, By aron lavis
A severe conflict has broken out within Sudan over the past few weeks. Fighting began due to a power struggle between two highly influential military leaders; General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.
Burhan has been the Head of the Sudanese military for the past few years, acting now as de facto leader of the country. His aims have been argued across western media to be totalitarian in nature. Officially, however, Burhan has stated that he wishes to step down from power upon the implementation of a democratically elected government. From where such a government may emerge, is unknown.
Dagalo – widely known as ‘Hemedti’ – is the head of a Sudanese paramilitary group called the ‘Rapid Support Force’ (RSF). The RSF is a militia group which lies outside of the jurisdiction of the regular Sudanese military, and thus Burhan’s official command. Hemidti’s position affords him large portions of the nation’s gold reserves and a large military force. He used to be Burhan’s military and political deputy. However, after tensions arose between the two, his objective is now to become the undisputed leader of Sudan.
The roots of this conflict stem back to 2013. That year, the former dictator of Sudan – Omar al-Bashir – transformed a powerful pro-government militia force, originally known as the ‘Janjaweed’, into the RSF. The reformed RSF answered directly to the Dictator, rather than the military chain of command.
In 2019, Bashir’s creation of the RSF exposed him. Bashir was overthrown via a mass pro-democracy civilian uprising, a movement of which Burhan and Hemidti took advantage by agreeing a deal to oust Bashir and oversee a peaceful transition.
In 2021, the two generals united to incite a coup against the transitional government for which they had advocated, thus taking direct control over the country.
The concept of ‘Security Sector Reform’ – defined as the process by which a state decouples its army from its political mechanism and centralises its army under one umbrella – was the key trigger for conflict action.
Burhan and Hemidti disagreed upon numerous aspects of the reform process, most notably the speed at which the RSF would be incorporated into the Sudanese army. Over time, tensions between the two men began to take physical form. Recently, RSF forces were provocatively placed around Khartoum by Hemidti as a show of strength. Burhan’s regular forces saw the action as a threat and were ordered to open fire.
Direct conflict started on the 15th of April and has since escalated in severity. The fighting is particularly brutal for civilians as the battleground is mostly centralised within the capital city of Khartoum, with RSF forces looking to forcefully occupy buildings and neither force exhibiting concern for civilian casualties.
The fighting has initiated a growing humanitarian crisis in the region, with food, water and electricity supplies running dangerously low. Furthermore, casualties have begun to reach the thousands whilst tens of thousands of Sudanese citizens are attempting to flee into neighbouring nations. The WHO has reported over 400 deaths thus far.
On a regional level, the conflict in Sudan will impact two key areas of Africa’s geopolitical landscape.
The fight is predicted to be both protracted and infectious
Firstly, the fight is predicted to be both protracted and infectious in nature. Alan Boswell, a spokesperson for the International Crisis Group, believes that the conflict will spill over into neighbouring countries. Neighbouring Chad has already closed its borders to Sudan. However, the porousness of the borders in the region is notable. As such, it is likely that South Sudan and Chad will prove stages for conflict expansion.
Secondly, Sudan shares access to the River Nile with both Egypt and Ethiopia. Conflict along the river will have a detrimental impact on trade and water distribution in a region which already suffers from environmental volatility.
Regional diplomacy has failed to stem the tide of conflict in Sudan. A regional bloc agreed to send three presidents – from Kenya, South Sudan, and Djibouti – to Khartoum on a peacebuilding mission. The mission quickly failed.
The instability in Sudan raises the possibility of global involvement. The UAE and Saudi Arabia see the Horn of Africa as a key area over which they can expand military and diplomatic influence. Moreover, ties between Hemidti’s RSF and the Gulf States are strong, as the RSF provided them thousands of troops for their conflict against the Iran-backed Houthi Rebels of Yemen. Therefore, the Gulf States are likely to intervene in the conflict.
Furthermore, Russia’s interests in Sudan span from gold mining to construction plans for a strategically advantageous naval base in Port Sudan. However, Russian interests in Sudan have not yet translated into intervention in favour of a particular conflict actor as the Kremlin holds positive relationships with both leaders. For example, Hemditi’s ties with the Russian Wagner Group and its mercenaries are extensive as Hemidti protects and controls a gold mine with reported links to the Wagner Group and the Kremlin. Moreover, Burhan’s diplomatic relationship with Vladimir Putin is solid as the two have a recent record of agreeing numerous diplomatic deals.
The regional and international dynamics to the conflict are cause for concern. Many argue that it is imperative that neutral forces invest in diplomatic efforts to broker peace.
Image: USAID via Wikimedia Commons
