Abstract
The International Crisis Group (icg) has the motto ‘working to prevent conflict worldwide’. As an organisation the icg occupies a very specific niche role, which is related to crises of a political nature, specifically armed conflict. While the icg employs a negative understanding of crisis, the academic definition of what a crisis may constitute is broader, as it can actually represent an opportunity for some actors. This article, written from a communication studies perspective, seeks to address how crises are manufactured in icg texts. It argues that the way in which crisis events are viewed and reacted to depends on the level of information and ‘knowledge’ that is produced and circulating about them. The article tackles the issue of the strategic level of the icg in terms of its means and mechanisms of attempting to project influence. It explores the different ploys and strategies used to influence policy makers, especially its communication strategy, the different values and ethics that are highlighted, and the ‘causes’ that are promoted.
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The International Crisis Group and the
manufacturing and communicating of
crises
Greg Simonsa
a Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala
University and National Centre for Crisis Management Research
and Training, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm,
Sweden
Published online: 16 Jul 2014.
To cite this article: Greg Simons (2014) The International Crisis Group and the
manufacturing and communicating of crises, Third World Quarterly, 35:4, 581-597, DOI:
10.1080/01436597.2014.924062
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.924062
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The International Crisis Group and
the manufacturing and
communicating of crises
Greg Simons*
Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University and National Centre for Crisis
Management Research and Training, Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, Sweden
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has the motto ‘working to pre-
vent conflict worldwide’. As an organisation the ICG occupies a very
specific niche role, which is related to crises of a political nature,
specifically armed conflict. While the ICG employs a negative under-
standing of crisis, the academic definition of what a crisis may consti-
tute is broader, as it can actually represent an opportunity for some
actors. This article, written from a communication studies perspective,
seeks to address how crises are manufactured in ICG texts. It argues
that the way in which crisis events are viewed and reacted to depends
on the level of information and ‘knowledge’that is produced and cir-
culating about them. The article tackles the issue of the strategic level
of the ICG in terms of its means and mechanisms of attempting to pro-
ject influence. It explores the different ploys and strategies used to
influence policy makers, especially its communication strategy, the
different values and ethics that are highlighted, and the ‘causes’that
are promoted.
Keywords: International Crisis Group (ICG); influence; communication
strategy; event management; crisis; persuasion
Introduction
Knowledge involves the ability to make sense of and instrumentalise informa-
tion and data that exist in our environment, to turn that raw intangible material
into something that is tangible, meaningful and real. The ability to achieve this
successfully depends on the availability of and access to information of good
quantity and quality. This is especially critical during periods of crisis and/or
war, when the tempo and stakes involved are simultaneously at elevated levels.
Some organisations exist specifically to fulfil the niche role of providing infor-
mation and data to policy makers concerning crisis situations –in a sense, they
are crisis knowledge brokers or gatekeepers.
*Email: [email protected]
© 2014 Southseries Inc., www.thirdworldquarterly.com
Third World Quarterly, 2014
Vol. 35, No. 4, 581–597, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.924062
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A policy maker will react to the information environment on a particular
event according to the manner in which it is conveyed. International crises and
especially war carry with them, on the one hand, a certain element of political
risk, which consists in the potential loss of military personnel, together with the
possibility of taking the blame politically, which can result in a government
being voted out of office. On the other hand, there is an element of opportunity
as well –conversely, if things go ‘right’it can lead to the accumulation of polit-
ical capital. Therefore, the event in question needs to be prominent in the infor-
mation sphere and there needs to be a sense of legitimacy associated with it to
enhance the likeliness of external intervention. This is an extremely politically
sensitive topic, as observable especially in the wake of the armed conflicts and
interventions in Iraq (2003), Libya and Syria.
1
Influencers such as NGOs,
think-tanks and other forms of organised lobbying have emerged that use com-
munication and knowledge production in order to engineer consent to socially
constructed politics and values with regard to such crises.
2
This article takes a communication studies approach to addressing the subject
matter. It analyses the International Crisis Group (ICG), as one prominent exam-
ple of such influencers, and its ability to shape political knowledge about and
perceptions of different international crises. The ways and means by which the
ICG tends to wield persuasion and influences perception through its communica-
tions on a number of different crises it has championed will be the core concern
of the article, which will not look at individual cases but rather at the means
and ability across the spectrum of ICG reporting.
The article begins by tackling the issue of defining what a crisis is and how
war and conflict fit into this frame. These questions will be addressed from the
stance of communicational considerations and aspects that are embedded in cri-
sis and war, exploring key attributes of ‘successful’communication from the
point of view of achieving organisational objectives and goals. The next section
lays the theoretical and conceptual foundations for defining influence and policy
via the use of persuasion. The focus will be on the role of NGOs and especially
think-tanks. The final section looks at concrete cases where the ICG has taken a
stance on individual crisis situations and suggested a particular course of action.
A sample of the different kinds of informational products produced and dissemi-
nated by the ICG will be evaluated. The analysis will be guided by the question
of how the ICG tries to wield influence and persuade policy makers and public
through its informational products and the respective communication strategy.
The ultimate task of this article is to identify whether there is a ‘recipe’used by
the ICG in its attempts to shape public perception and political reaction to armed
conflict.
Crisis, armed conflict and communication
The word ‘crisis’should be reserved only for serious events or threats. A crisis
involves ‘a disturbance in normal conditions and is an exceptional, unexpected
or abrupt change in the state of security that poses a threat to the functioning of
society and to the safety of the population’.
3
Although crises cannot be pre-
dicted, they can be anticipated.
4
Beyond this general definition, crises vary
widely in terms of their character and appearance:
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Crises may be international, national, regional or local, and they may have very
different effects. The following are examples of situations requiring intensified
communications: a major accident; a sudden international political or military cri-
sis; an environmental accident; a natural disaster or catastrophe; a disturbance
involving information systems or power distribution; wide-scale immigration; an
epidemic; terrorism; a threat caused by organised crime; and a publicity crisis
affecting the organisation or its top management.
5
As broad and diverse as crises can be, all examples listed above share some
common characteristics. There are three different elements of perception that
need to be simultaneously managed by decision makers in order to declare a
phenomenon a crisis: first, the threat to basic values; second, a sense of urgency;
and third, the issue of uncertainty.
6
The threat to values refers to what is being
threatened –way of life, human life, economic well-being, property, and so
forth. Values are important and need to be expressed; however, not all values
are equal. Sanctity of human life is considered paramount, mid-range values
include environmental concerns, and lower-end values relate to issues such as
financial cost.
7
An essential aspect to note at this stage is that ‘the use of infor-
mation is embedded in social norms that make it highly symbolic’.
8
Social
norms provide the means for establishing an emotional connection between the
communication and the target audience. However, this is only valid so long as
those norms resonate with the audience.
Perception or image is of crucial importance in today’s highly mediated
world, where image can be of as much importance as substance.
9
Mass media
play a critical role in the process of shaping the perception of a crisis, as is
noted by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency’s handbook: ‘The image
that various interested parties have of a crisis is created, to a very large extent,
by the media’.
10
The importance of the media had already been proposed by
Joseph Scanlon some 20 years earlier in 1975: ‘Every crisis is also a crisis of
information…Failure to control this crisis of information results in failure to
control the crisis, including its directly operational aspects’.
11
In this regard
knowledge can be considered as both a tangible and an intangible resource.
12
Good media management can create opportunities for some actors, which entails
a need to understand how media and journalists function.
Journalists and media set out to cover and report on crisis events in a rela-
tively predictable form. The former director of communications at the British
Home Office, Michael Granatt, has devised the progression of media response
to a crisis in the following way:
Mayhem –occurs in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The media rush
to the scene of the crisis to find out what, where, when, why, how, and to
get images.
Mastermind –relevant background information and history is sought.
Manhunt –the media seek to apportion error, fault, blame and a scape-
goat.
Epilogue –occurs in the long-term aftermath and follow-up. Inquiries, tri-
als and memorial services are covered; reconstructions of the event and
documentaries are produced.
13
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Should an organisation seek to influence the perception and hence opinion of an
event, then the best stages to do this are during the phases of mayhem or
mastermind. Shaping the information environment at this early stage allows for
the possibility to more easily dictate the narration and characterisation of the
event. Following from this, a course of suggested action may be proposed more
easily, which would seem to alleviate the constructed problem event. A crisis is
interesting news and will therefore attract the attention of the media. Therefore
media have the potential to alleviate or exacerbate the situation, to act as judge
and jury, and they have a tendency to exaggerate and sensationalise.
14
This must
be carefully and professionally managed through effective crisis communication.
The following discussion relates to the communicational aspects to be con-
sidered within a democratic political system. Within the area of crisis communi-
cation there are two broad categories: managing information and managing
meaning. The management of information involves the ‘collection, analysis and
dissemination of information during a crisis’. The management of meaning per-
tains to ‘the messages used in attempts to shape how people perceive the crisis
or the organisation in crisis’.
15
In order to initiate the process of turning infor-
mation into knowledge, there is much more involved than simply getting the
needed information to the required destination.
16
As mentioned above, war can
be categorised as a kind of crisis. It bears all of the symptoms of a crisis as out-
lined by Stern –threat to values, time constraint and uncertainty.
17
A crisis is
also an activity that is highly politicised in some circumstances, such as during
periods of armed conflict.
18
Periods of crisis also involve the possibility of deal-
ing with contradictory values and poor sets of choices that involve real or per-
ceived trade-offs.
19
For example, advocates of military intervention sometimes
argue for the need to intervene before the conflict becomes too costly for citi-
zens of the affected country. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hague spoke of
the need to arm the Syrian ‘opposition’, if the situation worsened (Guardian,3
March 2013).
If a war is to be fought, there needs to be some measure of perceived legiti-
macy and demand for it. It needs to be understood as being something that is
necessary and just, and as a last resort (ie there is no alternative). Under such
circumstances the uses of not only images but also narratives are the key to
how an audience receives and perceives the event.
20
This has the effect of creat-
ing a moral fog of war, in order to be able to justify an action that would be
deemed unjustifiable under normal (non-crisis) circumstances: ‘Military support-
ers often conflate political and moral discourse, under the assumption that war is
a form of community self-defence, and the nation’s survival supersedes all other
considerations’.
21
Therefore the expression of ranked values plays an important part in shaping
the moral narrative for (or against) a particular war.
22
For example, the protec-
tion of the highest value of the sanctity of human life at the barrel of a gun may
seem to be contradictory when subjecting the logic to critical analysis (rather
than from the lens of an emotional logic). These arguments need to be under-
stood and accepted by the target audience of the messages. This does not mean,
however, that all wars are equal in terms of the attention and the ‘popularity’
that they draw. A war that is promoted in a ‘better’manner in terms of its
intangible assets (legitimacy) is more likely to receive a greater level of political
584 G. Simons
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support and commitment.
23
This makes the public relations and marketing of
the proposed intervention or war a critical aspect.
24
An actual or potential war
that possesses the attributes of high casualty rates as well as links to national
politics and interests (of the potential intervening parties) is likely to gain trac-
tion in terms of concrete policy and response on the issue.
25
A central point that emerges from this section is that a ‘crisis’is not necessar-
ily an objective and concrete state of affairs, but is subject to interpretation and
perception. Therefore, there is an opportunity for those with the necessary skills
and ability to influence this perception of a particular crisis through the interpre-
tation of carefully selected and presented information. This can be achieved
through subjective and vested opinion being presented and masqueraded as
‘objective’fact. As such any attempt to project an event as a crisis will probably
place great emphasis on the simultaneous constituent elements that are used to
confirm its existence –threat to values (normally of a humanitarian nature), issue
of uncertainty, and the problem of time constraint. The humanitarian aspect is
offered to give a sense of legitimacy and lack of vested interest, as people are
more likely to be moved to action via ‘good’emotional values than by the articu-
lation of concrete political interests. The emphasis within the sphere of crisis
communication is to manage meaning, rather than managing information.
Seeking influence and shaping perception
The basic framework for making organisational decisions is often seen as based
upon the premise that organisations make implicit and explicit decisions on
seeking and using information that may improve predictions on future prefer-
ences and consequences. Those decisions are ‘presumed to be based on esti-
mates of the expected benefits and costs of particular information, information
strategies, or information structures’.
26
As such, ‘knowledge the organisation
possesses is the most salient source of sustainable competitive advantages’.
27
Shaping the information environment can reap rewards for actors in terms of
the persuasion and the influence of their ideas. Knowledge transfer not only
deals with the learning aspects, but also the issue of actively searching for
knowledge.
28
It may also lead to the creation of new and previously unknown
knowledge. ‘Knowledge management deals with the ways in which the various
exchange processes can be controlled’, which ‘includes the different ways in
which various types of knowledge are transferred between individuals and
between organisations, and how one form of knowledge is converted into
another form’.
29
An example in relation to the role of knowledge in organisa-
tional learning, where the transfer of knowledge contributes to the learning pro-
cess, is the conversion of tacit knowledge based on experience into explicit
knowledge, which is articulated, codified and stored in certain types of media.
However, information is not exact or perfect. This is because the construc-
tion and nature of information are based upon subjective as well as objective
aspects. When one person or organisation seeks to influence the perception and
reaction of another, the proportion of subjective construction is likely to
increase: ‘The last two decades have seen those that practice it place issue man-
agement within the bailiwick of the communications or public relations function.
And it’s proved to be quite a good fit, as long as that function has a role to play
at the strategic level.’
30
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There is therefore a need for influencers not only to communicate, but to
manage the communication in a very specific and symbolic manner. In some
regards the decision-making process can be considered more important than the
outcomes it produces: ‘It is an arena for exercising social values, for displaying
authority, and for exhibiting proper behaviour and attitude with respect to a cen-
tral ideological construct of modern western civilisation: the concept of intelli-
gent choice’,
31
as Feldman and March express it. They further state that the
‘command of information and information sources enhances perceived compe-
tence and inspires confidence’.
32
If an actor is able to position him/herself, and
to create a viable brand of being competent (for a variety of different tangible
and intangible reasons) in a niche within the information sphere, s/he may be
well placed to project a sense of influence more easily.
33
This forces those who seek to influence and persuade in order to shape opin-
ion, perception and reaction to events to adopt certain sets of tactics to maxi-
mise their chances of achieving success:
Policymakers, think tanks, and pressure groups are encouraged to commission
pragmatically oriented research, strengthening the hands of experts whose claims
to be able to conduct and interpret it are widely accepted. But it also supports the
emergence of ‘the instrumental rationalisation of persuasion,’based on the tech-
niques, values, and personnel of (a) advertising, (b) market research, and (c) pub-
lic relations.
34
Thus the basis of persuasion, as seen above, is not ‘forcing’a viewpoint or
course of action upon others; it is to present information in such a manner as to
convince others to freely choose a particular point of view or action. Important
within this context is that persuasion is influenced by moral components –
choosing to engage in morally beneficent actions and choosing to refrain from
morally reprehensible ones, for example.
35
This implies the weighing of moral
judgements based upon symbolism and values.
36
Perloff defines persuasion as ‘a
symbolic process in which communicators try to convince other people to
change their attitudes and behaviours regarding an issue through the transmis-
sion of a message in an atmosphere of free choice’.
37
This implies that persuasion involves five different components: (1) it is a
symbolic process; (2) in which people persuade themselves; (3) which involves
an attempt to influence and (4) the transmission of a message; and (5) which
requires free choice.
38
In terms of impact persuasion can be used for three broad
effects. The first is to shape attitudes and opinions on something. The second is
to reinforce attitudes and opinions in an audience. The third is to change atti-
tudes and opinions.
39
This now needs to be tied back to NGOs and how they
embark upon attempting to persuade (influence) policy makers.
NGOs, among them think-tanks, come in many shapes and forms. They also
fulfil different functions and go about their work of influence and persuasion in
diverse ways and manners. Historically think-tanks can be divided into two cate-
gories: universities without students and non-profit government research contrac-
tors. Although these addressed specific legislation and issues, the focus was on
changing the climate of elite opinion.
40
The division of the character of think-
tanks is important in helping to define their modus operandi.
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In terms of how think-tanks work today, there are different opinions and
ways of viewing the issue. Weidenbaum studied US think-tanks and listed the
following characteristics:
1. Think-tanks are both academics and activists; they are at the crossroads
of politics and academia.
2. Major think-tanks are neither completely conservative nor completely
liberal.
3. Differentiation between think-tanks and universities is substantial –edu-
cation of students versus influencing public policy.
4. Competition among think-tanks is pervasive.
5. Think-tanks make a special contribution to public policy; they provide a
policy forum of knowledgeable and experienced people.
41
There are also signs that such organisations seek to advance certain interests. A
‘new’third model of think-tank has come into being –advocacy tanks. These
combine strong policy, partisan or ideological bias with aggressive salesmanship
in order to influence current policy debates. A case of spin on existing ideas
and their accessibility to policy makers drives their success.
42
According to Abelson, think-tanks have four main characteristics. First, they
are elite organisations; they rely on expertise and close ties to policy makers to
advance political and economic interests of their sponsors. Second, they are one
of many groups in what has become a crowded marketplace of ideas. Third,
they play a modest role in shaping public policy, especially compared with the
power and resources of government; yet, while the role may well be modest, it
is also strategic at times. Fourth, they have different mandates and resources.
43
Additional roles of think-tanks identified by other researchers include: (1) as a
source of policy ideas; (2) as a source and evaluator of policy proposals; (3) as
an evaluator of government programmes; (4) as a source of personnel; and (5)
punditry.
44
Weaver also adds that think-tanks can provide some government pol-
icy with a sense of legitimacy, especially if the organisation is seen as being
‘independent’and its recommendations match existing (but not yet imple-
mented) government policy.
In terms of the International Crisis Group’s place within these classifications
it may be argued that it serves as a non-profit government research contractor,
given that 49% of its 2012 budget was derived from government sources
according to its website, and that it is working toward shaping elite opinion on
identified conflict issues. Looking at Weidenbaum’s classification of think-tanks,
the ICG is definitely not positioning itself on the political scale in terms of con-
servative or liberal, but rather in advocating or legitimising (for governments)
certain policy positions towards conflicts it champions. The fact that the ICG is
working very actively to groom the ‘independent’image of itself hints at this
being one of the levers of legitimacy that is used. Others include the nature of
its products, which are at the crossroads of government and academia. A final
important point is the nature of the personnel, many of whom are derived from
the political, economic and intellectual elite and are therefore already known by
and interacting with policy- and decision makers.
45
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The ICG and the manufacturing of crises
The material in this section is sourced from the various ICG informational prod-
ucts –briefings, reports, conferences, other material produced and distributed
via its website and other means, and op-eds. An analysis will be made of these
products in terms of the format, means or medium of distribution, length of the
material and the nature of the content (in terms of rhetoric used and narrative/
framing). The ICG is positioning itself as a one-stop knowledge channel in the
sphere of policy response to particular (highlighted) armed conflicts by govern-
ments. Through its extensive networks and field operations it is in the business
of converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge via its communication
activities. It is the aim of this section to highlight the different means of rhetori-
cal persuasion and influence the ICG uses in its informational products.
The analysed material was selected in order to explore whether the manufac-
turing of ‘crisis’follows the same pattern in different cases, namely through the
notions of threat, urgency and uncertainty, regardless of the country or issue at
hand. Materials are mostly from the period starting from 2010 onwards, which
incorporates periods of intense armed conflict and intense debate on so-called
humanitarian interventions (especially within the context of the Arab Spring).
Reports produced by the ICG form the first type of informational product to
be examined. Reports constitute the largest category in terms of physical bulk of
the organisation’s information products and range in size from some 30 to 50
pages. The examination of seven randomly chosen ICG reports hints at the more
general finding that these reports all follow the same style, that is, the pattern of
the different elements of a crisis: highlighting certain values under threat, detail-
ing various uncertainties and emphasising the element of time constraint.
46
As a start to analysing the ICG material the events of the summer of 2010 in
Kyrgyzstan are considered; these involved ethnic unrest in the south of the
country between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. The violent conflict between the two eth-
nic groups took place between May and June 2010; by late August 2010 the ICG
had produced a 34-page report on the issue.
47
This report utilised and exploited
the different aspects of a crisis, and references to these aspects are found
throughout the report, but are concentrated in the conclusion and recommenda-
tions. Looking specifically at the conclusion in relation to the communicated
threats to values, uncertainties and time constraints, each is taken in turn.
A primary value under threat, as identified by the report, was the Kyrgyz
democracy: ‘A few years ago [ie during the 2005 Colour Revolution that saw
the overthrow of President Akayev], Kyrgyzstan was viewed, not completely
implausibly, as Central Asia’s outpost of democracy and tolerance’.
48
Another
value seen as threatened was national identity –both Uzbek and Kyrgyz: ‘The
violence and pogroms of June 2010 have further deepened the gulf between eth-
nic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks’.
49
A third threat was seen as affecting the territorial
unity of the country, visible in differences between the north and south: ‘The
country is de facto split in two’.
50
The threat to development, life and property
is another value under threat that is emphasised: ‘The forces that were involved
in the well planned and executed attacks on Uzbek mahallas are a threat to Ky-
rgyz democracy and development, not just to ethnic minorities’.
51
Taken
together, these stated threats to central values form the basis for labelling the
events as a major ‘crisis’.
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The second ingredient of the ‘crisis recipe’, the issue of uncertainty, is also
highlighted in the report. As a main component it is emphasised that the central
government is very weak and unable to assert its influence over the regions.
Statements from the Mayor of Osh regarding moving the capital from Bishkek
to Osh reinforce the air of uncertainty concerning the lack of central governmen-
tal control. On page 27 of the report doubts are cast upon the effectiveness of
state institutions, which are presented as a local assessment: ‘The government
itself has doubts about the loyalty of its security forces, and admits that police,
the courts and prosecutors are crippled by top-to-bottom corruption’. Further
projections are laid out on page 28 concerning additional threats, such as the
possible emergence of and domination by narcotics dealers and the potential for
the south of the country to become a safe haven for ‘Islamic radical guerrillas’.
A historic parallel is projected by stating that the reputation of Kyrgyzstan could
be that of the ‘Sick Man of Central Asia’–a parallel to the Ottoman Empire in
the years before the First World War.
Third, time constraint issues are also emphasised in the report, and related to
the necessity to act urgently. The conclusions emphasise the need to quickly
provide adequate housing for those people displaced by the ethnic unrest before
the onset of winter. An urgent need for thorough investigation of the causes and
the actual events of the summer of 2010 is highlighted, which is portrayed as
being a prerequisite for possible reconciliation and peace. Without it, the possi-
bility of violence occurring again is projected: ‘If this problem remains unad-
dressed, it will not take 20 years for another explosion to occur. It could happen
five years from now –or, if the slide towards extreme nationalism continues
unchecked, much sooner than that.’
52
Taken together, threatened values, uncer-
tainty and time constraints create the notion of crisis in the report –a recipe that
the ICG uses throughout its information products.
A more general observation across ICG reports is that their policy recommen-
dations often do not challenge the policy preferences of major international
actors in a region, for instance those pursued by the USA and its allies regard-
ing the selective application of the responsibility to protect (R2P) and military
intervention. The report on Syria, for example, suggests support for the so-called
Syrian political opposition and marginalisation of the jihadist elements, a
demand made by the Western members of the UN Security Council. Others,
such as the Sri Lanka report, urge that diplomatic pressure be applied to the
government in response to various rights abuses (symbolic rather than substan-
tive action). Again, the values promoted are Western-oriented and of a humani-
tarian nature (emphasising democracy, rule of law, human rights, etc).
The next category of informational product to be examined is briefings,
which are typically 15–20 pages in length. Briefings are formatted as being
either policy briefings or update briefings. Seven briefings were viewed for this
article, five policy briefs and three update briefs, analysing their content and
style.
53
The familiar narrative of a weak government in need of specific guid-
ance and support in order to secure and/or consolidate certain human values is
present in all briefings. This is again located within the context of the three dif-
ferent elements of a crisis. Two policy briefs –on the aftermath of the over-
throw of President Morsi in Egypt and on elections in Somalia –are directed at
emerging issues that would not seem currently to possess any set policy. As
Third World Quarterly 589
Downloaded by [Gregory Simons] at 06:09 18 July 2014
Citations (6)
References (69)
… There are three different elements of perception that need to be simultaneously managed by decision makers in order to declare a phenomenon a crisis: first, the threat to basic values; second, a sense of urgency; and third, the issue of uncertainty (Simons, 2014). The Crisis management forming 4 stages (prevention, preparedness, response, and reconstruction)is a tough task for political and bureaucratic leaders.The prime reason is that the requisites of crisis leadership are at odds with the requirements of effective reform (Boin and ‘T Hart, 2003). …
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… The conclusions are also consistent with other observations focusing on negative effects of the mediatization of politics, such as simplification, personalization, and negative representations of politics favoring conflict (Esser & Matthes, 2013). Clearly, the mass media play a critical role in manufacturing the perceived reality of international crises and shaping public attitudes towards them (Simons, 2014). The news coverage of international conflicts is frequently accompanied by individual opinions, independent interpretations of events, and other examples of slanted reporting. …
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Last Updated: 05 Jul 2022
