If jihad is often mentioned, other
Muslim duties are also mentioned, according to the calendar and the local situation. Paying taxes (to
Al-Shabaab) and helping poor people are regularly quoted.
Al-Shabaab has also tried to invest in the religious education of children. Sending children to a
Quranic school is considered by Al-Shabaab as a basic duty of any family. But Quranic teachers need
to earn a living and many parents are unwilling to spend a lot on such schooling, because they
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believe that the faith could manifest itself in other ways than reading the Holy Quran. Al-Shabaab
has therefore been anxious to improve access to religious education and to improve the quality of the
teaching.
According to some testimonies, Al-Shabaab has tried to limit the number of students in Quranic class
to a maximum of 50 children. If parents are not able to pay the teacher enough money, Al-Shabaab
will pay a supplement to allow the teaching to continue. Moreover, it organises special sessions for
the teachers: refreshment courses and pedagogy. Al-Shabaab may emphasise jihad as a pillar of Islam
but does not forget that a good Muslim needs much more. The teaching uses the Saudi curriculum,
which explains also why parents cannot oppose it loudly.4
Up to the emergence of IS and Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab had little interest in the normal curriculum
of schools, which often are managed by pious Muslims or even Islamists. Recently, Al-Shabaab
hardened its discourse on these schools and required them to give up the UNICEF curriculum
(basically, the pre-war curriculum) and adopt another that was close to those followed in the Gulf
States. Efforts should be made to carefully verify the degree to which this decision has been
enforced. Threats were publicly made against schools that did not accept this decision. However, it
should be determined whether this was a general policy or a decision taken only by some wilayat
(provincial) governors.
In many classes where the lectures are made in Arabic, the fluency of the teachers is so limited that
after 30 minutes in Arabic, the teacher uses Somali to sum up and explain what he is supposed to
have taught. Al-Shabaab has no alternative to that situation: learning Arabic is a real investment that
few adults could afford due to their low salary and the lack of good Arabic teachers. Of course,
teaching the Saudi curriculum does not make Al-Shabaab terrorists.
We shouldbe more concerned by some attitudes exalted by Al-Shabaab that are quickly adopted by
the youth: the intolerance of dissenters; a dogmatic view on religious issues and a refusal to admit
that others may have the right to differ on some specific religious viewpoints; and the idea that those
in power are those who know religion better than all others.
These attitudes may be altered: the same intolerant teenager could fall in love with Facebook and his
smartphone. Youth may shift their views with the same speed they accepted them. However, the
overall impact may be significant. Tolerance and open-mindedness are the first two casualties in this
ongoing cultural war.
Organising Society and Keeping Elders at Bay
As analysed elsewhere, Al-Shabaab is undermining any alternative source of moral and social
authority in Somalia. Therefore, its policy towards clan elders is complex because it cannot afford to
antagonise the whole of local society but wants to make clear that people are ruled by Sharia and not
by xeer (customary law).5
Whenever a village is taken over, Al-Shabaab will gather the elders in front of the population, make
some requests in terms of recruits, weapons and sometimes taxes and then remind all that Al-
Shabaab is ruling with Islamic law and that elders should not try to interfere because their reign is over. Elders will have to pronounce the bayah (allegiance pledge) to Al-Shabaab, which is supposed to be their last public act as customary chiefs. Of course, the balance of force is not always in Al- Shabaab’s favour, but one should acknowledge that empowering elders is very rare and always a short-term policy to regain the support of a segment of the population or solve an immediate problem. Al-Shabaab’s policy of ruling through Islamic law (not customary law) also prevents the
elders of any given village from running their community; in some cases they are relocated in order
to avoid the emergence of clan issues.
If elders are kept at bay, the fate of the local intellectuals is not much better. Al-Shabaab is often
hostile to local intellectuals or educated people who could seek to play an alternative role to the
elders and lead the population. Those who want to be accepted will have to prove their readiness to
endorse Al-Shabaab and keep quiet. Many prefer to leave and settle in Mogadishu or any big cities
under AMISOM control.
If Al-Shabaab threatens certain social groups, it also promotes others. Its action is intended to
organise women, teenagers, and traders plus other economic operators. Al-Shabaab hasencouraged
marriages between its fighters and local girls. While such relations are usually forced, it appears to be
an effective method of entering local society, knowing who is who and building a local leadership
under Al-Shabaab’s influence.6 Obviously, such marriages may entail misery for the women
concerned. However, they could provide a social advantage because the wife may become a member
or even the chair of the local women’s committee that will gather women for religious meetings or
collect money to be distributed to the poorest families. For her relatives, the wedding means a higher
level of protection in the case that Al-Shabaab members are investigating them.
A similar kind of committee is often set up to manage the market place. This committee is often
original because it includes people who are useful to ensure honest trading but who are seen as
irrelevant by the main economic operators. Members of the committee are not selected
democratically. Rather, selection is in defiance of usual practice, which would give the upper hand to
men who belong to locally important clans. This means that the committee is scrutinised by Al-
Shabaab and cannot act without its agreement. Its duties are to manage the market, ensure it
functions cleanly, and make people aware of the taxation collected by Al-Shabaab. If need be, the
committee also gathers money for rehabilitating community infrastructure or helping poor families or
widows.
These committees serve as a powerful network to collect data on certain individuals and to police the
area. They function as a panopticon that makes it hard for any opposition to gather and plan against
Al-Shabaab.
Teenagers are also a strategic target for Al-Shabaab and resources are spent to give them a sense that,
sooner or later, they have to support the group, whether by spying on their own community, joining
local militias or even the core fighting force. But Al-Shabaab, except in exceptional cases, is careful
not to kidnap these young people because the population may overreact. Forced conscription does
happen but never in a systematic way.
Justice and Police
Al-Shabaab offers people something that has been missing for too long in the civil war:
predictability. People know what Al-Shabaab is expecting from them. They learn the hard way to
respect the prohibitions of this rudimentary Salafi order: no football, no movies, no music, and no
dating. If they respect these prohibitions, they have nothing to fear from Al-Shabaab. This does not
make people happy but they can survive.
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Whenever Al-Shabaab takes over a city or a village, it first intends to prove that its implementation
of Sharia is uncompromising and that no one can escape it. Usually, several huduud7 take place in the
first months in front of the local population that is obliged to gather to witness the execution or the
amputation of a man or a woman. Fear is an essential component of Al-Shabaab’s governance.
But it would be wrong to assume that this is the only function of Al-Shabaab’s courts. As in any
human community, many problems arise and require settlement. Most often, the courts are busy with
issues related to divorce, reimbursement of dowry, debt, business contracts, inheritance and land
conflict.
People rely on Al-Shabaab for three main reasons. First, the law is the Islamic law that no one can
contest, which is less the case when it is the customary law or the law of the state. Second, Al-
Shabaab magistrates are much less corrupt than state magistrates or the elders. Third, which makes
the real difference, Al-Shabaab enforces the judgements of its courts, while the elders have no power
of that kind and the state courts often work independently from the police.
Al-Shabaab also acts when lay people make allegations of corruption. Al-Shabaab’s Internal Security
division, known as Amniyat, may investigate the case and decisions can be made to reverse a
previous judgement and even to punish a judge. It is far from the ideal judicial system but so clearly
better than the other available options.
Al-Shabaab courts also show some seriousness in the way they investigate a case. They ask for
testimonies, for documents. They cross-check what parties declare at the court. They even try to
obtain official documents from the Mahamed Siyad Barre time to corroborate a viewpoint. To put it
in a nutshell, they do what is required despite the obvious shortcomings created by the war. This
transparency in the administration of justice does not go unnoticed by people.
This explains why in Lower Shabelle, farmers are ready to walk 30 km to attend the court and make
their case. They do not go to Afgooye or Merka because they have no faith in a positive outcome.
They also fear punishment for having interacted with the Somali government. Even people in
Mogadishu go to Al-Shabaab courts in Lower Shabelle (particularly Torotoroow court) to open a
case (often a land issue, debt or business matter). If the defendant refuses to accept the court’s
involvement, Al-Shabaab sends messages and eventually an Amniyat cell may kidnap a member of
his/her family to make clear that everyone has to comply with Al-Shabaab court. The main advantage
is that the court’s decision is respected by all those involved in the case, because of the fear of
reprisal.
This description begs a question: why does the government not act the same way? Al-Shabaab’s
methods are basic, based on common sense more than judicial expertise, and understood by
everyone. Why should the government not do the same, which would not require huge foreign
funding and international legal experts? In 13 years of existence, the Somali government was able to
sell land to U.A.E rulers, but to do little for the local population. The usual claim was made that no
one was living on the land that was sold to foreigners but reports suggest that local communities were
not consulted.
Yet, we should also not be too naïve. State laws have many advantages for people, especially
women. Al-Shabaab makes judgements but no one knows for sure that the entire legal process might
have been confirmed by a state court. Al-Shabaab’s role in justice weakens the system as a whole
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and reminds people that they cannot escape war, even if fighting does not take place in their
neighbourhood.
Conclusion
Al-Shabaab, as a politico-military organisation, has to fulfil a number of duties that are rooted in the
government of the population it controls. It corresponds to priorities that one can identify in other
Salafi movements such as IS.
Dawa is prominent and allows the movement to explain its actions and counter Federal Government
of Somalia’s (FGS) propaganda while enhancing its own. This Salafi importance given to dawa also
explains why Al-Shabaab commanders have been eager to improve the quality of the Quranic
schools and the pedagogy of their teachers. Resources are poured into that sector because they
represent an investment in the next generations and policy-makers should be vigilant as to its long-
term impact on youth.
Al-Shabaab claims a monopoly on the religious arena and does not accept any alternative source of
authority. Sharia, as understood by Al-Shabaab, prevails over any other legal system, either the
customary law (xeer) or the state laws.
Elders are edged out and Al-Shabaab establishes committees made up of appointees in relation to
social functions and women. Their objectives are twofold. It is a way to rule the population and avoid
being seen as outsiders, and a network of people who eventually are going to collect intelligence on
their fellow citizens.
After 27 years of civil war, Al-Shabaab indeed provides some kind of rule of law that allows people
to get important day-to-day problems solved in a non-contentious way: especially divorce and
disputes relating to inheritance, property titles, business issues and debt.
Al-Shabaab may produce fear and terror but it also produces public goods. There is no way it can be
defeated without responding to this challenge.
Recommendations
1. The challenges facing Al-Shabaab go beyond the military or security realm. Al-Shabaab civilian
achievements do not explain why people support or do not support the group. However, the FGS
should be aware that it is not the only actor engaged in a state-building project in Somalia and
that Al-Shabaab may win a degree of legitimacy through achievements that the FGS is unable to
realise.
2. Al-Shabaab’s governance needs to be better assessed since it offers a counter-model to what the
FGS claims to achieve with so far little results. In particular, policy-makers should pay attention
to the way Al-Shabaab devolves powers at the local level and allows some kind of local
governance, which should be an ambition of the current Somali government.
3. Al-Shabaab’s judicial system should be analysed carefully because many of its decisions affect
the day-to day life of the lay population and are well received. Consideration should be given to
updating Somali laws and making them more realistic for a population that has suffered much
from the arbitrariness of the civil war.
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4. Al-Shabaab is instrumental in reforming the social fabric of Somalia. One may disagree with its
means and its priorities but its relative successes show that the status quo is no longer acceptable.
The question is: does the FGS have sufficient ambition and imagination to rise to this challenge?
Talo Bixin
1. Caqabadaha ay leedahay in laga hortago Al-Shabaab wey ka badanyihiin kuwo ciidan iyo kuwo
amni. Guulaha xagga rayidka ay ka gaartay Al-Shabaab ma ahan kuwo faahfaahinaya sababta
dadku ay ku taageeren ama ay ku taageeri waayeen kooxda. Si kasto ay ahaataba, DFS waa in ay
ogaataa in aanay kaligeed ku ahayn mashruuca dowlad-dhisidda ee Soomaaliya oo Al-Shabaab
ay ku hooreyn karto qadar sharciyadeed oo ay ku kasbatay guulo ay gaari weysay DFS.
2. Maamulka Al-Shabaab waxa uu u baahanyahay in si wanaagsan loo qiimeeyo maadaama ay
bixineyso hab ka gadisan midka DFS sheeganeyso inay ku guuleysatay, taas oo natiijadeedu aad
u yartahay. Si gaar ah, waa in siyaasad dejiyeyaashu fiiro gaar ah u yeeshaan habka ay Al-
Shabaab u dhaadhiciso awoodda oo ay u gaarsiiso heer deegaan una ogolaato inuu shaqeeyo
maamul deegaan, taas oo la rabay inay noqoto hammiga iyo yididiilada dowladda Soomaaliya ee
hadda jirta.
3. Waa in si taxadar leh loo falanqeeyaa nidaamka garsoor ee Al-Shabaab waayo in badan oo
go’aamadooda ah waxay taabanayaan nolosha maalin kasta ee bulshada caadiga ah,
go’aamadaasna si fiican ayaa loo qaataa oo wey hirgalaan. Waa in tixgelin la siiyaa
cusbooneysiinta sharciyada Soomaaliya lagana dhigaa kuwo ka turjumaya waaqica ay ku
nooshahay bulsho ay daashadeen xukun ridista aan loo meel dayin ee laga dhaxlay dagaalladii
sokeeye.
4. Al-Shabaab waxay dowr muhiim ah ka qaadan kartaa dib-u-habaynta xaalada bulsho ee
Soomaaliya. Waa laga yaabaa in laga hor-yimaado oo aan la aqbalin habka ay u marto iyo
waxyaabaha ay mudnaanta siiso laakiin guulaha muuqdo oo ay gaartay ayaa caddeyn u ah in
xaaladda hadda lagu suganyahay aan la aqbali Karin in lagusii jiro. Su’aashu waxay tahay: DFS
ma leedahay hami iyo fikir ku filan oo ay wax uga qabato caqabaddan?
Notes
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1 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Strike in Somalia Targets Al-Qaeda Figure”, Washington Post, 8 January 2007.
2 Stig Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group 2005-2012
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
3 Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2007.
4 Roland Marchal, Lower Shabelle in the Civil War. Historical Dynamics of Land Conflicts in a Somali
Region, Mogadishu/Nairobi/Paris, June 2016 (forthcoming).
5 Roland Marchal, “The rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin”,
Nairobi, March 2011.
6 This practice already existed within clan factions in the 1990s and has a long history in some agricultural
regions such as Lower Shabelle and Lower Jubba.
7 Huduud is an Islamic term referring to punishments, which under Islamic law (Sharia) are mandated and fixed
by God. Huduud punishments range from public lashing to publicly stoning to death, amputation of hands an
