Analysis
Brendon J. Cannon
1. Introduction
Somalia’s 2017 presidential election was billed as an opportunity for
hope in a country that has not had a viable government able to broadcast
power across the country for over 25 years. Though it was far from
the one person, one vote election initially promised – reportedly on
account of the parlous security situation – it did produce unexpected
and (to some) welcome results.1
The victory of Mohamed Abdullahi
Mohamed, known popularly as “Farmajo”, was welcomed with dancing and demonstrations of pleasure from the streets of Mogadishu’s to Jijiga in neighboring Ethiopia and Garissa in next-door Kenya. Farmajo’s populist rhetoric, sprinkled with anti-Ethiopian invective and promises for jobs and peace in Somalia resonated with a number of Somali citizens. Yet Somalia’s election results also demonstrated structural
factors that are potentially less welcome – factors that Farmajo
and his allies appear to have been influenced by and were able to
exploit. First, Somalia’s recent election, particularly the run-up to the election finally held in February 2017 (after multiple postponements), demonstrated the number of foreign actors with a stake in Somalia’s future is growing and changing as is the amount of foreign influence and its limits in Somali politics. Second, the election showed just how reviled and discredited the previous presidential administration of Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud had become. Third, the results display the amount of foreign influence in Somali domestic politics and therefore
the limits of Farmajo’s (or any other SFG president’s) mandate, to
include the ability to chart a truly independent policy agenda. Fourth,
the elections demonstrated that foreign money exercised a critical factor in electoral success, but that the choice of candidate was in some senses predicated by the demands of the “Somali street.”
2. Background
In mid-2016, a vote resulting in the election of a relative outsider as
president of the Somalia Federal Government (SFG) appeared next to
impossible. In this not-so-distant past, all bets were that then-President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was almost certain to win. This was not necessarily because he had been a particularly able or effective leader.
Indeed, the rosy prognostications that accompanied his election in
2012 largely came to naught.2
Nor was Hassan Sheikh popular. Rather, the money was on him because he had proved particularly adept in exploiting and expanding the levers of power and reach of state intimidation at his disposal. Additionally, Hassan Sheikh was able to rely on the firm political and financial support of key foreign backers as well as exploit the fact that his major electoral opponents were themselves weak, discredited or both. Indeed, if the election had been held as initially scheduled in mid-2017, Hassan Sheikh would have almost certainly been reelected for six reasons:
1. Lack of credible or viable opposition candidates
2. The size of Hassan Sheikh’s election war chest
3. Hassan Sheikh’s ability to broadcast power through the
use of force and intimidation
4. Hassan Sheikh’s financial support from Turkey, financial
and political support from the UK, and political support
from Ethiopia
5. Clumsy political machinations of various states or their
corresponding inability to locate a viable opposition candidate
acceptable to the “Somali street”
6. A neutral or disinterested United States
In the lead up to the election, one article reported, “More than 20 presidential hopefuls are running. Analysts contend that President [Hassan Sheikh] Mohamud has a good chance of keeping his office because he has received millions of dollars from Turkey and the United Arab Emirates to buy enough votes from the Parliament members who will vote for a new president. Turkey, the analysts said, has invested millions in Mogadishu’s port and airport.” (3)
Additionally, “… the Emirates
and Qatar are backing different candidates here in a rivalry over the
Muslim Brotherhood, while Egypt and Ethiopia are supporting different
candidates because of their duel over the Nile.”4
While capturing the complexity and number of international actors, the analysis simplified and therefore misconstrued the true fault lines and rivalries at play in Somalia’s presidential election.
This article focuses on six states which attempted to influence the
outcome of the 2017 Somalia presidential elections, only one of which is located in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, the article mentions the role of the United States of America (US), but only insofar as it remained a disinterested actor with the potential to have played a
significant role had the domestic situation in the US been different.
Importantly, for reasons of time and space, this article does not broach
the role played by major international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) or bodies within the UN such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), all of which continue to be powerful political and economic actors in Somalia. It also does not take into account the relatively important military and political role of Kenya given uncertainty over Nairobi’s true interests vis-à-vis the 2017 presidential candidates.
Lastly, it only briefly mentions formerly powerful political
actors in Somalia such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia which appear, for
the time being, to have shifted their focus elsewhere; Egypt to its internal
political situation and Saudi Arabia to Yemen and its domestic
situation.
This article subscribes to the oft-proved theory that states have
interests and those generally revolve around power, both the projection of power as well as the maintenance thereof; its loss and/or gain.
A necessary follow-on to this is the idea that states often intervene in
the affairs of other states in order to balance or hedge their interests
and, ideally, to gain power and influence within that state. The list of states attempting to influence the outcome of elections, democratic or
not, ranges from the United States in Chile in 1964, to Russia in the
2016 US elections, to Qatar in Egypt’s 2011 Arab Spring revolution
and the election of the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammed Morsi as president in 2012. Various schools of international relations
thought attempt to explain the motivation for external involvement
in elections in vastly different ways.5
For some, it is driven simply by an attempt to gain influence within that state as a means of increasing
power relative to other external actors. Others, however, point to more ideational motives, such as preference for the political stance of a particular candidate. This was likely the case in Qatar’s and Turkey’s overt support for Mohammed Morsi in Egypt during his brief tenure. Which side an external actor chooses to support is unlikely to be devoid of self-interest, even if assistance is veiled in the language of democracy
promotion. The case of US involvement in Nicaragua in 2006 is instructive, for example. When states choose to engage in such behavior and when is the subject of much debate. However, what is not in question is that states do engage in this behavior.
In the case of Somalia’s presidential election, the plethora of state
actors attempting to influence it sets it apart from say US engagement in Chile or Russian attempts to influence the US elections. A second differentiator is the fact that the most influential actors turned out to be small or medium rising powers such as Turkey, the UAE or Qatar.
Thirdly, these states’ actions tended to displace or usurp the influential
roles played by other small-to-medium powers such as Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, which had held sway in Somalia since the 1970s. Lastly,
states such as Turkey and Qatar played roles that displaced arguably
more powerful actors with a longer history of engagement in Somalia
such as the US and the UK. However, this is not necessarily indicative of long-term change and was more the result of disinterest or lack of salience of this election in Washington DC and, to a lesser degree, in London, as discussed in greater detail below.
What is important to understand prior to a discussion of external
actors and their role and rationale for influencing the election is
that their engagement in Somalia may be viewed, for the most part,
from the vantage point of emerging power diplomacy. Diplomacy and
recognition play central roles in the conventional conferral of state
legitimacy and functioning of the inter-state system. They focus on
sovereignty and legitimacy; the diplomatic relationships fostered as
well as the institutions of diplomacy constructed; and the strategic
position of such diplomacy vis-à-vis the conventional state-system.6
Andrew Cooper and Dennis Flemes focus on specific riddles about the
foreign policy strategies of emerging powers like Turkey. While they focus heavily on Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the
BRICS), they attempt to also provide answers to whether the preference
of emerging powers is to utilize established institutions or to use
parallel and/or competitive mechanisms. The authors also look at the balance between material interests, status-enhancement, and identity issues as motivators for policy preferences.
In the case of Turkey, its actions in Somalia may largely be explained by its interest in accruing political capital in the form of international prestige. These developed
organically and were most likely unintended outcomes, at least initially, in what was at first a humanitarian mission, as demonstrated below.
3. Genesis of Power and Intimidation
A splinter group from al Islah (the Somali branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), Damul Jadiid (new blood) reportedly worked behind the scenes to elect Hassan Sheikh, an obscure and largely unknown local
academic, in 2012.9
They were helped in this effort by Qatari money, reportedly secured by Fahad Yasin Tahir, formerly a member of religiously
militant Al-Itihad Al-Islami (AIAI), and the Chief of Staff for
President Farmajo.(10)
After his election, Hassan Sheikh and his Damul Jadiid allies sidelined
Fahad Yasin (and Fahad’s protégé, Farmajo) and cemented their
hold on power and monopoly on the use of force and government by
assuming key posts in the SFG. These reportedly included the ministries of justice, interior and the minister of state for the presidency.(11)
By actively being able to utilize the forces at his disposal – his powerful
kin (Hawiye), the military, the intelligence services, the treasury
and Damul-Jadid – the president was by far the most powerful Somali political stakeholder to contest the 2017 presidential race. Furthermore, he was the incumbent – a factor that should have worked for him but, given his track record in power, may have ultimately worked against his reelection chances given anger and frustration on the street and in the diaspora over corruption, mismanagement and paltry economic growth.
Until mid-January 2017, the Somali electorate faced a choice between
a corrupt current president, Hassan Sheikh; a corrupt and discredited
ex-president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; and a corrupt prime
minister, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. This list of choices arguably favored the chances of a viable opposition candidate or pool of contenders who would then nominate a titular candidate. However, Somalia’s stakeholders, both in-country and the diaspora, appeared unable to coalesce around or support a particular candidate. That a relative outsider, Farmajo was able to ride a late wave of support had less to do with his populism, clean hands and apparent popularity than with an understanding that none of the other candidates, to include
then-President Hassan Sheikh, were viable as the face of a new Somali
government – both internally and externally – on account of reportedly
massive corruption and mismanagement.12 There was a palpable sense of anger on the streets of Mogadishu and other major towns and cities in Somalia.(13) There was also a sense of disenchantment among many
in the substantial diaspora communities in London, Toronto and Minneapolis that was informed
by frustration at Hassan Sheikh’s reported penchant of being swayed
to whichever side offered the most money.
4. Election Funding
Anger on the street and amongst the large diaspora was aggravated as the 2017 presidential election campaign became marred by repeated allegations of vote buying.15 In a report issued just prior to the election, Marqaati, a Somali corruption watchdog claimed, “The main contenders
for the presidency, including the incumbent, Hassan Sheikh, stated
that they plan to fight corruption if elected. This is however contradicted by their actions as all are planning to use substantial amounts of money to bribe MPs.”16 Payments of reportedly $500-$1000 were made by various presidential candidates to Somali MPs in order to acquire the 20 signatures of MPs required to be listed as a presidential candidate.
Once this hurdle was cleared, another round of vote buying got
underway, with votes for presidential candidates reportedly costing anywhere from $50K-$100K depending on the influence of the MP. But it seems that while many MPs were willing to take money from Hassan Sheikh and consider voting for him, their voting options remained open until the last minute given the possibility that another bribe may have been on offer.18
This last sentence is crucial to understanding what transpired on
February 8, 2017 in Mogadishu. That is, even though Hassan Sheikh
had a sizeable reelection war chest at his disposal he was unable to
ensure that his bribes resulted in the needed votes to confirm his
reelection. It certainly was not for lack of funds. In power since 2012,
Hassan Sheikh necessarily had access to the significant resources available to residents of Villa Somalia, the presidential building in Mogadishu.
Additionally, he had inked some lucrative tenders, making friends
and enemies (inside and outside Somalia) in the process. Foremost
among these were the contracts for the running and operation of Mogadishu’s
international airport and the Port of Mogadishu. Both of these
were awarded to Turkish companies with strong ties to the AK Party
the airport and port are estimated to run anywhere between $11 and
$20 million, per month.19 Turkey and Turkish companies have been
commended for competently upgrading and successfully operating this critical infrastructure. And while the exact figures flowing to Villa
Somalia are uncertain, under the terms of the 20-year port agreement
between Turkish firm Al-Bayrak and the Somalia Federal Government
(SFG) of Hassan Sheikh, 55% of revenue generated at the seaport will go to the SFG and the remaining 45% to Al-Bayrak.20 This represents
the major source of non-aid revenue for the SFG, thus underscoring
and enhancing Turkey’s critical influence and behind-the-scenes political power in Mogadishu.
None of the opposition candidates running against the president, to
include those who appeared to be his closest rivals had access, at least initially, to even a fraction of this revenue stream. Yet Hassan Sheikh did lose the election. In order to understand why, an exploration of
pivotal states and their attempts to influence the election is in order.
5. Turkey
Turkey maintained a stance of strict public neutrality during the period
leading up to Somalia’s presidential election. But Turkey is a powerful
political actor in Somalia. Since 2011, Turkey has made Somalia a major focus of its foreign policy and its presence in Somalia certainly embodies one of the most interesting, but widely misunderstood regional
geopolitical developments in the past decade.
Genuine humanitarian concerns, at least initially, drove Turkey’s
engagement in efforts to alleviate a widespread and devastating
famine in 2011-2012.21 The prospect of economic gain has played an equally important role in Turkey’s developing relationship with Somalia.
In the six years spanning 2011-2017, Turkey moved from being an economic footnote in Somalia to its fifth-biggest source of imports.(22 )
Turkey’s engagement has been unique in that it is tangible and lasting in the form of hospitals, schools and roads.23 Less tactile forms of aid such as scholarships, training and diplomatic efforts aimed at fostering political dialogue are targeted, coordinated from Ankara, and largely unilateral in nature.(24)
As Turkey’s initial investments and efforts for influence in Somalia
paid off in the form of infrastructure contracts, to include Mogadishu’s
international airport and its seaport.25 Turkey’s control of Somalia’s most critical and lucrative infrastructure along with its substantial humanitarian aid necessarily make Turkey an important political actor
in Somalia because of the leverage over, and relationship it has, with
the SFG.26 Turkey’s clout has only grown with the October 2017 opening of a military training facility in Mogadishu.27 This will reportedly
train up to 22,000 members of the Somali National Army and potentially have major ramifications on the broadcast of power by the SFG.
This means that Turkey has become one of the most significant actors
in the calculations of Somali politicians.(28) Given Turkey’s significant investment and political leverage in Somalia, Turkey had many reasons to desire the reelection of Hassan
Sheikh. The president’s favoritism towards Turkey in the form of
lucrative contracts was itself a byproduct of Turkey’s unilateral, highly personal, and coordinated approach to Somalia.(29) Turkey’s approach included allegations of bribery and corruption that further enriched Villa Somalia and resulted in Turkish firms winning control of Somalia’s two biggest revenue earners, the port and airport. Yet, the president’s desire to work with Turkey, as well as Qatar and Egypt (under former president Mohamed Morsi), was reportedly driven by the reorientation of Somalia’s foreign policy away from IGAD and the African Union towards the Muslim Brotherhood world preferred by his Damul Jadiid allies and supporters.30 Perhaps most importantly, Qatari money
and support for his election as president swayed Hassan Sheikh to be at least initially supportive of Doha’s foreign policy aims in Somalia, as discussed in section IX.
Turkey’s support of Hassan Sheikh reportedly emanated less from
an affinity for the president and more from a wish for continuity and
continued access to the levers of Somali power and profit. Ankara realized that a change in leadership could also mean a change to their contracts.
This is not without precedent, as Hassan Sheikh’s shady award
of the airport contract to the Turkish firm Favori, LLC – at the expense
of Dubai-based and South African-staffed SKA International Group –
could be performed by his successor with a resultant loss to Turkey.
6. The United Kingdom
The UK, for reasons of expediency and political capital, wished, like
Turkey and Ethiopia, to see Hassan Sheikh remain in power. During
his tenure, powerful members of the UK government establishment,
to include former Conservative Party leader Lord Michael Howard of Lympne CH, QC were instrumental in a deal signed in August 2013 between the London-based oil company, Soma Oil & Gas, and the SFG to conduct seismic surveys. The deal reportedly involved the payment of hundreds of thousands of dollars to key figures in the SFG by Soma
Oil & Gas in return for oil and gas exploration rights.43 Allegations of
serious fraud were raised by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia
and Eritrea and the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) launched an investigation into the deal in mid-2015. The SFO dropped the investigation in late 2016, even though “there were reasonable grounds to suspect
the commission of offences involving corruption.”44
UK citizens were also involved in the so-called Fishguard scandal
wherein Mauritius-registered Somalia-Fishguard Ltd., run by former British army soldiers David Walker and Simon Falkner, was given the rights to manage all aspects of Somalia’s fishing industry. This included
the issuance of fishing permits worth millions of dollars for the rights to fish off Somalia’s lengthy coastline.45 According to one study, the illegal foreign fishing taking place in Somalia’s territorial waters in 2015, for example, was worth an estimated $306 million a year.46
Numerous Britons have reportedly utilized their positions, or been
“deployed” from London, to influence and curry favor with Mogadishu.
They furthered business contracts and organized conferences in
London in order to maintain British influence in the face of stiff competition from Turkey and Turkish businesses as well as to split Somalia from certain Arab states, particularly those in the Gulf and Egypt, in order to expand British economic and political influence by removing competitors.47 These have included Hassan Sheikh’s PR advisor circa 2013, Richard Bailey, whose salary was reportedly paid by the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); Deborah (Bella) Bird, the
World Bank country director for Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan; and Justin Marozzi, the former PR advisor to Prime Minister Abdi Farah
Shirdon. Louise Cottar, variously described as a Horn of Africa expert
and low-level advisor to the UN, was personally requested by Hassan
Sheikh48 to act as a buffer between his administration and the UN
Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea coordinated by Jarat Cho
pra, whose questions and subsequent report incensed Villa Somalia and many powerful Britons alike.49
Perhaps the most visible and powerful role has been played by
Nicholas Kay, variously the head of the UN’s integrated mission to
Somalia (UNSOM) and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (UN SRSG).50 The role these individuals played in concert with London was described by one former Somalia government official as “… the most corrupt Europeans… I’ve ever come in contact with.”51
Given the UK’s influence through individuals such as these, as well
as its donor contributions and powerful NGO and governmental overseas aid actors such as the Department for International Development (DFID), it has supported initiatives in venues such as the UN that furthered
its own agenda as well as those of Hassan Sheikh. For example,
the UK offered its support for a UN Security Council agreement to ease
a decades-old arms embargo in March 2013, despite serious concerns.52
7. Qatar
Qatar has played a powerful role in Somalia’s politics for over a decade
despite its small size and population. However, Qatar’s foreign policy impetus and objectives in Somalia are something of a black box. David B. Roberts has argued that Qatar has consistently attempted to distance itself from the long shadow cast by Saudi Arabia.53 It has used its 1992 defense cooperation agreement with the United States, which
allows the U.S. military use of Al Udeid Air Base as a tool to discourage any overt meddling by Saudi Arabia. At the same time, its rulers have used the soft power tools at the disposal of their compact, uberhierarchical,
oil-rich state to ensure its indispensability to multiple,
powerful states.54 Qatar’s role has annoyed its close neighbors from
time to time55 and alarmed regional actors who have borne the brunt
of Qatar’s mediation and peacekeeping efforts.56 However, its actions in support of overt political Islamist actors across the Middle East, particularly post-2011, have made Qatar’s position arguably untenable as it reportedly lost control of the very Islamist actors it supported and led directly to the ongoing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis,
Regardless of the outcome, Qatar’s use of Islamists to further its
influence and distance its foreign policy from that of its neighbors is
one of the defining factors of its foreign policy. In the case of Somalia
Qatar’s role only began in 2006. Mohamed Hussein Gaas presciently
noted that prior to that time, Qatar possessed no local connections or
legitimacy.58 However, with the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC), their short-lived rule and the subsequent atomization of Islamist
movements in Somalia, Qatar began to seriously engage with various
Islamist factions and former UIC members, attempting to influence
politics through personal and religious networks and, crucially, members of the Somali diaspora. “Often Qatar’s support [to its allies] was via Islamist linkages. This reflected a certain practicality given existing connections the Qatari elite had across the region. Equally, [Qatar’s ruler] and his advisors were also content to support and empower a broad range of Islamists, not least because they believed the time for moderate Islam to play a role in regional politics had arrived. Consequently,
they reasoned, supporting such a movement early on would
be a savvy political gamble for Qatar.”59 Indeed, influential diaspora members reportedly negotiated the arrival of some of the UIC leadership, to include Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, to Qatar after Ethiopia invaded Somalia and ended the UIC’s rule. Sheikh Sharif was feted in Doha after his arrival in 2007, to include an interview with Al Jazeera.
Sheikh Sharif was subsequently elected in 2009, possibly with the
assistance of significant Qatari funding, but fell out with Doha when
it insisted on expanding the government to include violent Islamists such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and his Hisbul Islam. By 2012, Qatar had dropped Sheikh Sharif in favor of a little-known academic, Hassan Sheikh, who was promptly elected, reportedly with Fahad Yasin’s assistance in the form of Qatari monetary support.61
During his tenure, Hassan Sheikh alienated himself from Fahad
Yasin and Qatar by refusing to appoint Farmajo, someone who both Doha and their ally in Mogadishu, Fahad Yasin, assessed could influence Hassan Sheikh to make decisions in their favor. Doha withdrew its support for Hassan Sheikh and instead supported Farmajo in the 2017 presidential election with money again couriered from Doha by Fahad Yasin.62 Qatari money and Fahad Yasin’s organizational support proved absolutely critical to the outcome resulting in Farmajo’s election. For example, Fahad Yasin reportedly recruited key defectors
and insiders from Hassan Sheikh’s administration such as Hassan
Ali Kheyre, Thabit Mohamed, Jamal Mohamed Hassan, and Mustaf
Dhuxulow.63 From his base at the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu, Fahad
Yasin was reportedly provided with secret and sensitive information
by these individuals that informed the timing and direction of bribery
payments to Somali politicians casting their votes.
Interestingly, Qatar’s role in Somalia, given its role as kingmaker for
the past two presidents, remains largely invisible beyond money and
key Somali allies. This separates it from Turkey’s visible and overt role
of port and airport operator, military training facilitator, and its plethora
of humanitarian and business actors operating in and around the
capital. Indeed, Turkey’s and Qatar’s roles in Somalia, while perhaps
complimentary by nature, have not until recently been so by design
despite divergent arguments and misleading hyperbole.65 Indeed, perceptions to the contrary that see Turkey’s and Qatar’s role in Somalia as lock-step are informed by analysis and commentary on the GCC crisis which erupted in June 2017. Pitting Qatar against the KSA, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, developments in Somalia are viewed through the lens
of this crisis. Given that Qatar’s and Turkey’s involvement in Somalia
began at different times and for very different reasons, they thus
should not be viewed as having always been (and perhaps not even
now) mutually constitutive or supportive.
8. Italy
Italy’s desire to affect change in Somalia can be said to be motivated
by a combination of colonial nostalgia,66 a desire to influence events
beyond Italy, control of offshore oil and gas blocks and, to a lesser
degree, making Somalia a stronger destination market for Italian
goods.67 To this end, Italy attempted to influence the 2017 election in
Somalia in its favor by leveraging its European Union (EU) role. Italy
was able to exert large amounts of control over EU policy vis-à-vis
Somalia because of its “colonial expertise” embodied in the role played
by Michele Cervone d’Urso, EU Special Envoy and first EU Ambassador
for Somalia.68 Thus, by effectively guiding EU policy vis-à-vis
Somalia and directing the EU’s significant financial aid in country, Italy has punched above its weight both in Somalia and at international conferences and meetings on Somalia. It also reportedly has consistently fed the EU information that was necessarily colored by Italian bias, arguably influencing EU policy and priorities.
Given its importance, leverage and gravitas, Italy attempted to
convince regional powers such as the UAE and Ethiopia that Hassan
Sheikh’s choice for Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke was
a viable candidate.70 While there is little evidence that Italy’s choice of
candidate ever held any sway in Addis Ababa it did play a role in Abu
Dhabi’s political calculations, as discussed in the next section. Italian
politicians reportedly liked Omar Abdirashid for two reasons. First, he
was not Hassan Sheikh and thus offered Italy a chance to reassert itself
within the ruling elite structure of Mogadishu, a role that had increasingly
been swallowed up by Turkey over the course of Hassan Sheikh’s
tenure. Second, Omar Abdirashid likely supported Italian exploratory
oil blocks – granted by Kenya to Italian multinational oil and gas company ENI S.p.A. – off the coast of Somalia and Kenya.71 Evidence of Italy’s favoritism for Omar was evidenced by a series of high-level
meetings in Rome and an official state visit with Italian Prime Minister
Matteo Renzi in May 2016. This dovetailed rather neatly with Renzi’s
public declaration to re-engage with Africa and ENI’s commitment to
invest $20 billion in Africa in the four years from 2016.72
Italy became increasingly concerned over the moves made by Hassan Sheikh’s administration to change the maritime border of Kenya and Somalia. The government of Hassan Sheikh insisted that Somalia’s
maritime border with Kenya should be drawn in a southeasterly direction
following the same line as the Kenya-Somalia border as it meets
the Indian Ocean (rather than stretching due east as Kenya insists).
When Somalia took Kenya to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in 2015,73 Italian politicians and oil interests were alarmed given ENI’s
outstanding blocks in the Indian Ocean were now in jeopardy should
the ICJ rule in favor of Somalia. As Fasil Amdetsion noted, “Perhaps
no Italian company better epitomizes opacity in its operations, and
intertwinement of state and corporate interests, than ENI… The Italian
government is a major shareholder in ENI, and ENI too has long had a
revolving door between its business and government.”74 Indeed, Renzi
baldly noted on national television “ENI is a fundamental component
of our energy policy, our foreign policy, our intelligence policy. By
intelligence, I mean our secret services.”
Given the amount of state and industry collusion and deep fiscal
and strategic interests offshore in the Horn of Africa region, Italy
threw its support to Omar Abdirashid. It did so because of the role he
had previously played as Prime Minister under the former TFG President
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. During his tenure, Omar ordered
the then Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Abdirahman
Abdishakur Warsame to sign a controversial memorandum of
understanding (MoU) with Kenya. This MoU reportedly renounced
Somalia’s claims to the now contested maritime border by affirming
Qatar’s role only began in 2006. Mohamed Hussein Gaas presciently
noted that prior to that time, Qatar possessed no local connections or
legitimacy.58 However, with the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC), their short-lived rule and the subsequent atomization of Islamist
movements in Somalia, Qatar began to seriously engage with various
Islamist factions and former UIC members, attempting to influence
politics through personal and religious networks and, crucially, members
of the Somali diaspora. “Often Qatar’s support [to its allies] was
via Islamist linkages. This reflected a certain practicality given existing
connections the Qatari elite had across the region. Equally, [Qatar’s
ruler] and his advisors were also content to support and empower a
broad range of Islamists, not least because they believed the time for
moderate Islam to play a role in regional politics had arrived. Consequently,
they reasoned, supporting such a movement early on would
be a savvy political gamble for Qatar.”59 Indeed, influential diaspora
members reportedly negotiated the arrival of some of the UIC leadership,
to include Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, to Qatar after Ethiopia invaded
Somalia and ended the UIC’s rule. Sheikh Sharif was feted in Doha
after his arrival in 2007, to include an interview with Al Jazeera.60
Sheikh Sharif was subsequently elected in 2009, possibly with the
assistance of significant Qatari funding, but fell out with Doha when
it insisted on expanding the government to include violent Islamists such as Hassan Dahir Aweys and his Hisbul Islam. By 2012, Qatar had dropped Sheikh Sharif in favor of a little-known academic, Hassan Sheikh, who was promptly elected, reportedly with Fahad Yasin’s assistance in the form of Qatari monetary support.61
During his tenure, Hassan Sheikh alienated himself from Fahad
Yasin and Qatar by refusing to appoint Farmajo, someone who both Doha and their ally in Mogadishu, Fahad Yasin, assessed could influence Hassan Sheikh to make decisions in their favor. Doha withdrew its support for Hassan Sheikh and instead supported Farmajo in the 2017 presidential election with money again couriered from Doha by Fahad Yasin.62 Qatari money and Fahad Yasin’s organizational support
proved absolutely critical to the outcome resulting in Farmajo’s
election. For example, Fahad Yasin reportedly recruited key defectors
and insiders from Hassan Sheikh’s administration such as Hassan
Ali Kheyre, Thabit Mohamed, Jamal Mohamed Hassan, and Mustaf
Dhuxulow.63 From his base at the Jazeera Hotel in Mogadishu, Fahad
Yasin was reportedly provided with secret and sensitive information
by these individuals that informed the timing and direction of bribery
payments to Somali politicians casting their votes.
Interestingly, Qatar’s role in Somalia, given its role as kingmaker for
the past two presidents, remains largely invisible beyond money and
key Somali allies. This separates it from Turkey’s visible and overt role
of port and airport operator, military training facilitator, and its plethora
of humanitarian and business actors operating in and around the
capital. Indeed, Turkey’s and Qatar’s roles in Somalia, while perhaps
complimentary by nature, have not until recently been so by design
despite divergent arguments and misleading hyperbole.65 Indeed, perceptions to the contrary that see Turkey’s and Qatar’s role in Somalia as lock-step are informed by analysis and commentary on the GCC crisis which erupted in June 2017. Pitting Qatar against the KSA, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, developments in Somalia are viewed through the lens
of this crisis. Given that Qatar’s and Turkey’s involvement in Somalia
began at different times and for very different reasons, they thus
should not be viewed as having always been (and perhaps not even
now) mutually constitutive or supportive.
9. Italy
Italy’s desire to affect change in Somalia can be said to be motivated
by a combination of colonial nostalgia,66 a desire to influence events beyond Italy, control of offshore oil and gas blocks and, to a lesser
degree, making Somalia a stronger destination market for Italian
goods.67 To this end, Italy attempted to influence the 2017 election in Somalia in its favor by leveraging its European Union (EU) role. Italy was able to exert large amounts of control over EU policy vis-à-vis Somalia because of its “colonial expertise” embodied in the role played by Michele Cervone d’Urso, EU Special Envoy and first EU Ambassador for Somalia.68 Thus, by effectively guiding EU policy vis-à-vis Somalia and directing the EU’s significant financial aid in country, Italy has punched above its weight both in Somalia and at international conferences and meetings on Somalia. It also reportedly has consistently fed the EU information that was necessarily colored by Italian bias, arguably influencing EU policy and priorities.
Given its importance, leverage and gravitas, Italy attempted to
convince regional powers such as the UAE and Ethiopia that Hassan
Sheikh’s choice for Prime Minister, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke was
a viable candidate.70 While there is little evidence that Italy’s choice of
candidate ever held any sway in Addis Ababa it did play a role in Abu
Dhabi’s political calculations, as discussed in the next section. Italian
politicians reportedly liked Omar Abdirashid for two reasons. First, he
was not Hassan Sheikh and thus offered Italy a chance to reassert itself within the ruling elite structure of Mogadishu, a role that had increasingly been swallowed up by Turkey over the course of Hassan Sheikh’s tenure. Second, Omar Abdirashid likely supported Italian exploratory oil blocks – granted by Kenya to Italian multinational oil and gas company ENI S.p.A. – off the coast of Somalia and Kenya.71 Evidence of Italy’s favoritism for Omar was evidenced by a series of high-level meetings in Rome and an official state visit with Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi in May 2016. This dovetailed rather neatly with Renzi’s public declaration to re-engage with Africa and ENI’s commitment to invest $20 billion in Africa in the four years from 2016.
Italy became increasingly concerned over the moves made by Hassan Sheikh’s administration to change the maritime border of Kenya and Somalia. The government of Hassan Sheikh insisted that Somalia’s maritime border with Kenya should be drawn in a southeasterly direction
following the same line as the Kenya-Somalia border as it meets
the Indian Ocean (rather than stretching due east as Kenya insists).
When Somalia took Kenya to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
in 2015,73 Italian politicians and oil interests were alarmed given ENI’s
outstanding blocks in the Indian Ocean were now in jeopardy should
the ICJ rule in favor of Somalia. As Fasil Amdetsion noted, “Perhaps
no Italian company better epitomizes opacity in its operations, and intertwinement of state and corporate interests, than ENI… The Italian government is a major shareholder in ENI, and ENI too has long had a revolving door between its business and government.”74 Indeed, Renzi baldly noted on national television “ENI is a fundamental component
of our energy policy, our foreign policy, our intelligence policy. By
intelligence, I mean our secret services.”
Given the amount of state and industry collusion and deep fiscal
and strategic interests offshore in the Horn of Africa region, Italy
threw its support to Omar Abdirashid. It did so because of the role he had previously played as Prime Minister under the former TFG President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. During his tenure, Omar ordered the then
